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RE:

Date 12/30/75

DIRECTORS APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES,
DECEMBER 10, 1975

☐ For information ☐ Retention optional ☐ For appropriate action ☐ Surep, by _____

☐ The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, ☐ conceal all sources, ☐ paraphrase contents.

☐ Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA _____ dated _____

Remarks:

ReButel to all SACs and Legats, 12/10/75.

Enclosed for each Office and Legat is one copy of the transcript of questions which were asked Mr. Kelley during captioned appearance, along with Mr. Kelley's answers to those questions.

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Vol. 20

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The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations

With Respect to Intelligence Activities

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

Wednesday, December 10, 1975

Washington, D. C.

WARD & PAUL

410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

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ENCLOSURE

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C O N T E N T

STATEMENT OF:

PAGE

The Honorable Clarence M. Kelley,
Direcotor, Federal Bureau of Inve-
stigation

2451

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

- - -

Wednesday, December 10, 1975

- - -

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10
o'clock a.m., in Room 318, Russell Senate Office Building,
the honorable Frank Church (Chairman of the Committee)
presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan,
Mondale, Huddleston, Hart of Colorado, Baker, Goldwater and
Mathias.

Also present: William G. Miller, Staff Director; Frederick
A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority
Counsel; Paul Michel, Joseph diGenova, Barbara Banoff, Frederick
Baron, Mark Gitenstein, Loch Johnson, David Bushong, Charles
Lombard, John Bayly, Charles Kirbow, Michael Madigan, Bob
Kelley, John Elliff, Elliot Maxwell, Andy Postal, Pat Shea,
Michael Epstein and Burt Wides, Professional Staff Members.

- - -

The Chairman. The Committee's witness this morning is

1 the Honorable Clarence M. Kelley, the Director of the Federal
2 Bureau of Investigation.

3 Mr. Kelley was appointed Director in July of 1973 in a
4 troubled time for the FBI. His experience as an innovative
5 law enforcement administrator in charge of the Kansas City
6 Police Department for over ten years, and his previous work as
7 a Special Agent of the FBI have made him uniquely qualified
8 to lead the Bureau.

9 The Select Committee is grateful for the cooperation
10 extended by Director Kelley in the course of its inquiry over
11 the past months. The Committee is also impressed by the
12 openness of the FBI's witnesses before this Committee, and
13 their willingness to consider the need for legislation to
14 clarify the Bureau's intelligence responsibility.

15 It is important to remember from the outset that this
16 Committee is examining only a small portion of the FBI's
17 activities. Our hearings have concentrated on FBI domestic
18 intelligence operations. We have consistently expressed our
19 admiration and support for the Bureau's criminal investigative
20 and law enforcement work, and we recognize the vital importance
21 of counterespionage in the modern world. But domestic
22 intelligence has raised many difficult questions.

23 The Committee has also concentrated on the past rather
24 than on present FBI activities. The abuses brought to light
25 in our hearings occurred years and even decades before Director

1 Kelley took charge.

2 The Staff has advised the Committee that under Director
3 Kelley the FBI has taken significant steps to rethink previous
4 policies and to establish new safeguards against abuse. The
5 FBI is now placing greater emphasis on foreign related intelli-
6 gence operations, and less on purely domestic surveillance.
7 The FBI is working more closely with the Justice Department in
8 developing policies and standards for intelligence. These
9 are welcome developments.

10 Nevertheless, many important issues remain unresolved.
11 Therefore, we have invited Director Kelley to share with the
12 Committee his views on some of the considerations the Congress
13 should take into account in thinking about the future of
14 FBI intelligence. Among these issues are whether FBI surveil-
15 lance should extend beyond the investigation of persons
16 likely to commit specific crimes; whether there should be
17 outside supervision or approval before the FBI conducts certain
18 types of investigations or uses certain surveillance techniques;
19 whether foreign related intelligence activities should be
20 strictly separated from the FBI's domestic law enforcement
21 functions, and what should be done to the information already
22 in the FBI files and that which may go into those files in
23 the future.

24 The Committee looks forward to a constructive exchange
25 of views with Director Kelley this morning, with Attorney

1 General Levi tomorrow, and with both the FBI and the Justice
2 Department in the next months as the Committee considers
3 recommendations that will strengthen the American people's
4 confidence in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. That
5 confidence is vital for the effective enforcement of Federal
6 law and for the security of the nation against foreign
7 espionage.

8 Director Kelley, we are pleased to welcome you, and if
9 you would have a prepared statement you would like to lead off
10 with, please proceed.

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1 STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CLARENCE M. KELLEY,
2 DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

3 Mr. Kelley. Thank you very much, Senator Church and
4 gentlemen.

5 I welcome the interest which this Committee has shown in
6 the FBI and most particularly in our operations in the intelli-
7 gence and internal security fields.

8 I share your high regard for the rights guaranteed by the
9 Constitution and laws of the United States. Throughout my
10 35 year career in law enforcement you will find the same insis-
11 tence, as has been expressed by this Committee, upon programs
12 of law enforcement that are themselves fully consistent with
13 law.

14 I also have strongly supported the concept of legislative
15 oversight. In fact, at the time my appointment as Director of
16 the FBI and was being considered by the Senate Judiciary
17 Committee two and one half years ago, I told the members of
18 that Committee of my firm belief in Congressional oversight.

19 This Committee has completed the most exhaustive study
20 of our intelligence and security operations that has ever been
21 undertaken by anyone outside the FBI other than the present
22 Attorney General. At the outset, we pledged our fullest
23 cooperation and promised to be as candid and forthright as
24 possible in responding to your questions and complying with your
25 requests.

1 I believe we have lived up to those promises.

2 The members and staff of this Committee have had unprece-
3 dented access to FBI information.

4 You have talked to the personnel who conduct security-type
5 investigations and who are personally involved in every facet
6 of our day-to-day intelligence operations.

7 You have attended numerous briefings by FBI officials who
8 have sought to familiarize the Committee and its staff with
9 all major areas of our activities and operations in the national
10 security and intelligence fields.

11 In brief, you have had firsthand examination of these
12 matters that is unmatched at any time in the history of the
13 Congress.

14 As this Committee has stated, these hearings have, of
15 necessity, focused largely on certain errors and abuses. I
16 credit this Committee for its forthright recognition that the
17 hearings do not give a full or balanced account of the FBI's
18 record of performance.

19 It is perhaps in the nature of such hearings to focus
20 on abuses to the exclusion of positive accomplishments of the
21 organization.

22 The Counterintelligence Programs which have received the
23 lion's share of public attention and critical comment constituted
24 an infinitesimal portion of our overall work.

25 A Justice Department Committee which was formed last year

1 to conduct a thorough study of the FBI's Counterintelligence
2 Programs has reported that in the five basic ones it found
3 3,247 Counterintelligence Programs were submitted to FBI
4 Headquarters from 1956 to 1971. Of this total, 2,370,
5 less than three fourths, were approved.

6 I repeat, the vast majority of those 3,247 proposals were
7 being devised, considered, and many were rejected, in an era
8 when the FBI was handling an average of 700,000 investigative
9 matters per year.

10 Nonetheless, the criticism which has been expressed
11 regarding the Counterintelligence Programs is most legitimate
12 and understandable.

13 The question might well be asked what I had in mind when
14 I stated last year that for the FBI to have done less than it
15 did under the circumstances then existing would have been an
16 abdication of its responsibilities to the American people..

17 What I said then, in 1974, and what I believe today, is
18 that the FBI employees involved in these programs did what they
19 felt was expected of them by the President, the Attorney General,
20 the Congress, and the people of the United States.

21 Bomb explosions rocked public and private offices and
22 buildings; rioters led by revolutionary extremists laid seige
23 to military, industrial, and educational facilities; and
24 killings, maimings, and other atrocities accompanied such
25 acts of violence from New England to California.

1 The victims of these acts were human beings, men, women,
2 and children. As is the case in time of peril, whether real or
3 perceived, they looked to their Government, their elected and
4 appointed leadership, and to the FBI and other law enforcement
5 agencies to protect their lives, their property, and their
6 rights.

7 There were many calls for action from Members of Congress
8 and others, but few guidelines were furnished. The FBI and other
9 law enforcement agencies were besieged by demands, impatient
10 demands, for immediate action.

11 FBI employees recognized the danger; felt they had a
12 responsibility to respond; and in good faith initiated actions
13 designed to counter conspiratorial efforts of self-proclaimed
14 revolutionary groups, and to neutralize violent activities.

15 In the development and execution of these programs,
16 mistakes of judgment admittedly were made.

17 Our concern over whatever abuses occurred in the Counter-
18 intelligence Programs, and there were some substantial ones,
19 should not obscure the underlying purpose of those programs.

20 We must recognize that situations have occurred in the
21 past and will arise in the future where the Government may well
22 be expected to depart from its traditional role, in the FBI's
23 case, as an investigative and intelligence-gathering
24 agency, and take affirmative steps which are needed to meet
25 an imminent threat to human life or property.

1 In short, if we learn a murder or bombing is to be carried
2 out now, can we truly meet our responsibilities by investigating
3 only after the crime has occurred, or should we have the
4 ability to prevent? I refer to those instances where there is
5 a strong sense of urgency because of an imminent threat to
6 human life.

7 Where there exists the potential to penetrate and disrupt,
8 the Congress must consider the question of whether or not such
9 preventive action should be available to the FBI.

10 These matters are currently being addressed by a task
11 force in the Justice Department, including the FBI,
12 and I am confident that Departmental guidelines and controls can
13 be developed in cooperation with pertinent Committees of Congress
14 to insure that such measures are used in an entirely responsible
15 manner.

16 Probably the most important question here today is what
17 assurances I can give that the errors and abuses which arose
18 under the Counterintelligence Programs will not occur again?

19 First, let me assure the Committee that some very sub-
20 stantial changes have been made in key areas of the FBI's
21 methods of operations since I took the oath of office as
22 Director on July 9, 1973.

23 Today we place a high premium on openness, openness
24 both within and without the service.

25 I have instituted a program of open, frank discussion .

1 in the decision-making process which insures that no future
2 program or major policy decision will ever be adopted without a
3 full and critical review of its propriety.

4 Participatory management has become a fact in the FBI.

5 I have made it known throughout our Headquarters and
6 Field Divisions that I welcome all employees, regardless of
7 position or degree of experience, to contribute their thoughts
8 and suggestions, and to voice whatever criticisms or
9 reservations they may have concerning any area of our operations.

10 The ultimate decisions in the Bureau are mine, and I take
11 full responsibility for them. My goal is to achieve maximum
12 critical analysis among our personnel without in any manner
13 weakening or undermining our basic command structure.

14 The results of this program have been most beneficial, to
15 me personally, to the FBI's disciplined performance, and to
16 the morale of our employees.

17 In addition, since some of the mistakes of the past
18 were occasioned by direct orders from higher authorities outside
19 the FBI, we have welcomed Attorney General Edward Levi's
20 guidance, counsel, and his continuous availability, in his
21 own words, "as a 'lightning rod' to deflect improper requests."

22 Within days after taking office, Attorney General Levi
23 instructed that I immediately report to him any requests
24 or practices which, in my judgment, were improper or which,
25 considering the context of the request, I believed presented

1 the appearances of impropriety.

2 I am pleased to report to this Committee as I have to the
3 Attorney General that during my nearly two and one half years as
4 Director under two Presidents and three Attorneys General, no
5 one has approached me or made overtures, directly or otherwise,
6 to use the FBI for partisan political or other improper
7 purposes.

8 I can assure you that I would not for a moment consider
9 honoring any such request.

10 I can assure you, too, in my administration of the FBI
11 I routinely bring to the attention of the Attorney General and
12 the Deputy Attorney General major policy questions, including
13 those which arise in my continuing review of our operations and
14 practices. These are discussed openly and candidly in order
15 that the Attorney General can exercise his responsibilities
16 over the FBI.

17 I am convinced that the basic structure of the FBI today
18 is sound. But it would be a mistake to think that integrity
19 can be assured only through institutional means.

20 Integrity is a human quality. It depends upon the
21 character of the person who occupies the office of the
22 Director and every member of the FBI under him.

23 I am proud of the 19,000 men and women with whom it is
24 my honor to serve today. Their dedication, their professionalism,
25 their standards, and the self-discipline which they personally

1 demand of themselves and expect of their associates are the
2 nation's ultimate assurance of proper and responsible conduct
3 at all times by the FBI.

4 The Congress and the members of this Committee in
5 particular have gained a great insight into the problems
6 confronting the FBI in the security and intelligence fields,
7 problems which all too often we have left to resolve without
8 sufficient guidance from the Executive Branch or the Congress
9 itself.

10 As in all human endeavors, errors of judgment have been
11 made. But no one who is looking for the cause of our
12 failures should confine his search solely to the FBI, or even
13 to the Executive Branch.

14 The Congress itself has long possessed the mechanism for
15 FBI oversight; yet, seldom has it been exercised.

16 An initial step was taken in the Senate in 1973 when the
17 Committee on the Judiciary established a Subcommittee on FBI
18 Oversight. Hearings had been commenced, and we were fully
19 committed to maximum participation with the members of that
20 Subcommittee.

21 I laud their efforts. However, those efforts are of very
22 recent origin in terms of the FBI's history.

23 One of the greatest benefits of the study this Committee
24 has made is the expert knowledge you have gained of the complex
25 problems confronting the FBI. But I respectfully submit that

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1 those benefits are wasted if they do not lead to the next step,
2 a step that I believe is absolutely essential, a legislative
3 charter, expressing Congressional determination of intelligence
4 jurisdiction for the FBI.

5 Action to resolve the problems confronting us in the
6 security and intelligence fields is urgently needed; and it
7 must be undertaken in a forthright manner. Neither the Congress
8 nor the public can afford to look the other way, leaving it to
9 the FBI to do what must be done, as too often has occurred in
10 the past.

11 This means too that Congress must assume a continuing role
12 not in the initial decision-making process but in the review of
13 our performance.

14 I would caution against a too-ready reliance upon the
15 courts to do our tough thinking for us. Some proposals that
16 have been advanced during these hearings would extend the role
17 of the courts into the early stages of the investigative
18 process and, thereby, would take over what historically have
19 been Executive Branch decisions.

20 I frankly feel that such a trend, if unchecked, would
21 seriously undermine the independence of the Judiciary and cast
22 them in a role not contemplated by the authors of our
23 Constitution. Judicial review cannot be a substitute for Con-
24 gressional oversight or Executive decision.

25 The FBI urgently needs a clear and workable determination

1 of our jurisdiction in the intelligence field, a jurisdictional
2 statement that the Congress finds to be responsive to both
3 the will and the needs of the American people.

4 Senators, first and foremost, I am a police officer, a
5 career police officer. In my police experience, the must
6 frustrating of all problems that I have discovered facing
7 law enforcement in this country, Federal, state, and local, is
8 when demands are made of them to perform their traditional
9 role as protector of life and property without clear and
10 understandable legal bases to do so.

11 I recognize that the formulation of such a legislative
12 charter will be a most precise and demanding task.

13 It must be sufficiently flexible that it does not stifle
14 the FBI's effectiveness in combating the growing incidence
15 of crime and violence across the United States. That charter
16 must clearly address the demonstrated problems of the past;
17 yet, it must amply recognize the fact that times change and
18 so also do the nature and thrust of our criminal and subversive
19 challenges.

20 The fact that the Department of Justice has commenced
21 the formulation of operational guidelines governing our
22 intelligence activities does not in any manner diminish the need
23 for legislation. The responsibility for conferring juris-
24 diction resides with the Congress.

25 In this regard, I am troubled by some proposals which

1 question the need for intelligence gathering, suggesting that
2 information needed for the prevention of violence can be
3 acquired in the normal course of criminal investigations.

4 As a practical matter, the line between intelligence
5 work and regular criminal investigations is often difficult
6 to describe. What begins as an intelligence investigation may
7 well end in arrest and prosecution of the subject. But there
8 are some fundamental differences between these investigations
9 that should be recognized, differences in scope, in objective
10 and in the time of initiation. In the usual criminal case, a
11 crime has occurred and it remains only for the Government to
12 identify the perpetrator and to collect sufficient evidence
13 for prosecution. Since the investigation normally follows
14 the elements of the crime, the scope of the inquiry is
15 limited and fairly well defined.

16 By contrast, intelligence work involves the gathering of
17 information, not necessarily evidence. The purpose may well be
18 not to prosecute, but to thwart crime or to insure that the
19 Government has enough information to meet any future crisis
20 or emergency. The inquiry is necessarily broad because it
21 must tell us not only the nature of the threat, but also whether
22 the threat is imminent, the persons involved, and the
23 means by which the threat will be carried out. The ability
24 of the Government to prevent criminal acts is dependent on
25 our anticipation of those criminal acts. Anticipation,

1 in turn, is dependent on advance information, that is, intelli-
2 gence.

3 Certainly, reasonable people can differ on these issues.
4 Given the opportunity, I am confident that the continuing need
5 for intelligence work can be documented to the full satisfaction
6 of the Congress. We recognize that what is at stake here is not
7 the interests of the FBI, but rather the interests of every
8 citizen of this country. We recognize also that the resolution
9 of these matters will demand extensive and thoughtful
10 deliberation by the Congress. To this end, I pledge the
11 complete cooperation of the Bureau with this Committee or
12 its successors in this important task.

13 In any event, you have my unqualified assurance as
14 Director that we will carry out both the letter and the spirit
15 of such legislation as the Congress may enact.

16 That is the substance of my prepared statement.

17 I would also like to say extemporaneously that I note
18 that on this panel are some gentlemen who were on the Judiciary
19 Committee which heard my testimony at the time I was presented
20 to them for candidacy as Director of the FBI. At that time
21 I took very seriously the charge which may possibly result
22 in the deliberation of this Committee and of the full Senate.
23 I have been well aware of the problems of the FBI since that
24 time. I have also been well aware of the capabilities of
25 the FBI to discharge those responsibilities. I don't take

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1 them lightly. I am of sufficient experience and age that I
2 have pledged myself to do what is good and proper. I say this
3 not as a self-serving statement but in order that we might
4 place in context my position within the FBI. I could seek
5 sanctuary and perhaps a safe sanctuary by saying during the
6 period these things occurred I was with the local police
7 department in Kansas City, Missouri. Prior to that time,
8 however, I was in the FBI.

9 During the time I was with the FBI, during the time I
10 was with the police department, I continued throughout that
11 period a close acquaintance with and a strong affection for
12 the FBI.

13 I only want to point out that based on those years, based
14 on those observations, we have here a very fine and very
15 sensitive and a very capable organization. I feel that there
16 is much that can still be done. I know that we are not without
17 fault. I know that from those experiences I have had. We
18 will not be completely without fault in the future. But I
19 assure you that we look upon this inquiry, we look upon any
20 mandate which you may feel you have, that you should look at --
21 this is good and proper, and we do not intend -- I only want
22 to place in your thinking the fact that you have here a
23 matchless organization, one which I continue to say was
24 not motivated in some of these instances, and in most of
25 them, and I cannot justify some, that the motivation was of the

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1 best. I am not pleading, as does a defense attorney. I am
2 only putting in your thinking my objective observations as
3 a citizen who is somewhat concerned about the future of this
4 organization. It is too precious for us to have it in
5 a condition of jeopardy.

6 Thank you very much.

7 The Chairman. Thank you, Director Kelley.

8 I want to turn first to Senator Hart who won't be able
9 to remain through the whole morning. I think he has one
end t. 1 10 question he would like to ask.

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1 Senator Hart of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

2 Senator Mathias and I have Judiciary Committee hearings at 10:30.

3 Iahve several questions, and I'm sure they'll be
4 covered by others, but the ones that I have is a result of
5 reading your testimony and listening to it this morning, and
6 it relates to your comment at the foot of page 10 and at the
7 top of 11.

8 There you are indicating that you caution us about
9 extending the court's role in the early stages of investigations
10 suggesting that this might take us beyound the role comtemplated
11 for the courts under the Constutution.

12 Now as you have said, aside from the so-called national
13 security wiretap problem, the main focus of our discussions
14 and concern has been on the possibility requiring court
15 approval for the use of informants, informants directed to
16 penetrate and report on some group.

17 And one of the witnesses yesterday, Professor Dorsen,
18 pointed our that really those informants are the most pervasive
19 type of an eavesdropping device. It is a human device. It's
20 really, an informant is really more intrusive on my privacy
21 than a bug or a tap because he can follow me anywhere. He
22 can ask me questions to get information the government would
23 like to have.

24 Now we certainly involve the courts in approval of the
25 wiretaps for physical searches with the intent of the drafters

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1 of the Constitution to have a neutral third party magistrate
2 screen use of certain investigative techniques. And the
3 informant is such a technique. He functions sort of like a
4 general warrant, and I don't see why requiring court approval
5 would violate the role envisaged for the courts.

6 And as I leave, I would like to get your reactions to
7 my feelings.

8 Mr. Kelley. I do not feel that there is any use of the
9 informant in intrusion, which is to this extent objectionable.
10 It has of course been approved, the concept of the informant,
11 by numerous court decisions.

12 Let us go down not to the moral connotation of the use
13 of the informant.

14 I think, as in many cases, that is a matter of balance.
15 You have only very few ways of solving crimes. You have
16 basically in the use of the informant, I think, the protection
17 of the right of the victim to be victimized. You have within
18 the Constitution certain grants that are under ordinary
19 circumstances abrogation of rights. The right of search and
20 seizure, which, of course, can't be unreasonable, but none-
21 theless, you have the right.

22 I think that were we to lose the right of the informant,
23 we would lose to a great measure our capability of doing our
24 job.

25 Now I'm not arguing with you, Senator, that it is not an

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1 unusual procedure. I'm not even going to say that it is not
2 an intrusion, because it is. But it has to be one I think
3 that is by virtue of the benefits must be counted.

4 We don't like to use it. We don't like the problems that
5 are attendant. We take great care.

6 Now you say about the court having possibility taking
7 jurisdiction over them and guiding. I think that possibly we
8 could present the matter to the court but what are they going
9 to do insofar as monitoring their effort? Are they going to
10 have to follow it all the way through?

11 Also, there is, of course, urgency in the other contacts.
12 Must the court be contacted for each and approval of the court
13 given for each contact?

14 There are a great many problems insofar as administration
15 of it.

16 I frankly feel, and again, all I can do is give you my
17 idea -- I frankly feel that there is a satisfactory control over
18 the informants as we now exercise it today. Yes, there are
19 going to be some who will get beyond our control, but this
20 is going to happen no matter what you do.

21 Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, I appreciate your
22 reaction.

23 I was not suggesting that there is consideration here to
24 prohibit informants. I was reflecting a view that I felt and
25 hold that the use of an informant does require some balance, as

1 you yourself said, and I would be more comfortable with a
2 third party making a judgment as to whether the intrusion is
3 warranted by the particular circumstance. But I do understand
4 your position.

5 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

6 The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hart.

7 (Senator Hart leaves the hearing room.)

8 The Chairman. Senator Baker, do you have questions?

9 Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

10 Mr. Kelley, I have a great respect for you and your
11 organization and I personally regret that the organization is
12 in political distress, but we've both got to recognize that
13 it is, along with other agencies and departments of the
14 government.

15 I think you probably would agree with me that even though
16 that is extraordinarily unpleasant and in many respects
17 unfortunate, that it also has a plus side. That is, it gives
18 us an indication of our future direction and the opportunity,
19 at least, to improve the level of competency and service of
20 the government itself.

21 With that hopeful note, would you be agreeable then to
22 volunteering for me any suggestions you have on how to improve
23 the responsiveness of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or
24 indeed, for any other law enforcement agencies of the government,
25 to the Congress, to the Attorney General, to the President, and

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1 beyond that, would you give me any suggestions you have on
2 how you would provide the methods, the access, the documents,
3 the records, the authority, for the Congress to perform its
4 essential, I believe, essential oversight responsibility to
5 see that these functions, these delicate functions are being
6 undertaken properly?

7 And before you answer, let me tell you two or three things
8 I am concerned about.

9 It hasn't been long ago that the FBI Director was not
10 even confirmed by the Senate of the United States. I believe
11 you are the first one to be confirmed by the Senate of the
12 United States. I think that is a movement in the right
13 direction. I think the FBI has taken on a stature that, an
14 additional importance that requires it to have closer supervision
15 and scrutiny by us.

16 At the same time I rather doubt that we can become
17 involved in the daily relationship between you and the Attorney
18 General.

19 Therefore, I tend to believe that the Attorney General
20 needs to be more directly involved in the operations of the
21 FBI.

22 I would appreciate any comments on that.

23 Second, I rather believe that major decisions of the
24 intelligence community and the FBI ought to be in writing, so
25 that the Congress can, if it needs to in the future, take a

1 look at these decisions and the process by which they were
2 made to decide that you are or you are not performing your
3 services diligently.

4 I don't think you can have oversight unless you have
5 access to records, and in many cases records don't exist
6 and in some cases the people who made those decisions are now
7 departed and in other cases you have conflicts.

8 How would you suggest then that you improve the quality
9 of service of your agency? How would you propose that you
10 increase the opportunity for oversight of the Congress of the
11 United States? What other suggestions do you have for improving
12 the level of law enforcement in the essential activity that
13 is required?

14 Mr. Kelley. I would possibly be repetitious in answering
15 this Senator, but I get a great deal of pleasure from telling
16 what I think is necessary and what I hope that I have followed,
17 one which is beyond my control, but which I think is very
18 important is that the position of Director, the one to which
19 great attention should be paid in choosing the man who will
20 properly acquit himself.

21 I feel that the Judiciary Committee, at least in going
22 over me, did a pretty good job. I feel that it is most
23 necessary that care be taken that his philosophy, his means
24 of management, his facility to adapt to change, his tendency
25 toward consulting with other members of the official family,

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1 that he be willing to, for example, go through oversight with
2 no reticence, and that I think that he should be chosen very
3 carefully.

4 I think further that he should be responsible for those
5 matters which indicate impropriety or illegality.

6 Senator Baker. Could you stop for just a second? Who
7 does he work for? Does the Director, in your view, work for
8 the President of the United States, for the Attorney General,
9 for the Justice Department, for the Executive Branch?

10 Who does the executive of the FBI, the Director of the
11 FBI, be responsible to, who should he be responsible to?

12 Mr. Kelley. Jurisdictionally, to the Attorney General,
13 but I think this is such an important field of influence that
14 it is not at all unlikely that we can expand it to the
15 judiciary, the legislative, and of course, we are under the
16 Attorney General.

17 Senator Baker. Do you have any problems with the idea
18 of the President of the United States calling the Director of
19 the FBI and asking for performance of a particular task?

20 Does that give you any difficulty? Or do you think that
21 the relationship between the FBI Director and the President
22 is such that that is desirable, or should it be conduited
23 through the Attorney General?

24 Mr. Kelley. I think it should be in the great majority
25 of the cases conduited through the Attorney General. There

1 has been traditionally some acceptance of the fact that if
2 the President wants to see and talk with the Director, he
3 may do so, call him directly.

4 It has been my practice in such an event to thereafter
5 report to the Attorney General, whoever it might be, that I
6 have been called over and I discussed and was told. And this
7 was revealed in full to them.

8 Senator Baker. I suppose we could pass a statute that
9 says the President has to go through the Attorney General,
10 although I rather suspect it would be a little presumptuous.

11 But to go the next step, do you think it is necessary
12 for the pursuit of effective oversight on the part of the
13 Congress, to have some sort of document written, or at least
14 some sort of account of a Presidential order or an order of
15 the Attorney General given to a Director of the FBI?

16 Do you think that these things need to be handled in
17 a more formal way?

18 Mr. Kelley. Personally, it would be my practice in
19 the event I receive such an order, to request that it be
20 documented. This is a protection as well as a clarification
21 as to whether or not it should be placed as part of legislation.
22 I frankly would like to reserve that for some more considera-
23 tion.

24 I don't know whether it would be, but I think that it
25 can be worked very easily.

gs 9
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1 Senator Baker. Mr. Kelley, Attorney General Levi, I
2 believe, has already established some sort of agency or
3 function within the Department that is serving as the equivalent,
4 I suppose, of an Inspector General of the Justice Department,
5 including the FBI.

6 Are you familiar with the steps that Mr. Levi has
7 taken in that respect? I think he calls it the Office of
8 Professional Responsibility.

9 Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir, I'm familiar with it.

10 Senator Baker. Do you have any comment on that? Will
11 you give us any observations as to whether you think that
12 will be useful, helpful, or whether it will not be useful or
13 helpful, how it affects the FBI, how you visualize your
14 relationship to it in the future?

15 Mr. Kelley. I don't object to this, which is to some
16 extent an oversight within the Department of Justice under the
17 Attorney General.

18 Frankly, it just came out. I have not considered it
19 completely, but to the general concept, yes, I very definitely
20 subscribe.

21 Senator Baker. How would you feel about extending that
22 concept of government-wide operation, a national Inspector
23 General who is involved with an oversight of all of the
24 agencies of government as they interface with the Constitutionally
25 protected rights of the individual citizen? Would you care

gsh 10

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1 to comment on that, or would you rather save that for a while?

2 Mr. Kelley. I would like to reserve that one.

3 Senator Baker. I'm not surprised. Would you think about
4 it and let us know what you think about it?

5 Mr. Kelley. I will..

6 Senator Baker. All right. Mr. Chairman, thank you very
7 much.

8 The Chairman. Senator Huddleston.

9 Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

10 Mr. Kelley, you describe on page 4 the conditions that
11 existed when much of the abuse that we have talked about during
12 this inquiry occurred, indicating that the people within the
13 Bureau felt like they were doing what was expected of them
14 by the President, by the Attorney General, the Congress and
15 the people of the United States.

16 Does not this suggest that there has been a reaction
17 there to prevailing attitudes that might have existed in the
18 country because of certain circumstances rather than any
19 clear and specific direct instructions that might have been
20 received from proper authorities? And if that is the case,
21 is it possible in developing this charter, this guideline,
22 to provide for that kind of specific instruction?

23 Mr. Kelley. I think so, yes. I think that they can
24 logically be incorporated and that --

25 Senator Huddleston. You can see there would be a continuing

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1 danger if any agency is left to simply react to whatever the
2 attitudes may be at a specific time in this country because --

3 Mr. Kelley. Senator, I don't contemplate it might be
4 a continuing danger, but it certainly would be a very acceptable
5 guidepost whereby we can, in the event such a need seems
6 to arise, know what we can do.

7 Senator Huddleston. Well, in pursuing the area which
8 Senator Hart was discussing, that is whether or not we can
9 provide sufficient guidelines would replace a decision by the
10 court in determining what action might be proper and specific-
11 ally in protecting individual's rights, can't we also
12 provide the restrictions and guidelines and the various
13 techniques that might be used?

14 For instance, supposing we do establish the fact, as
15 has already been done, that informants are necessary and
16 desirable. How do we keep that informant operating within the
17 proper limits so that he in fact is not violating individual
18 rights?

19 Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, much of the reliance must
20 be placed on the agent and the supervision of the FBI to assure
21 that there is no infringement of rights.

22 Senator Huddleston. But this is an aware we've gotten
23 into some difficulty in the past. We have assumed that the
24 particular action was necessary, that there was a present
25 threat that some intelligence programs should be initiated, but

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1 in many cases it has gone beyond what would appear to have been
2 necessary to have addressed the original threat.

3 How do we keep within the proper balance there?

4 Mr. Kelley. Well, actually, it's just about like any
5 other offense. It is an invasion of the other individual's
6 right and it is by an officer and an FBI agent is an officer.
7 There's the possibility of criminal prosecution against him.

8 This is one which I think might flow if he counsels
9 the informant.

10 Now insofar as his inability to control the informant,
11 I don't suppose that would warrant prosecution, but there is
12 still supervisory control over that agent and over that
13 informant by insisting that control is exercised on a continuing
14 basis.

15 Senator Huddleston. It brings up an interesting point
16 as to whether or not a law enforcement agency ought to be
17 very alert to any law violations of its own members or anyone
18 else.

19 If a White House official asks the FBI or someone to do
20 something unlawful, the question seems to me to occur as to
21 whether or not that is not a violation that should be reported
22 by the FBI.

23 Mr. Kelley. I think that any violation which comes to
24 our attention should either be handled by us or the proper
25 authority.

gsh 13

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1 Senator Huddleston. But that hasn't been the case in the
2 past.

3 Mr. Kelley. Well, I don't know what you're referring
4 to but I would think your statement is proper.

5 Senator Huddleston. Well, we certainly have evidence
6 of unlawful activity taking place in various projects that
7 have been undertaken, which certainly were not brought to
8 light willingly by the FBI or by other law enforcement agencies.

9 The question that I'm really concerned about is as
10 we attempt to draw a guideline and charters that would give
11 the Agency the best flexibility that they may need, a wide
12 range of threats, how do we control what happens within each
13 of those actions to keep them from going beyond what
14 was intended to begin with?

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1 Mr. Kelley. You're still speaking of informants.

2 Senator Huddleston. Not only informants but the agents
3 themselves as they go into surveillance, wiretaps, or whatever
4 intelligence gathering techniques.

5 The original thrust of my question was, even though we
6 may be able to provide guidelines of a broad nature, how do
7 we control the techniques that might be used, that in themselves
8 might be used, that in themselves might be a serious violation
9 of the rights.

10 Mr. Kelley. Well, first, I don't know whether it's
11 germane to your question but I do feel that it should be pointed
12 out that the association to, the relationship between the
13 informant and his agent handler is a very confidential one,
14 and I doubt very seriously whether we could have any guide-
15 lines, where there might be an extension of any monitors here
16 because thereby you do have a destruction of that relationship.
17 Insofar as the activities of agents, informants or others
18 which may be illegal, we have on many occasions learned of
19 violations of the law on the part of informants, and either
20 prosecuted ourselves, through the reporting of it to the
21 United States Attorney, or turned it over to the local authority.
22 We have done this on many a time, many occasions. Insofar
23 as our own personnel, we have an internal organization, the
24 Inspection Division, which reviews this type of activity, and
25 if there be any violation, yes, no question about it, we would

1 pursue it to the point of prosecution.

2 Senator Huddleston. But it could be helped by periodic
3 review.

4 Mr. Kelley. We do, on an annual basis, review the
5 activities of our 59 offices through that same Inspection
6 Division, and they have a clear charge to go over this as well
7 as other matters.

8 Senator Huddleston. Mr. Kelley, you pointed out the
9 difference in the approaches when gathering intelligence, in
10 gathering evidence after a crime has been committed.

11 Would there be any advantage, or would it be feasible to
12 attempt to separate these functions within the Agency, in the
13 departments, for instance, with not having a mixing of
14 gathering intelligence and gathering evidence? Are the techniques
15 definable and different?

16 Mr. Kelley. Senator, I think they are compatible. I
17 see no objection to the way that they are now being handled
18 on a management basis. I think, as a matter of fact, it is
19 a very fine association whereby the intelligence, stemming as
20 it does from a substantive violation, is a natural complement.

21 Senator Huddleston. Now, another area, the FBI furnishes
22 information to numerous government agencies.

23 Is this properly restricted and controlled at the present
24 time in your judgment as to just who can ask the FBI for
25 information, what kind of information they can ask for, and

1 who might also be inclined to call the Director and ask him
2 to do specific things?

3 Could there be some clearcut understanding as to whether
4 or not the Director would be obligated to undertake any such
5 project, that just anybody at the White House might suggest?

6 Mr. Kelley. It's very clear to me that any request must
7 come from Mr. Buchen's office, and that it be, in any case,
8 wherein it is a request for action, that it be followed with
9 a letter so requesting.

10 This has come up before during the Watergate hearings, as
11 I think it has been placed very vividly in our minds, in
12 take care that you just don't follow the request of some
13 underling who does not truly reflect the desire of the President.

14 Senator Huddleston. Just one more question about
15 techniques, aside from the guidelines of authority on broad
16 projects undertaken.

17 Would it be feasible from time to time in a Congressional
18 oversight committee, would be able to discuss with the Department,
19 with the Bureau various techniques so that they could have
20 some input as to whether or not these actions are consistent
21 with the overall guidelines, to start with, and consistent
22 with the very protections?

23 Mr. Kelley. Senator, I have already said to the
24 oversight committee of the Senate that so far as I can now
25 see, the only thing that would be withheld is the identity of

1 probably even more importantly, what restrictions can be put
2 on the use of that information once it has been supplied by
3 the FBI?

4 Mr. Kelley. I think so, Senator.

5 Senator Huddleston. You think there are proper restrictions
6 now?

7 Mr. Kelley. I don't know that we can ourselves judge
8 in all cases whether or not there is good and sufficient reason
9 for an Agency to inquiry. I think that there should be a
10 very close delineation by the agencies as to what they're
11 going to ask for, but I think that we do have sufficient rules
12 that at least to us we are satisfied.

13 Senator Huddleston. You're confident that the information
14 your agency supplies is not being misused, to the detriment
15 of the rights of any individuals.

16 Mr. Kelley. Senator, I'm only confident in what I
17 do myself. I would say that I am satisfied.

18 Senator Huddleston. I was wondering whether some
19 inclusion ought to be made in whatever charter is made as to
20 who specifically can request, what limits ought to be placed
21 on what the request, and what they can do with it after they
22 get it.

23 Mr. Kelley. Yes.

24 Senator Huddleston. I have some concern about the fact
25 that in intelligence gathering, you gather, you are just

1 bound to gather a great deal of information about some
2 individual that is useless as far as the intent of the intelli-
3 gence gathering is concerned, but might be in some way embarrass-
4 ing or harmful to the individual, whether or not there's any
5 effort to separate this kind of information out of a person's
6 file that is really initiated for a purpose, for a specific
7 purpose unrelated to this information.

8 Is there any effort, or could any direction be given to
9 doing that?

10 Mr. Kelley. We would be very happy to work under the
11 guidelines or rules or anything else to purge material which
12 is extraneous, irrelevant, or for any other reason objection-
13 able.

14 Senator Huddleston. And how about the length of time
15 that these files are kept in the agency?

16 Mr. Kelley. We are willing to work within that framework,
17 too.

18 Senator Huddleston. I think that might be done.

19 Now, I think in developing the chain of command, so to
20 speak, it certainly would be very difficult to prevent the
21 President of the United States from calling up the head of
22 the FBI or anyone else and discussing any law enforcement
23 problem he might so desire, and perhaps even give direction
24 to the agency.

25 But how about that? What about White House personnel

1 informants. We'll discuss techniques, we'll discuss our
2 present activities. I think this is the only way that we can
3 exchange our opinions and get accomplished what you want to
4 accomplish and what I want to accomplish.

5 Senator Huddleston. I feel that is an important aspect
6 of it because even though you have a charter which gives broad
7 direction for all the guidelines and to the types of projects
8 that enter into it, if we don't get down to specifics, such
9 things as how intelligence is to be collected, how evidence
10 is to be collected, what is done after it is collected, this
11 type of thing, it seems to me we are leaving a wide gap
12 again for the Bureau to assume that it has total instruction
13 and total permission to move in a certain direction and go
14 beyond what is intended or what was authorized.

15 Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Director.

16 The Chairman. Senator Goldwater?

17 Senator Goldwater. Mr. Kelley, as part of the FBI
18 electronic surveillance of Dr. King, several tapes of
19 specific conversations, and later a composite King tape were
20 produced.

21 Are these tapes still in the possession of the FBI?

22 Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

23 Senator Goldwater. Have they been reviewed by you?

24 Mr. Kelley. No, sir.

25 Senator Goldwater. Have they been reviewed by any of your

1 staff, to your knowledge?

2 Mr. Kelley. Senator, I think that they have been reviewed.
3 I know that at least some have reviewed it within the area of
4 this particular section. There has been no review of them
5 since I came to the FBI, I can tell you that.

6 Senator Goldwater. Would these tapes be available to
7 the Committee if the Committee felt they would like to hear
8 them?

9 Mr. Kelley. This, Senator Goldwater, is a matter which is
10 of, as I said before, some delicacy, and there would have to
11 be a discussion of this in an executive session.

12 The Chairman. I might say in that connection that the
13 Committee staff gave some consideration to this matter and
14 decided that it would compound the original error for the
15 staff to review the tapes, because that would be a still
16 further invasion of privacy, and so the staff refrained from
17 insisting on obtaining the tapes, believing that it was
18 unnecessary, and quite possibly improper, in order to get at
19 what we needed to know about the King case.

20 So the staff did refrain, and for that reason the issue
21 never came to a head. I just wanted to lay that information
22 before the Senator.

23 Senator Goldwater. I realize that's a prerogative of
24 the staff, but it's also the prerogative of the Committee if,
25 and I'm not advocating it, if we wanted to hear them to

1 ourselves whether Mr. Hoover was off on a wild goose chase
2 or whether there was, in effect, some reason. Again, I am
3 not advocating it, I am merely asking a question. They would
4 be available if the Committee took a vote to hear them and
5 decided on it.

6 Mr. Kelley. I don't think it would be within my juris-
7 diction to respond to this, Senator. It would have to be the
8 Attorney General.

9 Senator Goldwater. I see.

10 Now, are these tapes and other products of surveillance
11 routinely retained even after an individual ceased to be a
12 target of inquiry?

13 Mr. Kelley. They are retained usually for ten years.

14 Senator Goldwater. Ten years.

15 Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

16 Senator Goldwater. What is the future value, if any,
17 to the Bureau of retaining such information?

18 Mr. Kelley. If there be guidelines that set out a
19 destruction or erasure, we will abide by it. We will, on those
20 occasions where we think that matters might come up within
21 that period of time which may need the retention of them, we
22 will express our opinion at that time, but other than that
23 we would be guided by guidelines.

24 Senator Goldwater. Is it your view that legitimate
25 law enforcement needs should outweigh privacy considerations

1 with respect to retention of such information, or do we need
2 the clear guidelines on the destruction of these materials
3 when the investigation purposes for which they were collected
4 have been served?

5 Mr. Kelley. We feel that there should be a good close
6 look at the retention of material, and we would of course like
7 to have an input. But we welcome consideration of this.

8 Senator Goldwater. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank
9 you very much.

10 The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.

11 Senator Mondale?

12 Senator Mondale. Mr. Director, it seems to me that the
13 most crucial question before the Congress is to accept the
14 invitation of the FBI to draw Congressionally imposed lines,
15 limits of authority so the FBI will know clearly what you can
16 and cannot do, so you will not be subject to later judgments,
17 and the question is, where should that line be drawn?

18 As you know, in 1924 when the FBI was created, and
19 Mr. Stone later became the Chief Justice, he drew the line at
20 criminal law enforcement. He said that never again will we
21 go beyond the authority imposed upon us to get into political
22 ideas. We will stay in the area of law enforcement.

23 Would you not think it makes a good deal of sense to
24 draw the guidelines in a way that your activities are
25 restricted to the enforcement of the law, investigations of

1 crime, investigations of conspiracies to commit crime rather
2 than to leave this very difficult to define and control area
3 of political ideas?

4 Mr. Kelley. I don't know whether I understand your last
5 statement of involving the area of political ideas. I say that
6 I feel that certainly we should be vested and should continue
7 in the field of criminal investigations as an investigatory
8 objective. These are conclusions, of course, which are based
9 on statutes in the so-called security field, national or
10 foreign.

11 These are criminal violations. I feel that they should
12 be in tandem. I feel, having worked many years in this
13 atmosphere, that you have more ears and eyes and you have
14 more personnel working together, covering the same fields..
15 I do not think there should be a separation of the intelligence
16 matters, because it is a concomitant. It naturally flows
17 from the investigation of the security matters and the
18 criminal.

19 Senator Mondale. Mr. Kelley, what Mr. Stone said was
20 this, that the Bureau of investigation is not concerned
21 with political or other opinions of individuals. It is
22 concerned only with such conduct as is forbidden by the laws
23 of the United States. When the police system goes beyond
24 these limits, it is dangerous to proper administration of
25 justice and human liberty.

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Do you object to that definition?

Mr. Kelley. I think that life has become much more sophisticated and we have added to the so-called policeman's area of concern some matters which were probably not as important at that time. I think that the fact that the FBI has been in touch with the security investigations and the gathering of intelligence is something which has proved to be at times troublesome and given us great concern, but it is a viable, productive procedure.

I don't know what Mr. Stone was thinking of entirely of this course, but I can tell you about the procedure today.

Senator Mondale. You see, I think you recognize, if that further step is taken, as you're recommending here, that at that point it becomes so difficult to guarantee, and in fact, in my opinion, impossible to guarantee that we won't see a recurrence of some of the abuses that we've seen in the past, and I don't know how you establish any kind of meaningful oversight on a function as nebulous as the one you've just defined.

If the FBI possesses the authority to investigate ideas that they consider to be threats to this nation's security, particularly in the light of the record that we have seen how that definition can be stretched to include practically everybody, including moderate civil rights leaders, war dissenters and so on, how on earth can standards be developed

1 that would provide any basis for oversight?

2 How can you, from among other things, be protected from
3 criticism later on that you exceeded your authority or didn't
4 do something that some politician tried to pressure you into
5 doing?

6 Mr. Kelley. It might well be, Senator, that ten years
7 from now a Director of the FBI will be seated here and will be
8 criticized for doing that which today is construed as very
9 acceptable.

10 Senator Mondale. Correct. And I have great sympathy
11 for the predicament the FBI finds itself in.

12 Mr. Kelley. And the Director.

13 Senator Mondale. And the Director especially, and that is
14 why I think it's in the interest of the FBI to get these lines
15 as sharply defined as possible, so that when you are pressured
16 to do things, or when, after the fact, people with good 20/20
17 hindsight can criticize you or the Bureau, that you can say
18 well, here are the standards that you gave us, and they specific-
19 ally say this, and that is your answer. We have to live by
20 the law. If we don't define it specifically, it seems to me
21 that these excesses could reoccur, because I don't think it's
22 possible to define them, and the FBI is inevitably going to
23 be kicked back and forth, depending on personal notions of what
24 you should have done.

25 Don't you fear that?

1 Mr. Kelley. Not too much, Senator. I think we learned a
2 great lesson by virtue of Watergate, the revelations that have
3 come up as a result of this Committee's inquiries, the fact
4 that I think that we have a different type of spirit today
5 in the Bureau, the fact that, as I said before, you came in,
6 that I think the Bureau is a matchless organization, and they
7 are eager to do that which is vital and proper, and the fact
8 that we are getting a number of very fine young people in the
9 organization, people of the other ethnic backgrounds than we
10 had years ago. I think there is a greater understanding in
11 the Bureau today of what is the proper type of conduct.

12 We may not be able to project this on all occasions,
13 because we must equate this with the need and with our
14 experience, but if the precise guidelines be the goal, you're
15 going to have trouble. If, on the other hand, there be a
16 flexibility, I think that we can work very well within those
17 guidelines.

18 Senator Mondale. I think, as you know, I don't think
19 there is a better trained or higher professionally qualified
20 law enforcement organization in the world than the FBI. I
21 think we all agree it is superb. But the problem has been,
22 from time to time, that when you go beyond the area of
23 enforcing the law into the area of political ideas, that you
24 are subject to and in fact you leave the criminal field, you
25 get into politics. And that is where, it seems to me, that the

1 great controversy exists, and where you are almost inevitably
2 going to be subjected to fierce criticism in the future, no
3 matter how you do it. Once you get into politics, you get
4 into trouble.

5 Mr. Kelley. I agree to that, and I point out that in almost
6 every branch of the government and in every part, as a matter
7 of fact, every segment of our society, there are some who deviate
8 from the normal course. I feel that within the Bureau there is
9 less likelihood of this to happen, and I think that working
10 with you we can at least make some achievements that will be
11 significant.

12 Now, whether it be lasting, I don't think so, but I
13 think we've made a good start.

14 Senator Mondale. In your speech in Montreal on August
15 9th, you said we must be willing to surrender a small measure
16 of our liberties to preserve the great bulk of them.

17 Which liberties did you have in mind?

18 Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, this speech has been mis-
19 understood many, many times.

20 Senator Mondale. Well, I want you to have a chance to
21 clear it up.

22 Mr. Kelley. All that was intended here was a restatement
23 of the approach which the courts historically have used in
24 resolving most issues of Constitutional importance, and its
25 recognition that rights are not susceptible to absolute

1 protection. It's a matter of balance. Even in the Fourth
2 Amendment, for example, which protects the right of privacy, it
3 does not prohibit searches and seizures. I mention, it only
4 refers to those that are unreasonable.

5 I came from the police field. What is more restrictive
6 to more people than traffic regulation? But what would be
7 more chaotic is if you did not have traffic regulation. We
8 do have to , in order to live in the complexities and
9 intricacies of today's life, have to give up some of our
10 rights.

11 Some may construe this as an extravagant statement. If it
12 is so, I wish to say that I only was pointing out that there
13 has to be a balance.

14 Senator Mondale. So that when you say we have to give
15 up some liberties, or as you just said, some rights, what you
16 mean -- let me ask. Let me scratch that and ask again, you
17 have to give up some rights. Which rights would you have us
18 give up?

19 Mr. Kelly. Well, under the Fourth Amendment you would
20 have the right for search and seizure.

21 Senator Mondale. You wouldn't give up the Fourth Amend-
22 ment right.

23 Mr. Kelley. Oh, no not the right.

24 Senator Mondale. What right do you have in mind?

25 Mr. Kelley. The right to be free from search and seizure.

1 Senator Mondale. There's no such right in the Consti-
2 tution. You can have such seizures, but they must be reasonable,
3 under court warrant.

4 Did you mean to go beyond that?

5 Mr. Kelley. That's right.

6 Senator Mondale. That you should be able to go beyond
7 that?

8 Mr. Kelley. No, no. I do not mean that we should ever
9 go beyond a Constitutional right guarantee.

10 Senator Mondale. Well, would you say, Mr. Kelley, that
11 that sentence might have been inartful in your speech?

12 Mr. Kelley. I said that if it was misunderstood, I
13 made a mistake, because I should never make a statement which --
14 yes, it was inartful.

15 Senator Mondale. I think I know about your record in
16 law enforcement well enough to tell you that I think you were
17 saying something different, that it was taken to mean something
18 different than I think you intended.

19 What you are saying is that in the exercise of your law
20 enforcement powers, the rights of individuals is determined
21 by the laws and the courts, but the courts, in the handling
22 of those issues, have to balance rights and other values.

23 That's what you're essentially saying, is that correct?

24 Mr. Kelley. Senator, I ought to have you write my
25 speeches so that I don't have any misunderstandings. I didn't

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understand that to be at the time anything that was unusual.

I have to admit that maybe I made a mistake.

Senator Mondale. What you are saying in effect is that in effect, the rights of the American people can be determined not by the Director of the FBI but by the courts and by the law.

You meant that.

Mr. Kelley. Indeed, yes, sir.

Senator Mondale. All right.

Thank you.

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The Chairman. Senator Hart.

Senator of Colorado. Mr. Kelley, in response to a question by Senaotr Mondale, one of his first questions about laying down guidelines, it seems to me what you were saying was we could work together. That is to say the Bureau and the Congress, lay down guidelines that would not unreasonably hamper you from investigations of crime control in the country.

But I think implicit in his question was also an area that you didn't respond to, and that is how do you, what kind of guidelines do you lay down to protect you and the Bureau from political pressure, the misuse of the Bureau by political figures, particularly in the White House?

And we've had indications that at least two of your predecessors, if not more, obviously were corrupted and Mr. Gray was under great pressure from the White House to use the facilities of the Bureau and their capabilities to accomplish some plititcal end.

Well, it seems to me you were arguing in favor of fewer restrictions so you could get on with your job, but that is not what Senator Mondale and the rest of us are interested in.

What kind of restrictions can we lay down to protect you from political pressures? I'd be interested in that sign of the coin, if you would.

Mr. Kelley. I would welcome any guidelines which would

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1 protect me or any successor from this type of thing. I think
2 that would be splendid. I have not reviewed the guidelines
3 as prepared to the present date by the Department. It might
4 be that they are well defined in there. But I welcome any
5 consideration of such directives.

6 Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you think this is a problem?

7 Mr. Kelley. No, sir, not with me.

8 Senator Hart of Colorado. Do you think that it has been
9 a problem for the people that preceded you?

10 Mr. Kelley. I think so.

11 Senator Hart of Colorado. And that's a problem the
12 Congress ought to address?

13 Mr. Kelley. I think so.

14 Senator Hart of Colorado. The Committee received a
15 letter from the Department of Justice a couple of days, the
16 Assistant Attorney General asking our cooperation in carrying
17 out the investigation or their efforts to review the investi-
18 gation conducted by the FBI into the death of Martin Luther
19 King, Jr., in order to determine whether that investigation
20 should be re-opened. They asked our cooperation, they asked
21 for our transcripts, the testimony before the Committee, all
22 material provided to the Committee by the FBI which relates
23 to Dr. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

24 I guess my question is this: Why is the Justice Depart-
25 ment asking this Committee for FBI files?

3 1 Mr. Kelley. I don't think they're asking for files.
2 I think they're asking for what testimony was given by
3 witnesses whose testimony has not been given up. I don't know.

4 Senator Hart of Colorado. I'll quote it. "And all
5 material provided to the Committee by the FBI which relates
6 to Dr. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference."

7 I repeat the question. Why is the Justice Department
8 asking this Committee for material provided to us by the
9 FBI?

10 Mr. Kelley. Frankly, I don't know. Do you mind if I
11 just ask --

12 (Pause)

13 Mr. Kelley. I am informed, and I knew this one.
14 Everything that was sent to you was sent through them. Did
15 they have a copy also? Yes, they had a retained copy. I
16 don't know why.

17 Senator Hart of Colorado. So there's nothing you
18 provided us that's not available to the Justice Department?

19 Mr. Kelley. That's right.

20 Senator Hart of Colorado. And you can't account for why
21 an official of the Justice Department would ask this Committee
22 for your records?

23 Mr. Kelley. No, sir.

24 Senator Hart of Colorado. You released a statement on
25 November the 18th of '74 regarding the FBI's counter-intelligence

1 program and you said you made a detailed study of COINTELPRO
2 activities and reached the following conclusions, and I quote:

3 "The purpose of these counter-intelligence programs was
4 to prevent dangerously and potentially deadly acts against
5 individuals, organizations and institutions both public
6 and private across the United States."

7 Now we had an FBI informant in the other day before this
8 Committee and he stated he told the FBI on a number of
9 occasions he planned violent acts against black people in
10 groups. And yet, he said few, if any, instances in which the
11 FBI actually prevented violence from taking place.

12 How does his testimony square with your statement that
13 I have quoted?

14 Mr. Kelley. It doesn't, and I don't know if any of
15 his statements contrary to what we have said is the truth.
16 We don't subscribe to what he said. We have checked into it
17 and we know of no instances where, for example, 15 minutes
18 and that type of thing has been substantiated.

19 Senator Hart of Colorado. You're saying the testimony
20 he gave us under oath was not accurate?

21 Mr. Kelley. Right.

22 Senator Hart of Colorado. You also said in that statement,
23 and I quote: "I want to assure you that Director Hoover did
24 not conceal from superior authorities the fact that the FBI
25 was engaged in neutralizing and disruptive tactics against

1 revolutionary and violence-prone groups.

2 Now the Committee has received testimony that the New
3 Left COINTELPRO programs was not in fact told to higher
4 authorities, the Attorney General and Congress.

5 Do you have any information in this regard?

6 I know in that statement you cite onw or two instances,
7 but in terms of the bulk of COINTEL programs, the record
8 seems to date at least to be clear that there was not systematic
9 information flowing upward through the chain of command to
10 Director Hoover's superiors?

11 Mr. Kelley: May I ask that I be given the opportunity
12 to substantiate that with documentation?

13 Senator Hart of Colorado. Sure.

14 Mr. Kelley: Or respond to it.

15 Senator Hart of Colorado. Dorector Kelley, just in
16 passing, do you agree with the statement made by President
17 Ford that those responsible for harassing and trying to destroy
18 Dr. King should be brought to justice.

19 Mr. Kelley. Those who directly responsible and upon whose orders
20 the activities were taken responsible. I don't know if he intended to say
21 that, but if he did not, I would say that it would be more proper. Insofar
22 as my own opinion is concerned, that it be centered on those who said
23 to do it and those who are responsible.

24 I took the responsibility for any such program and I
25 don't expect that those under me would be not acting in

1 accordance with what they think is proper and may even have
2 some reservation, but they do it on my orders. I accept that
3 responsibility.

4 I think that it should rest on those who instructed that
5 that be done.

6 Senator Hart of Colorado. But you agree that the people
7 who give the orders should be brought to justice.

8 Mr. Kelley. I do.

9 The Chairman. Aren't they all dead?

10 Mr. Kelley. No.

11 The Chairman. Not quite?

12 Mr. Kelley. Not quite.

13 Senator Hart of Colorado. That's all, Mr. Chairman.

14 The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.

15 Director Kelley, in the Committee's review of the
16 COINTELPRO program and other political involvements of the
17 FBI, it seems to me that we have encountered two or three
18 basic questions.

19 Since the investigation is over insofar as the Committee
20 is concerned, we're now turning our attention to remedies for
21 the future, what I would think would be our constructive
22 legislative work, it is very important that we focus on what
23 we learned in that investigation.

24 And one thing that we have learned is that Presidents of
25 the United States have from time to time ordered the FBI to

7 1 obtain for them certain kinds of information by exercising the
2 necessary surveillance to obtain . and to have a purely
3 political character, that they simply wanted to have for their
4 own personal purposes.

5 I think that you would agree that that is not a proper
6 function of the FBI, and you agree.

7 Yet it's awfully difficult for anyone in the FBI,
8 including the Director, to turn down a President of the United
9 States if he receives a direct order from the President. It
10 is always possible, of course, to say no, and if you insist,
11 I will resign. But that puts a very hard burden on any man
12 serving in your position, particularly if the President puts
13 a good face on the request and makes it sound plausible or
14 even invents some excuse. It is always easy for him to say,
15 you know, I am considering Senator White for an important
16 position in my administration, and I need to know more about
17 his activities, particularly of late. I've had some cause
18 for concern and I want to be certain that there is nothing in
19 his record that would later embarrass me, and I just want you
20 to keep careful track of him and report to me on what he's
21 been doing lately.

22 It's difficult for you to say back to the President, Mr.
23 President, that's a very questionable activity for the FBI,
24 and I frankly don't believe that you've given me the real
25 reason why you want this man followed. I think his opposition

1 to your current policy is politically embarrassing to you and
2 you want to get something on him.

3 I mean, you know, the Director can hardly talk back that
4 way, and I'm wondering what we could do in the way of protecting
5 your office and the FBI from political exploitation in this
6 basic charter that we write.

7 Now, I want your suggestions, but let's begin with one
8 or two of mine. I would like your response.

9 If we were to write into the law that any order given you
10 either by the President or by the Attorney General should be
11 transmitted in writing and should clearly state the objective
12 and purpose of the request and that the FBI would maintain
13 those written orders and that furthermore they would be
14 available to any oversight committee of the Congress. If the
15 joint committee on intelligence is established, that committee
16 would have access to such a file.

17 So that the committee itself would be satisfied that
18 orders were not being given to the FBI that were improper or
19 unlawful.

20 What would you think of writing a provision of that kind
21 into a charter for the FBI?

22 Mr. Kelley. I would say writing into the law any order
23 issued by the President that is a request for action by the
24 Attorney General should be in writing, is certainly, in my
25 opinion, is a very plausible solution. I'm sure that in

1 contemplation of this there would be some that will say yes
2 or some that will say no, but I think we could define an
3 area where you are trying to cure the abuses and we could
4 do that.

5 Now as to the availability to any oversight committee
6 of Congress, I would say generally that I certainly would have
7 no objection to this, but I again, there may be some request
8 for something of high confidentiality that the President might
9 put in writing such as some national or foreign security
10 matter.

11 I would like to have such a consideration be given a
12 great deal of thought and that the oversight committee review
13 be conditioned with that possibility. I don't think it would
14 present a problem.

15 I have said previously that I feel I can discuss every-
16 thing except the identity of the informants to the oversight
17 committee. I welcome that.

18 The Chairman. Well, that has been of course the way we
19 proceeded with this Committee. It has worked pretty well,
20 I think.

21 Now Senator Goldwater brought up a question on the
22 Martin Luther King tapes. I would like to pursue that question.

23 If these tapes do not contain any evidence that needs
24 to be preserved for ongoing criminal investigations, and since
25 Dr. King has long since been violently removed from the scene,

10 1 why are they preserved? Why aren't they simply destroyed?

2 Is there a problem that we can help through new law to enable
3 the FBI to remove from its files so much of this information
4 that it has collected that it is no longer needed or may never
5 have connected the person with any criminal activity? And
6 yet, all of that information just stays there in the files
7 year after year.

8 What can we do? How can a law be changed? If that's
9 not the problem, then what is? Why are these tapes still down
10 there at the FBI?

11 Mr. Kelley. Well, of course, we do have the rule that
12 they are maintained ten years. Now why the rule is your
13 question and why right now are they maintained? Since we
14 do maintain everything since the inquiry has started and until
15 that's lifted, we can't destroy anything.

16 I would say that this is a proper area for guidelines
17 or legislation and again, as I have said, there should be
18 some flexibility and I know that's a broad statement but there
19 might be some areas wherein that the subject of the investigation
20 himself may want them retained because it shows his innocence.

21 I think you have to deliberate this very carefully, but
22 it can be done and we are willing to be guided by those
23 rules.

24 The Chairman. Let me ask you this. The FBI is conducting
25 thousands of investigations every year on possible appointees

1 to Federal positions. As a matter of fact, the only time I
2 ever see an FBI agent is when he comes around and flashes his
3 badge and asks me a question or two about what I know of Mr.
4 so and so, who's being considered for an executive office.
5 And we have a very brief conversation in which I tell him that
6 as far as I know, he's a loyal and patriotic citizen, and that
7 is about the extent of it.

8 Then when this file is completed and the person involved
9 is either appointed or not appointed, what happens to that
10 file? I know it's full of all kinds of gossip because it is
11 in the nature of the investigation to go out to his old
12 neighborhoods and talk to everybody who might have known him.

13 What happens to the file? Is that just retained forever?

14 Mr. Kelley. We have some capability of destroying some
15 files and they are rather lengthy insofar as retention. We
16 have some archival rules which govern the retention of material
17 and is developed in cases involving certain members of the
18 Executive Branch of the government.

19 I see no reason why this would not be a proper area
20 for consideration of legislation.

21 The Chairman. Can you give me any idea of how much --
22 do you have records that would tell us how much time and money
23 is being spent by the FBI just in conducting these thousands
24 of routine investigations on possible Presidential appointments
25 to Federal offices?

1 Mr. Kelley. I feel confident we can get it. I do not
2 have it now, but if you would like to have the annual cost
3 for the investigation of Federal appointees --

4 The Chairman. Yes. Plus, you know, plus any other
5 information that would indicate to us what proportion of the
6 time and effort of the FBI was absorbed in this kind of
7 activity.

8 Mr. Kelley. I can tell you it is relatively small, but
9 I can get you, I think, the exact amount of time and the
10 approximate expense.

11 The Chairman. I wish you would do that because this is
12 a matter we need more information about. And when you supply
13 that data to the Committee, would you also supply the number
14 of such investigations each year?

15 You know, I don't expect you to go back 20 or 25 years,
16 but give us a good idea of the last few years. For example,
17 enough to give us an idea of how much time and how broad the
18 reach of these investigations may be.

19 Mr. Kelley. Through '70?

20 The Chairman. That would be sufficient, I would think.

21 The other matter that is connected to this same subject
22 that I would like your best judgment on is whether these
23 investigations could not be limited to offices of sensitivity.
24 That is to say where legitimate national security interest might
25 be involved so that there is a reason to make a close check on

1 past associations, attitudes and expressions of belief.

2 I have often wondered whether we couldn't eliminate
3 routine Federal offices that are not particularly sensitive
4 in the national security sense from the reach of these FBI
5 checks.

6 And so when you respond to the series of questions, I
7 wish you would include the offices that are now covered by
8 such checks and give us an idea of how far down into the
9 Federal bureaucracy this extends.

10 Could you do that?

11 Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir.

12 The Chairman. Fine.

13 Now there is a vote. The vote always comes just at
14 the wrong time, but Mr. Schwarz wants to ask you some additional
15 questions for the record, and there may be other questions,
16 too that would be posed by the staff, after which I will ask
17 Mr. Schwarz to adjourn the hearings. It looks like we're going
18 to be tied up on the floor with votes.

19 But before I leave I want to thank you for your testimony,
20 Mr. Kelley, and to express my appreciation to you for the
21 way you have cooperated with the Committee in the course of
22 its investigation during the past months.

23 Mr. Kelley. Thank you.

24 The Chairman. And I hope, as you do, that as a result
25 of the work of the Committee we can write a generic law for

the FBI that will help to remedy many of the problems we'll
encounter in the future.

Thank you.

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End Tape 4

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1 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Kelley, I'll try to be very brief.

2 On page 5 of your statement --

3 Mr. Kelley. What?

4 Mr. Schwarz. On page 5 of your statement, the third
5 full paragraph, you said the following, and I would like then
6 to question about what you said. "We must recognize that
7 situations have occurred in the past and will arise in the
8 future where the Government may well be expected to depart from
9 its traditional role, in the FBI's case, as an investigative
10 and intelligence-gathering agency, and take affirmative steps
11 which are needed to meet an imminent threat to human life or
12 property."

13 Now, by that you mean to take what kind of steps in what
14 kind of situation?

15 And can you give some concrete examples under your general
16 principles statement?

17 Mr. Kelley. I think that Mr. Adams addressed himself to
18 that the other day, where you have an extremist who is an
19 employee at the waterworks, and he makes a statement that he's
20 going to do something which is devastating to the city, and you
21 have no way to attack this under the ordinary procedures, and
22 so therefore you must take some steps to meet that imminent
23 threat to human life or property.

24 Mr. Schwarz. So let us take that case as a test of the
25 principle. You are saying the extremist has said he is going

mn 2

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1 to do something to the waterworks, poison it or something, and
2 he is on the way down there with the poison in his car.

3 Is that the presumption?

4 Mr. Kelley. We hadn't gone that far, but all right, you
5 can extent it.

6 Mr. Schwarz. All right, now, in that case you have the
7 traditional law enforcement tool, which is the power of arrest.

8 Mr. Kelley. Not under probable cause where he has not
9 gone down there. The hypothetical we gave was one where he had
10 not taken any overt acts in perpetration of this.

11 Mr. Schwarz. Well, if he hasn't taken any overt acts,
12 are you then in what you would call in imminent threat of
13 human life or property?

14 Mr. Kelley. I think so.

15 Mr. Schwarz. How so? Unless he has taken an overt act
16 to buy the poison or to get in the car with the poison, there
17 is not by definition any threat to life or property.

18 Mr. Kelley. Mr. Schwarz, I've been around in this business
19 a long time. I've heard a number of threats which were issued,
20 and they thereafter materialized into actions. I don't think --
21 take these threats as being empty ones, because so many times
22 they have been acted upon.

23 I was criticized one time when there was a threat made to
24 kill me, and it was said later on, it's not rhetoric, it's
25 not rhetoric to me, because when they say they're going to

1 kill me, that just means one thing.

2 Mr. Schwarz. But I'm not disagreeing with you.

3 Mr. Kelley. But you are disagreeing with me. You're saying
4 on the basis of experience that you cannot detect a possible
5 threat. That's the whole area of concern that we have here, where
6 we don't lose the capability of doing something. We don't
7 say we should initiate ourselves. We say that we should go to
8 the Attorney General. We do not subscribe to the idea that
9 we should act independently because maybe we don't have the
10 judicial review, the capability of determining, but we do
11 think that we should report it and thereafter see what can
12 be done.

13 Mr. Schwarz. Well, have you changed in the course of
14 our discussion the standard on page 5.

15 On page 5 you're talking about an imminent threat.

16 Mr. Kelley. Yes.

17 Mr. Schwarz. And I hear you now as saying a possible
18 threat.

19 Mr. Kelley. An imminent possible threat.

20 Mr. Schwarz. An imminent possible threat. All right.

21 Now, would a fair standard for either action, other than
22 arrest, I don't know what you have in mind, but something to
23 prevent the person from carrying out his activities, other
24 than arrest, for instance, what is an example of what you have
25 in mind?

1 Mr. Kelley. Removing him from his position or whatever
2 is necessary in order to make it impossible or at least as
3 impossible as possible to perpetuate this thing.

4 Mr. Schwarz. You mean have him lose his job or --

5 Mr. Kelley. I don't know what it would be.

6 Mr. Schwarz. Isolate him in some fashion.

7 Mr. Kelley. In some fashion perhaps.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Now, for such activity and for opening
9 an investigation into a domestic group, could you live with
10 a standard which said you would have to have an immediate
11 threat that someone was likely to commit a serious federal
12 crime involving violence?

13 Mr. Kelley. I think that this thing could be worked out
14 so that there could be an adequate basis for an evaluation.

15 Mr. Schwarz. So those words, without trying to commit
16 you entirely to them, do not seem to you to depart far from
17 what you think would be an acceptable standard.

18 Mr. Kelley. Well, an imminent, immediate threat might
19 be, by virtue of the word "immediate" that he's going to
20 do it the next minute. In that case it may be necessary for
21 you to, not with the presence or the possibility, not able
22 to do anything except put him under arrest or anything.

23 Mr. Schwarz. Of course, of course.

24 And nobody would at all disagree with that kind of action.

25 Mr. Kelley. I don't think they would either.

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mn 8

1 Mr. Schwarz. But on the question, let's take the opening
2 of an investigation into a domestic group.

3 Is it basically consistent with practicality to make the
4 test immediate threat of a serious Federal crime involving
5 violence?

6 Mr. Kelley. To open a domestic security case.

7 Mr. Schwarz. Yes.

8 Mr. Kelley. It appears to me that this is a terrorist
9 activity, in effect. We certainly have terrorist activities
10 under our jurisdiction as a threat against the United States.

11 Mr. Schwarz. Now, are there other circumstances where
12 it is justifiable to open an investigation of the domestic
13 group where you do not have an immediate threat of serious
14 federal crime involving violence?

15 Mr. Kelley. Oh, I think there are other criteria, and
16 they have been well defined as to what is the possible
17 opening, the basis for a possible opening. We haven't been
18 discussing that, we have been discussing particular instances,
19 but there are other criteria that are used, yes.

20 Mr. Schwarz. What would the other criteria be?

21 Mr. Kelley. Well, the possible statutory violations
22 over which we have jurisdiction are, generally speaking, the
23 most used of the basis, and then you have, of course, some
24 intelligence investigations which should, of course, be of
25 short duration. If there is no showing of this into action

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1 or a viable intent.

2 Mr. Schwarz. So that's what you're looking for in the
3 intelligence investigation?

4 Mr. Kelley. By intelligence investigation, yes, you
5 are looking to prevent.

6 Mr. Schwarz. And what you are looking to prevent, and
7 what you're looking to find is a likelihood of action combined
8 with an intent to take an issue?

9 Mr. Kelley. And the capability.

10 Mr. Schwarz. And the capability.

11 All right. I just have two other lines, Mr. Kelley, and
12 I appreciate very much your time.

13 Mr. Kelley. That's all right.

14 Mr. Schwarz. Assuming a legitimate investigation has
15 been started into a domestic intelligence matter, is it legiti-
16 mate for the FBI, in addition to obtaining information that
17 relates to what we've just been talking about, the likelihood
18 of violent action, is it also legitimate for the FBI to
19 collect, A, retain, B, disseminate, C, information concerning
20 let's say the sex life of a person on the one hand, and the
21 political views of a person on the other?

22 Mr. Kelley. I think, Mr. Schwarz, that this is just what
23 many of our problems and perhaps the guidelines can define
24 this type of thing. I think probably you will agree that
25 within the determination of the deviations possibly of sex

1 lives, there might be something that is relevant. I would say
2 ordinarily it's not. And so far as political views, yes, I
3 think that this could be, if he is espousing some cause or
4 some view that advocates violence or the overthrow of the
5 government.

6 Mr. Schwarz. Would those be the two limits on political
7 views?

8 Mr. Kelley. What?

9 Mr. Schwarz. Would those be the only limits on political
10 views that you think are okay to collect, advocants of violence
11 or advocants of overthrow?

12 Mr. Kelley. Well, I don't think because he's a Democrat
13 or a Republican it would be anything that would be damaging,
14 but it might on the other hand counter the report that he's
15 a member of some other organization.

16 Mr. Schwarz. Is the standard you used on collection of
17 sex life information, might be relevant? I suppose anything
18 might be relevant, but don't you think that as a function of
19 balance, it has to have a high degree of relevance before it's
20 justifiable to collect that kind of information on American
21 citizens who are not suspected of having committed crimes?

22 Mr. Kelley. Insofar as doing it presently, it has been
23 included in some reports as a result of the requirement that
24 that is what is required by our rules, that when a person
25 reports something to us, we do a report of the complaint. Insofar

1 as a determination by guidelines that might be prepared later,
2 I think that we can certainly deliberate on this to see whether
3 or not this is something we should retain, and we would not
4 object to anything reasonable in that regard.

5 Mr. Schwarz. I just have one final question.

6 Taking the current manual and trying to understand its
7 applicability laid against the facts in the Martin Luther King
8 case, under Section 87 there is a -- permission is granted to
9 open investigations of the infiltration of non-subversive
10 groups, and the first sentence reads: "When information is
11 received indicating that a subversive group is seeking to
12 systematically infiltrate and control a non-subversive group
13 or organization, an investigation can be opened."

14 Now, I take it that is the same standard that was used
15 in opening the investigation of the Southern Christian Leadership
16 Conference in the 1960s, so that investigation could still be
17 open today under the FBI manual, the current FBI manual.

18 Mr. Kelley. We are interested in the infiltration of
19 clearly subversive groups into non-subversive groups inasmuch
20 as this is a ploy that is used many times, and having infil-
21 trated, they then get control, and they have a self-laundered
22 organization which they can use, and not, certainly, to the
23 benefit of the country.

24 Mr. Schwarz. But is the answer to my question yes, that
25 under that standard, the SCLC investigation could still be

1 opened today?

2 Mr. Kelley. I think so.

3 Mr. Schwarz. All right, then, just one final question.

4 Do you agree that special care needs to be taken not only
5 of the standards for initially opening an investigation of a
6 group, but perhaps extra care needs to be taken when the investi-
7 gation goes beyond the initial target group to individuals
8 or people who come into contact with it?

9 Mr. Kelley. I don't know if I agree with that entirely. If
10 you mean that we go into the non-subversive group, that we
11 then investigate people in that non-subversive group, not the
12 infiltrators, but the non, that we conduct a lengthy investigation
13 of them without any basis for doing so other than that they
14 are in an infiltrated group, I would likely have said -- but
15 off the top of my head I would say probably that's not necessary.

16 Mr. Schwarz. Thank you very much.

17 Mr. Smothers. Just a couple of very brief lines of
18 inquiry, Mr. Kelley.

19 I think that the questions of the Chief Counsel was
20 raising is one that goes further into your statement, when you
21 talk about the difficulty of setting out the line between
22 intelligence gathering and law enforcement kinds of functions.
23 Nevertheless, though, I think that you have made an effort,
24 indeed, the Bureau's organizational scheme reflects an effort
25 to distinguish some of this has been made.

1 Putting aside for one moment the counterespionage
2 effort, and looking strictly at what we have been calling the
3 Domestic Intelligence, is it your view that the retention of
4 this function in the Bureau is critical to the Bureau's
5 law enforcement position?

6 Mr. Kelley. My personal opinion is that the Bureau does
7 a splendid job in this area. I feel further that the background
8 of criminal investigatory activities and experiences which
9 all counterintelligence people have is very helpful. It is help-
10 ful not only in gathering knowledge and experience, it also
11 enters into this field, a person with a broad understanding
12 of the rights and privileges, and you don't have so much that
13 spy type, that cloak and dagger, that very, very secret type
14 of an operation.

15 I subscribe to the present system heartily.

16 Mr. Smothers. Would it be of assistance to your mission
17 if within the Bureau guidelines were established that
18 effectively limited access or controlled dissemination of
19 the intelligence product? In other words, if we had a
20 situation where the intelligence product is critical to assist
21 the law enforcement effort, I don't think there's any question
22 that there should be access to it.

23 Isn't our problem one of controlling the use of that
24 intelligence product and preventing the kind of murky crossing
25 of lines there with the information legitimately needed for

1 law enforcement?

2 Mr. Kelley. There is always a problem when there is wide
3 dissemination, because that just numerically increases the
4 possibility of misuse, abuse or slander, libel, or anything
5 of that matter, and I think that it would be well worthwhile
6 to review the dissemination rules to make them subject to
7 close guidance in the guidelines that we're speaking of.

8 Mr. Smothers. Let me just raise one final area with you.

9 We talked a little bit about, or a question was raised about
10 the investigation now being conducted by the Justice Department
11 regarding the improper actions on the COINTELPRO, and the
12 King case in particular.

13 As we look at allegations of impropriety by your personnel,
14 I think it would be helpful for our record here to have some
15 insight into the procedure the Bureau would normally follow.

16 What does the Bureau do when you get an allegation that
17 an agent or administrative official in the Bureau has behaved
18 improperly?

19 Is an investigation conducted internally, or is it
20 routinely referred to the Justice Department?

21 Mr. Kelley. There may be a revision in this type of
22 procedure as a result of the establishment of the Council for
23 Professional Responsibility. At present it would be in the
24 great majority of the cases turned over to our Investigative
25 Division for investigation. There might, on some unusual

1 occasion, be a designation of a special task force made up,
2 perhaps, of division heads. That is most unlikely, but it is
3 handled internally at present.

4 Mr. Smothers. Would these internal determinations be
5 reviewed by Justice, or do you think that is a necessary
6 step?

7 I guess what we are searching for here is, first of all,
8 I think you answered that, well, to what extent does the
9 Bureau police itself, and then secondly, is the Department of
10 Justice involved in the police determinations?

11 For instance, what if the Attorney General disagreed with
12 the assertion that only the higher up officials who ordered
13 the action against King should be the subject of investigation
14 and maybe prosecution?

15 How does the interplay work there between you and Justice?

16 Mr. Kelley. We do report to the Attorney General those
17 activities which we construe as improper or possibly illegal.
18 There is a possibility that the Department, having been advised
19 of the situation, might take it on their own to do their own
20 investigating, and this is something that we feel is a
21 decision to be made only rather rarely, because we feel we
22 have within our own organization sufficient capability to
23 handle that. But we do not protest it. It is handled
24 independently of us.

25 Mr. Smothers. Thank you.

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That is all I have.

Mr. Schwarz. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 12:12 o'clock p.m., the Committee recessed
subject to the call of the Chair.)

- - -

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

EBF 12364

SSC request of December 16
Response to Paragraph 3

Retain

~~SECRET~~



Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FBI

DANA HOPE BIBERMAN


*Individual involved in
Weather Underground
Support Apparatus*

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to intercept voice communications in Apartment 31, 521 West 111th Street, New York, New York, the residence of Dana Hope Biberman. — *target*

target's address

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified Secret and Top Secret which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested electronic surveillance is necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means and is necessary to protect the United States against clear and present danger to the structure and existence of the Government.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the surveillance requested until March 3, 1972.


JOHN N. MITCHELL
Attorney General of the United States

12/6/71
Date

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~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.



SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

December 6, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

TARGET ADDRESS

I hereby request that you, on behalf of the President of the United States, authorize a microphone surveillance on the residence of Dana Hope Biberman at Apartment 31, 521 West 111th Street, New York, New York. TARGET

A characterization of Dana Hope Biberman, TARGET including a description of her activities, is attached to this memorandum.

It is therefore requested that the President of the United States through the Attorney General, and in the interest of national security, consider this request in conjunction with all other intelligence information available to the Executive concerning this subject, and that you authorize the surveillance requested until March 3, 1972.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

Enclosure

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

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downgrading and
declassification

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

December 6, 1971

TARGET

DANA HOPE BIBERMAN

*Individual involved in
Weather Underground
Support apparatus*

TARGET
TARGET EMPLOYMENT

Dana Hope Biberman is an underground Weatherman courier whose residence is known to have been visited in the past by Weatherman fugitives and support personnel, and is also utilized intermittently as a Weatherman commune and "crash pad." A prime leader in New Left Movement circles in New York City, Biberman is employed as a part-time clerical employee (she is not an attorney) at the New York Office of the National Lawyers Guild, a communist front organization of lawyers and law students dedicated to the Communist Party, USA, and New Left ideals. *TARGET EMPLOYMENT*

TARGET

Biberman is a close associate of Weatherman fugitive Robert Henry Roth and Jennifer Dohrn (sister of Weatherman fugitive Bernardine Dohrn), who, during her visits to New York, resides with Biberman. Biberman is believed to have traveled to the West Coast of the United States during the past summer to meet with the fugitive leadership of the Weatherman organization. *TARGET*

DATE

Physical surveillance of Biberman's residence in June, 1971, indicated the presence of a vehicle, bearing license plates issued in the State of Oregon, registered to one Curtis J. Cantwell. Subsequent investigation regarding this matter culminated in the recent apprehension, in California, of Alvin Ira Katz, a missing New York Weatherman. Katz, utilizing the fabricated identity of Cantwell as well as other aliases, had been involved in a fraudulent traveler's check passing scheme, the proceeds of which are believed to have been utilized to finance Weatherman fugitives and Weatherman underground operations. *TARGET*

The Weatherman organization, which evolved out of the militant Students for a Democratic Society, is composed of violence-prone revolutionaries who are dedicated to the

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DANA HOPE BIBERMAN *TARGET*

overthrow of the United States Government by force and violence. Weatherman has adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology and strongly supports communist guerrilla activities abroad. Weatherman leaders have conferred with Viet Cong and North Vietnamese representatives in Cuba, North Vietnam, and Europe. Weatherman leaders have adopted the role of urban guerrillas in the United States and have claimed credit for a number of destructive bombings in which police departments, courts, and state correctional offices have been attacked. Weatherman has also claimed credit for the March 1, 1971, bombing of the United States Capitol Building.

Many Weatherman leaders have been indicted on Federal charges involving violations of the Federal antiriot, bombing, and gun control statutes. While some of these individuals have been apprehended, others remain in a fugitive status. They, together with former fugitives who have been released on bond and with a number of sympathizers, operate an extensive underground apparatus. This underground utilizes sophisticated techniques of false identities and communications through couriers and codes.

New York City, the primary area of Biberman's *TARGET* operations, has been the spawning ground for most of the current Weatherman fugitives, with such individuals as Mark William Rudd, Naomi Esther Jaffe, Peter Wales Clapp, Cathlyn Platt Wilkerson, and Kathie Boudin having New York ties. New York has likewise been the locale of the apprehensions of Weatherman fugitives such as Linda Sue Evans, Dianne Marie Donghi, and Judith Alice Clark. Terroristic activities, including the March 6, 1970, accidental explosion at the 18 West 11th Street, New York City, townhouse, killing three Weatherman activists, and such deliberate acts of malevolence as the June 9, 1970, bombing of the New York City Police Department Headquarters and the October 10, 1970, bombing of the Long Island City Courthouse, mark New York as a conspicuous focal point for Weatherman operations.

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- 2 -

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Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FBI

JENNIFER ELLEN DOHRN

*Individual Involved
in Weather Underground
Support Apparatus*

Target
Target This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to intercept voice communications in the residence of Jennifer Ellen Dohrn located at 217 Thompson Street, *Target Address* New York City. This residence is also occupied by Jennifer Dohrn's acquaintance and associate Judith Alice Clark. *Target Associate*

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested electronic surveillance is necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the Government.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority vested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the surveillance requested until June 17, 1972.

Richard G. Kleindienst

RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Acting Attorney General of the United States

3/21/72

Date

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

March 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

Target address
TARGET
TARGET
TARGET ASSOCIATE

I hereby request that you, on behalf of the President of the United States, authorize a microphone surveillance on the residence of Jennifer Ellen Dohrn at 217 Thompson Street, New York City. This residence is shared by Dohrn with Judith Alice Clark. *TARGET ASSOCIATE*

A summary of the background and activities of Jennifer Ellen Dohrn, which includes a characterization of Judith Alice Clark, is attached.

It is therefore requested that the President of the United States through the Acting Attorney General, in the interests of national security, consider this request in conjunction with all other intelligence information available to the Executive concerning this subject, and that you authorize the surveillance requested until June 17, 1972.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Enclosure

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

March 20, 1972
 INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN WEATHER
 UNDERGROUND SUPPORT APPARATUS
JENNIFER ELLEN DOHRN

TARGET

TARGET'S
SISTER

Jennifer Ellen Dohrn, sister of Bernardine Dohrn - *TENDS TO IDENTIFY TARGET*
 underground Weatherman leader and Bureau fugitive, is recognized as an extremely active member of the underground Weatherman support apparatus. Available information indicates she is not only knowledgeable concerning past violence perpetrated by revolutionary-type groups, but is also privy to information concerning future violent activities planned by the Weatherman and similar groups.

The Weatherman organization, which evolved out of the militant Students for a Democratic Society, is composed of violence-prone revolutionaries who are dedicated to the overthrow of the United States Government by force and violence. Weatherman has adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology and strongly supports communist guerrilla activities abroad. Weatherman leaders have conferred with Viet Cong and North Vietnamese representatives in Cuba, North Vietnam and Europe. Weatherman leaders, many of whom are current Bureau fugitives, have adopted the role of urban guerrillas in the United States and have claimed credit for a number of destructive bombings in which police departments, courts and state correctional offices have been attacked. Weatherman has also claimed credit for the -
 March 1, 1971, bombing of the United States Capitol Building.

TARGET

DATE

Regarding Jennifer Ellen Dohrn, in October, 1970, she was present at a press conference when the fifth underground taped message from the Weatherman, claiming credit for recent bombings and promising a fall offensive, was played, and she identified the voice on the tape as being that of her fugitive sister. That same month, in Algeria, she visited the self-exiled Black Panther Party Minister of Information Eldridge Cleaver, a fugitive from the State of California; was observed in the company of the notorious narcotics advocate Timothy Leary, when the latter

A DATE,
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TENDS TO IDENTIFY
 TARGET

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JENNIFER ELLEN DOHRN *Target*

"surfaced" following his Weatherman-assisted escape from a California prison; and she also met with representatives of the Vietnamese Government, at which time anti-Vietnam activities in this country were discussed and planned.

DATE *TENDS TO IDENTIFY TARGET*
In press inquiries during 1971, she admitted continuing in the work of her fugitive sister and to traveling extensively throughout the country in the setting up of an *DATE* underground communications system. During 1971, she was also in frequent contact with individuals associated with the Peoples Law Office in Chicago, known Weatherman benefactors, and she has made public statements regarding Weatherman activities indicative of her close association with this violence-oriented group and foreknowledge of their activities.


NAME, TENDS TO IDENTIFY TARGET

Target — Judith Alice Clark, a leading Weatherman who resides with Dohrn, has an extensive history of New Left-related violence and was sentenced in February, 1971, to three years' probation on a charge of mob action. She has been in constant contact with known Weatherman extremists and maintains a close relationship.

DATE *Target* — with Jennifer Dohrn. Jennifer Dohrn, in addition to her employment at The Center for Reproductive and Sexual Help, 424 East 62nd Street, New York City, periodically engages in speaking appearances on college campuses with Judith Clark. *NAME, TENDS TO IDENTIFY TARGET*
Target — During a December, 1971, joint appearance at a college campus in New York State, the topic of their discussion was the "Weatherman Underground."

Target — In the interest of protecting the internal security of this country, microphone surveillance of the residence of Jennifer Ellen Dohrn is considered necessary for obtaining vitally needed current intelligence-type information relating to violence-oriented activities employed by the Weatherman, and other revolutionary groups, dedicated to the violent overthrow of our present form of Government.

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Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FBI

SUSAN B. JORDAN

INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN
WEATHER UNDERGROUND
support apparatus

TARGET
AND
RESIDENCE
This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to intercept voice communications in the automobile of Susan B. Jordan, 2243 North Bissell Street, Chicago, Illinois, by means of a microphone surveillance on that car, a 1971 Volkswagen bearing a 1971 Illinois license 746-340.


↑ LICENSE #

TYPE OF AUTO

AUTO LICENSE YEAR

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President classified "Secret" and "Top Secret" which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested electronic surveillance is necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the surveillance requested until March 6, 1972.


JOHN N. MITCHELL
Attorney General of the United States

12/8/71
Date

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~~Group 1~~

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

December 8, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

I hereby request that you, on behalf of the President of the United States, authorize a microphone surveillance on an automobile, a 1971 Volkswagen bearing 1971 Illinois license 746-340, owned by Susan B. Jordan, 2243 North Bissell Street, Chicago, Illinois.

A characterization of Susan B. Jordan, including a description of her activities, is attached to this memorandum.

It is, therefore, requested that the President of the United States, through the Attorney General, and in the interest of national security, consider this request in conjunction with all other intelligence information available to the Executive concerning this subject and that you authorize the surveillance requested until March 6, 1972.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

Enclosure

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

December 8, 1971

*INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN
WEATHER UNDERGROUND SUPPORT APPARATUS*
SUSAN B. JORDAN

*TARGET**TARGET EMPLOYMENT*

Susan B. Jordan claims employment at the "People's Law Office" in Chicago, Illinois, as a "legal assistant." While she has completed law school, she does very little, if any, regular legal work. Rather, she travels extensively with individuals involved in radical New Left groups and acts as a courier for the Weatherman underground organization. She has earned a position of importance among Weatherman personnel.

The Weatherman organization, which evolved out of the militant Students for a Democratic Society, is composed of violence-prone revolutionaries who are dedicated to the overthrow of the United States Government by force and violence. Weatherman has adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology and strongly supports communist guerrilla activities abroad. Weatherman leaders have conferred with Viet Cong and North Vietnamese representatives in Cuba, North Vietnam, and Europe. Weatherman leaders have adopted the role of urban guerrillas in the United States and have claimed credit for a number of destructive bombings in which police departments, courts, and state correctional offices have been attacked. Weatherman has also claimed credit for the March 1, 1971, bombing of the United States Capitol Building.

Many Weatherman leaders have been indicted on Federal charges involving violations of the Federal antiriot, bombing, and gun control statutes. While some of the fugitives have been apprehended, others remain in fugitive status. They, together with former fugitives who have been released on bond and with a number of sympathizers, operate an extensive underground apparatus. This underground utilizes sophisticated techniques of false identities and communications through couriers and codes.

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~~SECRET~~

SUSAN B. JORDAN

TARGET

Investigation has disclosed that a key role in the operation of the Weatherman underground is played by several radical New Left attorneys, who exceed the legitimate limits of attorney-client relationships by actively involving themselves in operating the underground and in aiding the fugitives to escape apprehension.

Foremost among attorneys providing illegitimate assistance to Weatherman is that group of attorneys who compose the "People's Law Office," 2156 North Halsted Street, Chicago, Illinois. One of these attorneys, Dennis Cunningham, in March, 1971, used a false identity himself when forwarding a money order to a Weatherman fugitive in San Francisco, California. These attorneys are in regular contact with aboveground Weatherman support personnel and furnish financial support and communications channels for the underground.

TARGET

The automobile of Susan B. Jordan is frequently used by Weatherman activists and supporters, including Jennifer Dohrn (sister of Weatherman fugitive Bernardine Dohrn), Brian Flanagan (associate of Weatherman fugitive Mark Rudd), Caroline Tanner (former Weatherman fugitive apprehended in December, 1970) and others.

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SECRET



Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT: PANDA HOUSE
BETHESDA, MARYLAND

pro communism propaganda outlet

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to install a telephone surveillance on captioned establishment, 7842 Wisconsin Avenue, Bethesda, Maryland address.

Based upon intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested surveillance is necessary to obtain counterintelligence (including foreign) information deemed essential to the security of the United States and to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the surveillance requested until May 21, 1975.

Edward H. Levi

EDWARD H. LEVI
Attorney General of the United States

June 7, 1975

Date

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

Classified by The Attorney General
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SECRET

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton

February 21, 1975

JUNE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

I hereby request that, on behalf of the President of the United States of America, you authorize a telephone surveillance on the Panda House, 7642 Wisconsin Avenue, Bethesda, Maryland. *subject*

A summary in duplicate of the circumstances which prompt this request is attached to this memorandum.

It is, therefore, requested that the President of the United States, through the Attorney General, and in the interest of national security, consider this request in connection with all other intelligence information available to the Executive concerning this subject and that you authorize the surveillance requested for a period of three months ending May 21, 1975.

Respectfully,

15/C. Kelley
Clarence M. Kelley
Director

Enclosures (2)

105-259810 - 15

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
SEE NOTE PAGE 2

SECRET

Classified by Director, FBI
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 634-546

SECRET

Memorandum for the Attorney General

NOTE:

See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 2/19/75, captioned "Panda House, Internal Security - China," prepared by ELM:lps.

This memorandum is classified "Secret" since unauthorized disclosure of its contents could reasonably be expected to result in serious damage to the national security.

SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET

JUNE

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
2 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton

April 2, 1975

Pro Chicom propaganda outlet.
PANDA HOUSE
BETHESDA, MARYLAND

Subject
Panda House, a Chinese *curio* store which merchandises literature and manufactured goods from the People's Republic of China (PRC), became operational at 7842 Wisconsin Avenue *address* Bethesda, Maryland, in November, 1973. Panda House is owned by the *owner* Ta Ching Import-Export Corporation, Washington, D. C.

The staff of the *subject* Panda House consists of six individuals, all of whom are Chinese *aliens*, four of whom are currently under order of deportation from the United States as a result of their *illegal* immigration status. No United States citizens are stockholders of the *owner* Ta Ching Import-Export Corporation or employees of Panda House.

subject
Staff members of the Liaison Office, PRC, (LOPRC), have on occasions met with, consulted, and directed activities of personnel of *subject* Panda House. Personnel of the LOPRC, including two suspected of being engaged in intelligence activities in the United States, are in regular contact with *subject* Panda House personnel, who have performed specific assignments on behalf of the LOPRC, such as acting in the capacity of courier to deliver documents from Washington, D. C., to New York City. Specific details concerning these matters are set forth below:

subject
During October, 1974, a suspected intelligence officer assigned to the LOPRC counseled individuals to purchase literature from *subject* Panda House in order to keep politically informed.

subject
During November, 1974, an individual associated with *subject* Panda House acted as a courier for another suspected intelligence officer assigned to the LOPRC, delivering documents from the LOPRC to an undisclosed location in New York City.

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____
NW 55109

105-259810

ELM:cak

(7)

SECRET

SEE NOTE PAGE

Classified by Director, FBI
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐
DocId:32989555 Page 97

105-259810-15X

GPO 254-546

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

subject
Panda House
Bethesda, Maryland

subject
During the same month, it was learned that personnel of the LOPRC consulted with Panda House associates to establish if an individual in the U. S. was pro-PRC in his political sympathies prior to loaning him LOPRC films. This indicates use of Panda House personnel by the LOPRC to assess people prior to LOPRC contact.

subject
During December, 1974, it was reported that all members of the Board of Directors of Panda House are pro-PRC in their political sympathies, and it is the intention of the Board that all future Board members share those political sympathies.

subject
Later that same month, a suspected intelligence officer assigned to the LOPRC contacted the Manager of Panda House and urgently insisted that he come to the LOPRC for a conference. The LOPRC representative indicated that he was breaking a previous appointment in order to meet with the Manager of Panda House on that occasion.

subject
year Since the establishment of Panda House in November, 1973, Special Agents have observed personnel of Panda House visiting the LOPRC several times each week.

A friendly foreign intelligence service has advised that PRC officials historically engage in the recruitment of ethnic Chinese to serve as agents for the PRC. Additionally, another United States Government agency has advised that contacts of PRC diplomatic establishments have been recruited by the PRC for intelligence purposes.

subject
The coverage of the Panda House will produce additional information concerning the nature and extent of direction afforded it and its representatives by representatives of the LOPRC and will help determine if its personnel are engaging in intelligence activities on behalf of the PRC. It is a necessary part of counterintelligence coverage of this organization and the information afforded by this coverage is not available from other sources.

It is felt this surveillance is necessary to obtain counterintelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States and to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities.

SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET

Subject
Panda House
Bethesda, Maryland

NOTE:

See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 4/1/75, captioned "Panda House, Internal Security - China," prepared by ELI:lps. *Subject*

This memorandum is classified "Secret" since unauthorized disclosure of its contents could reasonably be expected to result in serious damage to the national security.

SECRET

- 3 -

1236X
102-116305-1236X

52 31
Encl. # 3

117176
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117175

The Attorney General UNITED STATES SENATE
CHIEF OF POLICE TO STUDY
OPERATIONAL OPERATIONS
IN THE AREA OF
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(SIC)

Ref made to let, w/attachment, from SSC 3rd
12/15/75, requesting delivery of material dealing
w/surveillance. Enclosed is the original of
memo. A copy of memo is being furnished for ur
records.



SECRET
Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT:

Coverage of Arab terrorist activist meeting
AL FATAH CONVENTION, MARCH 8-9, 1975
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to install a microphone surveillance at the Al Fatah Subject Convention, scheduled to be held at a presently unknown location in Chicago, Illinois, during the period March 8-9, 1975.

Based upon intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested surveillance is necessary to obtain counterintelligence information concerning a foreign-based international terrorist movement which has been publicly condemned by civilized nations throughout the world and which movement is engaged in activity that could interfere with the conduct of foreign affairs by the United States.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the surveillance requested for the period March 8 and 9, 1975.

Signature of Edward H. Levi
EDWARD H. LEVI
Attorney General of the United States

March 7, 1975

Date
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Classified by The Attorney General
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

Note reads:

(Signed in view
of memorandum
from Acting Director
of March 7, 1975
on same subject
-EHL)

SECRET

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. F. S. Putman, Jr.
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton

March 5, 1975

JUNE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

I hereby request that, on behalf of the President of the United States of America, you authorize a microphone surveillance at the Al Fatah Convention, scheduled to be held at a presently unknown location in Chicago, Illinois, during the period March 8-9, 1975.

Prior to installation you will be advised of the location of the convention, which location will be confirmed in writing.

A summary in duplicate of the circumstances which prompt this request is attached to this memorandum.

It is, therefore, requested that the President of the United States, through the Attorney General, and in the interest of national security, consider this request in connection with all other intelligence information available to the Executive concerning this subject and that you authorize the surveillance requested for the period March 8 and 9, 1975.

Respectfully,

15/Conkelly
Clarence M. Kelley
Director

Enclosures (2)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

DJM:lps
(7)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

SECRET

Classified by Director, FBI
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
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Asst. Dir.: _____
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
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Telephone Rm. _____

SECRET

Memorandum for the Attorney General

NOTE:

See memorandum F. S. Putman, Jr. to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 3/4/75, captioned ^{subject} "Al Fatah Convention, March 8-9, 1975, Chicago, Illinois, Internal Security - Middle East," prepared by DJM:lps.

Memorandum is classified "Secret" in order to protect sensitive sources and methods.

SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET

1 - Mr. J. E. Adams
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. F. S. Putman, Jr.
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton

March 5, 1975

JUNE

AL FATAH CONVENTION, MARCH 8-9, 1975
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Subject

Al Fatah is the most important and best financed organization within the Palestine liberation movement. It is headquartered in the Middle East and has members and supporters throughout the world. Its terrorist wing, the Black September Organization (BSO), was responsible for the assassinations of eleven Israelis at the XXth Olympiad, Munich, Germany, September 5, 1972, and two American diplomats at Khartoum, Sudan, March 3, 1973. On March 6 and 7, 1973, three highly explosive devices were located near Israeli-connected business establishments at New York City. Khalid D. Al Jawary, an Iraqi national known to have been connected with the BSO in the past, has been charged with this offense. The BSO has also claimed responsibility for numerous other assassinations, bombings, kidnappings and skyjackings.

A confidential source, who is in a position to know and who has furnished reliable information in the past, recently advised that the various regional leaders of the Al Fatah cadre in the United States will attend a ~~convention~~ *convention* at presently unknown location in ~~Chicago, Illinois~~ *location* during the period ~~March 8-9, 1975~~ *date*. This is the first such meeting of the regional leaders that has been known of prior to its happening.

This coverage would afford information not available from any other source and would allow the United States Government to be in a position of knowing the plans and activities of the Al Fatah cadre in the U. S. while they are being formulated and promulgated.

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Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

DJM:lp
(7)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
SEE NOTE PAGE 2

SECRET

Classified by Director, FBI
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET

subject
Al Fatah Convention, March 8-9, 1975
Chicago, Illinois

This coverage is also necessary to obtain counter-intelligence information concerning a foreign-based international terrorist movement which has been publicly condemned by civilized nations throughout the world and which movement is engaged in activity that could interfere with the conduct of foreign affairs by the United States.

NOTE:

See memorandum F. S. Putman, Jr., to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 3/4/75, captioned "Al Fatah Convention, March 8-9, 1975, Chicago, Illinois, Internal Security - Middle East," prepared by DJM:lps.

Memorandum is classified "Secret" in order to protect sensitive sources and methods.

SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. F. S. Putman
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
Ticker

The Attorney General

March 7, 1975

JUNE

Acting Director, FBI

AL FATAH CONVENTION, *subject*
MARCH 8-9, 1975, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Reference is made to FBI memorandum to the Attorney General, captioned as above, dated March 5, 1975.

Referenced memorandum requested authority to install a microphone surveillance on captioned convention, at a then unknown location in Chicago, Illinois, during the period March 8-9, 1975.
metropolitan city

Information developed by the Chicago Office of the FBI indicates that the convention of the Al Fatah cadre leaders will take place in the residence of Mahmoud Abdallah Naji, 3105 South Harlem Avenue, Bryn Mawr, Illinois, a permanent resident alien. *name and address*

Naji has been identified by confidential sources, who have furnished reliable information in the past, as a member of the Al Fatah cadre in the United States. These confidential sources had previously reported that high level meetings of the Al Fatah cadre had been held at Naji's residence in the past.
Activities

Authority is requested to install a microphone surveillance on Naji's residence during the period March 8-9, 1975. Installation and monitoring will be conducted from an adjacent apartment under the custody and control of this Bureau and no trespass will be involved.

DJM:sjg
(7)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
SECRET

Classified by Acting Director, FBI
Exempt from GDS, Category number 2
Date of Declassification indefinite

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SECRET

The Attorney General

NOTE:

The Attorney General (AG) was previously requested to authorize a microphone surveillance at the Al Fatah convention in Chicago, Illinois; however, at the time the request was made the location of the convention site was unknown. The AG was advised that he would be notified as soon as the location was determined. Above is notification to the AG of the location of the convention and request for authority to install a microphone surveillance.

SECRET

- 2 -



SECRET

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FBI


SUBJECT: (PALESTINE ARAB FUND

West Coast fund - primary for Arab terrorist groups.

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to install a telephone surveillance on captioned organization at the Pasadena Hilton Hotel, Pasadena, California. *Hotel*

Based upon intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the surveillance requested until September 23, 1973.


ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON
Attorney General of the United States

9/20/73
Date

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

Classified by The Attorney General
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SECRET

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. F. S. Putman, Jr.
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

September 20, 1973

JUNE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

I hereby request that, on behalf of the President of the United States of America, you authorize a telephone surveillance on the Palestine Arab Fund at the Pasadena Hilton Hotel, Pasadena, California.

A summary in duplicate of the circumstances which prompt this request is attached to this memorandum.

It is, therefore, requested that the President of the United States, through the Attorney General, and in the interest of national security, consider this request in connection with all other intelligence information available to the Executive concerning this subject and that you authorize the surveillance requested for the period September 21, 1973, through September 23, 1973.

Respectfully,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

Enclosures (2)

97-5240

DJM:ems
(6)

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Director Sec'y _____

REC-15

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EX-103

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Classified by Director, FBI
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

OCT 3 1973

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

NOTE:

See memorandum F. S. Putman, Jr., to Mr. E. S. Miller, dated 9/19/73, captioned ^{3/19/73} "Palestine Arab Fund", Internal Security - Middle East, prepared by DJH:cak.

This memorandum is classified "Secret" since it tends to disclose sensitive sources and/or methods.

SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET

JUNE

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. F. S. Putman, Jr.
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

September 20, 1973

West Coast fund-raising for Arab terrorist groups
PALESTINE ARAB FUND

The ^{subject} (Palestine Arab Fund) is a fund-raising group which furnishes money to Palestinian liberation movements in the Middle East.

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, has advised that captioned organization intends to hold its ^{subject} (fifth) annual convention at the ^{address} (Hilton Hotel, Pasadena, California) during the period ^{date} (September 21, 1973, through September 23, 1973). This source further advised that the convention would be attended by "all those working for Al Fatah."

The ^{subject} (Palestine Arab Fund) supports Palestinian liberation movements, including Al Fatah, whose Black September Organization (BSO) was responsible for the assassination of two American diplomats, March 3, 1973, at Khartoum, Sudan. This Bureau now has information from two sources, who have furnished reliable information in the past, that Al Fatah, the leading Arab terrorist organization, plans activities in the United States which may include assassinations and kidnappings. On March 6 and 7, 1973, three highly explosive devices were located at New York, New York, near Israeli-connected business establishments. Literature located with the devices indicates the BSO was responsible; and an Iraqi national, known to have been connected with the BSO in the past, has been charged with this offense.

It is expected that approximately 350 people will attend the convention. The schedule calls for general as well as various committee meetings. At the meetings a public address system will be used by the speakers.

It is essential that we identify all members and/or supporters of Al Fatah in the United States.

97-5240

DJM:cak

(6) CAK

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure PAGE 2

Classified by Director, FBI
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

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Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
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Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET

PALESTINE ARAB FUND

Subject

NOTE:

See memorandum F. S. Putman, Jr., to Mr. E. S. Miller, dated 9/19/73, captioned ^{Subject} (Palestine Arab Fund), Internal Security - Middle East, prepared by DJM:cak.

This memorandum is classified "Secret" since it tends to disclose sensitive sources and/or methods.

SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT: PALESTINE ARAB FUND


*West Coast fund-raising
for Arab terrorist groups.*

This is in response to your request to the
President of the United States of America for authority
to install a microphone surveillance in the Mount Wilson
Room, Pasadena Hilton Hotel, Pasadena, California.

Hotel Room

Based upon intelligence data available to the
President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," I have,
on behalf of the President of the United States, determined
that the requested surveillance is necessary to obtain
foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the
security of the United States.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested
in me by the President of the United States of America, do
hereby authorize the surveillance requested until
September 23, 1973.


ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON
Attorney General of the United States

9/19/73
Date

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

Classified by The Attorney General
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SECRET

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

September 20, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

I hereby request that, on behalf of the President of the United States of America, you authorize a microphone surveillance in the Mount Wilson Room, Pasadena Hilton Hotel, Pasadena, California.

A summary in duplicate of the circumstances which prompt this request is attached to this memorandum.

It is, therefore, requested that the President of the United States, through the Attorney General, and in the interest of national security, consider this request in connection with all other intelligence information available to the Executive concerning this subject and that you authorize the surveillance requested for the period September 21, 1973, through September 23, 1973.

Respectfully,

Clarence M. Kelley
Clarence M. Kelley
Director

Enclosures (2)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

Classified by Director, FBI
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SECRET



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

September 20, 1973

West Coast Fund - raising for Arab terrorist groups.
 PALESTINE ARAB FUND

The ^{Subject} (Palestine Arab Fund) is a fund-raising group which furnishes money to Palestinian liberation movements in the Middle East.

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, has advised that captioned organization intends to hold its ^{year} (fifth) annual convention at the (Hilton Hotel, Pasadena, California, during the period (September 21, ^{date} 1973, through September 23, 1973). This source further advised that the convention would be attended by "all those working for Al Fatah."

The (Palestine Arab Fund) supports Palestinian liberation movements, including Al Fatah, whose Black September Organization (BSO) was responsible for the assassination of two American diplomats, March 3, 1973, at Khartoum, Sudan. This Bureau now has information from two sources, who have furnished reliable information in the past, that Al Fatah, the leading Arab terrorist organization, plans activities in the United States which may include assassinations and kidnappings. On March 6 and 7, 1973, three highly explosive devices were located at New York, New York, near Israeli-connected business establishments. Literature located with the devices indicates the BSO was responsible; and an Iraqi national, known to have been connected with the BSO in the past, has been charged with this offense.

It is expected that approximately 350 people will attend the convention. The schedule calls for a meeting of 30 individuals, not further identified, but believed to be the hierarchy of Al Fatah in the United States, in the Mount Wilson Room of the hotel.

It is essential that we identify all members and/or supporters of Al Fatah in the United States.

SECRET

Classified by Director, FBI
 Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
 Date of Declassification Indefinite
 NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
 Subject to Criminal Sanctions



Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI


MUNIR SAYID YAMEEN
INTERNAL SECURITY - MIDDLE EAST

Arab terrorist activist

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to intercept wire communications to and from the telephone installation at the residence of the subject, 8018 *upper* Northwest Potomac, Parkville, Missouri.

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified Secret and Top Secret, which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States, do hereby authorize the surveillance requested through January 10, 1973.


RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Attorney General of the United States

10/12/72
Date

SECRET

Classified by The Attorney General
Exempt From General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category Number 2
Automatically Declassified On Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

1 - Mr. D. D. Kinley
 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
 1 - Mr. A. J. Decker
 1 - Mr. J. M. Sizoo
 1 - Mr. T. H. George

JUNE

October 10, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
 ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

I hereby request that you, on behalf of the President of the United States, authorize a telephone surveillance on the residence of Munir Sayid Yameen, 8018 Northwest Potomac, Parkville, Missouri.

name and address of target

A summary of the circumstances which prompt the request is attached to this memorandum.

It is, therefore, requested that the President of the United States, through the Attorney General, and in the interest of national security, consider this request in conjunction with all other intelligence information available to the Executive concerning this subject and that you authorize the surveillance requested through January 10, 1973.

Respectfully,

L. Patrick Gray, III
 Acting Director

Enclosure

134-20720

THC:asm/asm

(8)

ST-101 REG-24

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

15 OCT 24 1972

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Classified by Acting Director, FBI

Exempt From General Declassification

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REC.D-6EVB Exemption Category Number 2

Automatically Declassified On Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

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 Walters _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Mr. King _____
 Mr. Armstrong _____
 Mr. Holt _____

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

NOTE:

See memorandum A. J. Decker to Mr. ^{page 2} E. S. Miller, dated 10/6/72, captioned "Munir Sayid Yameen, Internal Security - Middle East," prepared by TUG:asm.

Classified "Secret" since it reveals a sensitive investigative technique, the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in serious damage to the national defense interests.

SECRET

- 2 -

1 - Mr. D. Kinley
1 - Mr. S. Miller
1 - Mr. A. J. Decker
1 - Mr. J. M. Sizoo
1 - Mr. T. H. George

JUNE

October 10, 1972

MUNIR SAYID YAMEN
INTERNAL SECURITY - MIDDLE EAST

Subject was born in Palestine October 19, 1932, and was naturalized as a U. S. citizen in 1947. He is employed in the personnel office of Trans World Airlines at Kansas City, Kansas, and is married to an American citizen. Subject has been identified as a member of the Al Fatah cadre in the United States and has had contacts with Fatah officials both in the United States and abroad.

The "Black September" organization of Al Fatah was responsible for the assassinations of Israelis at the XXth Olympiad, Munich, Germany, on September 5, 1972, and we have been informed by a source that Al Fatah has contacted the Cleaver Faction of the Black Panther Party in the United States to obtain explosives and ammunition to be used to create an incident in this country. Another highly sensitive source advised that Al Fatah contemplates a "spectacular action" in the United States.

On September 19, 1972, a letter addressed to an Israeli official assigned to that country's embassy in London, England, was opened by that individual, at which time an explosive device detonated and fatally injured him. Additional letter bombs intercepted throughout the world addressed to Israeli officials have been disarmed and shown to contain a message from the "Black September" organization indicating that organization's responsibility for mailing the letter bombs.

Sources furnishing the above information have furnished reliable information in the past.

134-20720

THG:dsb

(7)

SECRET

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

FBI

REC.D-BEYOND

Classified by Acting Director, FBI

Exempt From General Declassification

Schedule of Executive Order 11652

Exemption Category Number 2

Automatically Declassified On Indefinite

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Bishop _____
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Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Ponder _____
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Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Adams _____
Mr. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MUNIR SAYID YANSEN

Name of target
SECRET

NOTE:

See memorandum A. J. Decker to Mr. E. S. Miller, dated 10/6/72, captioned Munir Sayid Yansen, Internal Security - Middle East, prepared by THG:asm.

Classified "Secret" since it reveals a sensitive investigative technique, the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in serious damage to the national defense interests.

SECRET

- 2 -



SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION/NO DISSEMINATION ABROAD
CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION/THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO
BE INCLUDED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION

Office of the Attorney General

Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT: SAMI AYUB KHOURY

*Ma
Terrorist
Activist*

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to install a telephone surveillance at subject's residence, 6608 Beverly Avenue, McLean, Virginia. *residence address*

Based upon intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the surveillance requested until December 13, 1973.

ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON
Attorney General of the United States

9/18/73
Date

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION/NO DISSEMINATION ABROAD
CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION/THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO
BE INCLUDED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION

Classified by The Attorney General
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 4
Date of Declassification Indefinite ; ;

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. F. S. Putman, Jr.
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

JUNE

REC-52

105-250568-12

September 13, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

I hereby request that, on behalf of the President of the United States of America, you authorize a telephone surveillance on Sami Dyah ^{Subject} Houry at his residence, 6603 ^{Residence} Beverly Avenue, McLean, Virginia.

A summary in duplicate of the circumstances which prompt this request is attached to this memorandum.

It is, therefore, requested that the President of the United States, through the Attorney General, and in the interest of national security, consider this request in connection with all other intelligence information available to the Executive concerning this subject and that you authorize the surveillance requested for a period of three months ending December 13, 1973.

Respectfully,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

Enclosures (2)

SEP 24 1973

DJM:cak
(6)

SECRET

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

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Classified by Director, FBI
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 4
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

OCT 3 1973

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐
NW 55109 DocId:32989559 Page 123

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Assoc. Dir. _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Cong. Serv. _____
Corr. & Crm. _____
Research _____
Press Off _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

NOTE:

See memorandum F. S. Putman, Jr., to Mr. E. S. Miller dated 9/12/73, captioned "Sami Ayub ^{Subject} Khoury, Internal Security - Middle East," prepared by DJM:ems.

Classified "Secret, No Foreign Dissemination/No Dissemination Abroad/Controlled Dissemination/This Information is Not to be Included in Any Other Document or Publication" since information by CIA source is so classified.

SECRET

- 2 -

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. F. S. Putman, Jr.
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

JUNE

September 13, 1973

SAMI AYUB KHOURY

ambassador activist

Place of Birth
Subject is a white male born *date of birth* July 13, 1922, at Kfeir, Lebanon, but subsequently obtained Syrian citizenship. He is currently employed as a Medical Officer, Public Health Administration, District of Columbia Government, 801 North Capitol Street, Northeast, Washington, D. C. He resides with *place of residence* his wife and daughter at 6608 Beverly Avenue, McLean, Virginia.

Prior to coming to the United States, *Subject* Khoury had been a member of the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party, a pro-Palestinian group, and was sentenced to death (in absentia) by Syrian authorities for his activities in behalf of that organization.

Information received from another government agency, from a source described as reliable, indicates that *Subject* Khoury has had contacts with members of the Black September Organization (BSO) of Al Fatah. This source further advised that *Subject* Khoury is expected to continue contacts with BSO members in the future. He has been identified as the middle man between BSO members in the Middle East and BSO members in the United States whose identities are unknown to this Bureau.

See
The BSO was responsible for the assassination of two American diplomats, March 3, 1973, at Khartoum, Sudan. This Bureau now has information from two sources, who have furnished reliable information in the past, that Al Fatah, the leading Arab terrorist organization, plans activities in the United States which may include assassinations and kidnappings. On March 6 and 7, 1973, three highly explosive

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Comp. Syst. _____
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Rec. Mgmt. _____
Tech. Serv. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

DJM:cak
(6) CAK

SECRET

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

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SAMI AYUB KHOURY *Subject*

devices were located at New York, New York, near Israeli-connected business establishments. Literature located with the devices indicates the BSO was responsible. Khalid D. Al Jawary, an Iraqi national known to have been connected with the BSO in the past has been charged with this offense.

Due to the BSO's propensity for violence and terrorism it is essential to identify its members.

NOTE:

See memorandum F. S. Putman, Jr., to Mr. F. S. Miller dated 9/12/73, captioned "Sami Ayub Khoury, Internal Security - Middle East," prepared by DJH:ems.

Classified "Secret, No Foreign Dissemination/
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Information is Not to be Included in Any Other Document
or Publication" since information by CIA source is so
classified.

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- 2 -



SECRET
Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI


FIHME HUSSEIN SULEIMAN
INTERNAL SECURITY - MIDDLE EAST

*Arab Terrorist
Activist*

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to intercept wire communications to and from the telephone installation located at 157 De Diego Street, Rio Piedras, *ADDRESS.* Puerto Rico.

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States do hereby authorize the surveillance requested through July 12, 1973.


RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Attorney General of the United States

4/16/73
Date

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
SECRET

Classified by The Attorney General
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SECRET

JUNE

1 - Mr. D. D. Kinley
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. F. S. Putman, Jr.
1 - Mr. R. H. Horner
1 - Mr. T. H. George

April 12, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

I hereby request that you, on behalf of the President of the United States, authorize a telephone surveillance on Fihme Hussein Suleiman ^{subject} at his place of business, Joyeria Cleopatra, 157 De Diego Street, ^{Address} Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico.

A summary in duplicate of the circumstances which prompted this request is attached to this memorandum.

It is, therefore, requested that the President of the United States, through the Attorney General, and in the interests of national security, consider this request in conjunction with all other intelligence information available to the Executive concerning this subject and that you authorize the surveillance requested through July 12, 1973.

Respectfully,

L. Patrick Gray, III
Acting Director

SENT FROM D. O.

TIME 5:50 pm
DATE 4/12/73
BY ATG

16 APR 17 1973

Enclosures (2)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

105-219337

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

THG:ems cm
(8)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

SECRET

Classified by Acting Director, FBI
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Baker _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Gebhardt _____
Mr. Jenkins _____
Mr. Marshall _____
Mr. Miller, E.S. _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Mr. Thompson _____
Mr. Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Mr. Bowers _____
Mr. Herington _____
Ms. Herwig _____

6 APR 20 1973 ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

NOTE:

2240 See memorandum F. S. Putman, Jr., to Mr. E. S. Miller, dated 4/11/73, captioned, "Fihme Hussein Suleiman^{subject}, Internal Security - Middle East," prepared by THG:ems.

Classified "Secret" since it reveals sensitive investigative technique the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in serious damage to the national security of the United States.

SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET

JUNE

1 - Mr. D. D. Kinley
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. F. S. Putman, Jr.
1 - Mr. R. H. Horner
1 - Mr. T. H. George

April 12, 1973

RE: FIHME HUSSEIN SULEIMAN
INTERNAL SECURITY - MIDDLE EAST

*Arab Terrorist
Activist*

Subject Suleiman was born *Date of birth* April 17, 1936, at *Place of birth* Tira, Palestine, and is currently a naturalized United States citizen residing at Windsor Tower Apartments, 400 De Diego Street, Apartment 816, Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico. Sources of this Bureau have identified subject as a member of Al Fatah, the leading Arab terrorist group and investigation has developed that Suleiman *Subject* is in both personal and telephonic contact on a regular basis with individuals in the United States, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands who have been identified as members of Al Fatah by sources. Suleiman operates the Joyeria Cleopatra, a jewelry store *Employment* at 157 De Diego Street, Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico. On interview October 3, 1972, by Agents of this Bureau, Suleiman *Subject* denied knowledge of any Arab terrorist activity in Puerto Rico and stated that he had never been a member of Al Fatah or at any time associated with any terrorist group.

goc A source reported that in May, 1972, Suleiman traveled to an undisclosed location in the Middle East to attend an Al Fatah meeting with his travel reportedly to correspond with travel by Dr. Abu Ayman Wadi of Dallas, Texas, who was making a trip to the Middle East at the same time and for the same purpose. Other sources have identified Wadi as the former head of Al Fatah in the United States.

Position Another source has reported that Suleiman is the former treasurer of the Puerto Rican Arab Cultural Club. This club was reportedly established on a social basis; however, this source reports that at recent meetings films have been shown depicting acts of guerrilla warfare. At

Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Baker _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Gebhardt _____
Mr. Jenkins _____
Mr. Marshall _____
Mr. Miller, E.S. _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Mr. Thompson _____
Mr. Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Mr. Bowers _____
Mr. Herington _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mr. Mintz _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

105-219337

THG:ems
(8)

SECRET

Classified by Acting Director, FBI
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

NW 55109 DocId:32989559 Page 130

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

ENCLOSURE

105-219337-2

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

DEM

SECRET

Fihme Hussein Suleiman ^{Subject}

its meeting of December 14, 1972, Al Fatah flags were sold and at its meeting of December 28, 1972, the president told members that there is a necessity of obtaining more funds in support of Al Fatah for immediate transmittal to guerrillas in the Middle East. This source reports that while Suleiman ^{Position} is no longer treasurer of the Puerto Rican Arab Cultural Club, ^{Subject} he continues to exert an influence on its activities.

The Black September Organization (BSO) of Al Fatah was responsible for the assassination of two American diplomats March 3, 1973, at Khartoum, Sudan. This Bureau has received information from two sources that Al Fatah plans activities in the United States which may include assassinations and kidnappings. On March 6 and 7, 1973, three highly explosive devices were located at New York, New York, near Israeli-connected business establishments. Literature located with the devices indicates the BSO was responsible. Khalid Dahham Al Jawary, an Iraqi national known to have been connected with BSO in the past, has been charged with this offense.

All sources of this Bureau furnishing the above information have furnished reliable information in the past.

NOTE:

⁴⁰ See memorandum F. S. Putman, Jr., to Mr. E. S. Miller, dated 4/11/73, captioned "Fihme Hussein Suleiman", Internal Security - Middle East," prepared by THG:ems. ^{Subject}

Classified "Secret" since it reveals sensitive investigative technique the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in serious damage to the national security of the United States.

SECRET

- 2 -

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Office of the Attorney General

Washington, D. C. 20530



MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT: SABRI KHALID KAWASH

*ARAB TERRORIST ACTIVIST;
ARAB TERRORIST AFFILIATE.*

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to install a telephone surveillance at subject's residence, 1016 Havre Court, Sunnyvale, California, and his place of business, Ask Printing Enterprises, 658 South Bernardo Avenue, Sunnyvale, California.

*RESIDENCE ADDRESS
BUSINESS ADDRESS*

Based upon intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the surveillance requested until December 17, 1973.

A handwritten signature, likely of Elliot L. Richardson, is written over a horizontal line.

ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON
Attorney General of the United States

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

9/18/73
Date

SECRET

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Classified by The Attorney General
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 4
Date of Declassification Indefinite

JUNE

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. F. S. Putnam, Jr.
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

September 17, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

I hereby request that, on behalf of the President
of the United States of America, you authorize a telephone
surveillance on Sabri Khalid Hawash at his residence,
1016 Bayre Court, Sunnyvale, California, and his place of
business, Ask Printing Enterprises, 658 South Bernardo Avenue,
Sunnyvale, California.

A summary in duplicate of the circumstances which
prompt this request is attached to this memorandum.

It is, therefore, requested that the President
of the United States, through the Attorney General, and
in the interest of national security, consider this request
in connection with all other intelligence information
available to the Executive concerning this subject and
that you authorize the surveillance requested for a period
of three months ending December 17, 1973.

Respectfully,
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

SEP 24 1973

Enclosures (2)

EX-103

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

SECRET

105-244935 -

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Classified by Director, FBI/1001
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 4
Date of Declassification Indefinite

OCT 3 1973

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

NOTE:

NAME of target

See memorandum F. S. Putman, Jr., to Mr. E. S. Miller dated 9/14/73, captioned "Sabri Khalid Kawash, Internal Security - Middle East," prepared by DUM:cak.

Classified "Secret, No Foreign Dissemination/No Dissemination Abroad/Controlled Dissemination/This Information is Not to be Included in Any Other Document or Publication" as it contains information from CIA which was so classified.

CIA concurrence was obtained in order to furnish information from their source to the Attorney General.

SECRET

- 2 -

NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION/NO DISSEMINATION ABROAD
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BE INCLUDED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. F. S. Putman, Jr.
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

JUNE

September 17, 1973

SABRI KHALID KAWASH

ARAB TERRORIST
ACTIVIST
TARGET'S DATE
OF BIRTH

Subject is white Arab male born November 15, 1929,
in Palestine. He presently resides at 1015 Bayre Court,
Sunnyvale, California. He is the owner-operator of Ask
Printing Enterprises, 658 South Bernardo Avenue, Sunnyvale,
California.

RESIDENCE
EMPLOY-
MENT OF
TARGET

He has been identified as having been in contact
with members of the Al Fatah cadre in the United States.
Information received from another Government agency, from
a source they described as reliable, indicates that subject
will meet with a member of the Black September Organization
(BSO) who is presently in the United States contacting members
and/or supporters of Al Fatah.

Al Fatah's BSO was responsible for the assassination
of two American diplomats, March 3, 1973, at Khartoum, Sudan.
This Bureau now has information from two sources, who have
furnished reliable information in the past, that Al Fatah,
the leading Arab terrorist organization, plans activities
in the United States which may include assassinations and
kidnapings. On March 6 and 7, 1973, three highly explosive
devices were located at New York, New York, near Israeli-
connected business establishments. Literature located with
the devices indicates the BSO was responsible, and an Iraqi
national, known to have been connected with the BSO in the
past, has been charged with this offense.

105-244935 NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

DJM:cak

(6)

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

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Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 4
Date of Declassification Indefinite

Assoc. Dir. _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Ext. Affairs _____
Files & Com. _____
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Inspection _____
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Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Telephone Rm. _____

TELETYPE UNIT

RECEIVED FBI TARGET ODF

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BE INCLUDED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION

SABRI KHALID KAWASH

NAME OF TARGET

It has been reported that subject has used his business to print literature used by Palestinian liberation groups in the United States.

Due to their propensity for violence, it is essential that members of the BSO be identified.

NOTE:

See memorandum F. S. Putman, Jr., to Mr. F. S. Miller dated 9/14/73, captioned "Sabri Khalid Kawash, Internal Security - Middle East," prepared by DJM:cak.

Classified "Secret, No Foreign Dissemination/No Dissemination Abroad/Controlled Dissemination/This Information is Not to be Included in Any Other Document or Publication" as

☐ concurrence was obtained in order to furnish information from their source to the Attorney General.

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

SECRET

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BE INCLUDED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION

SECRET



Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI
ACTION COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN ARAB RELATIONS
INTERNAL SECURITY - MIDDLE EAST

*Pro-Palestine
Group*

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to intercept wire communications to and from the telephone installation located at 441 Lexington Avenue, New York City.

Address

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States, do hereby authorize the surveillance requested through March 29, 1973.

Richard G. Kleindienst

RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Attorney General of the United States

1/2/73

Date

SECRET

Classified by The Attorney General
Exempt From General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category Number 2
Automatically Declassified On Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

1 - Mr. D. Kinley
 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
 1 - Mr. J. M. Sizoo
 1 - Mr. T. H. George

JUNE

December 29, 1972

REC-11 / 105-131134-127

v.101

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
 ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

I hereby request that you, on behalf of the President of the United States, authorize a telephone surveillance on the Action Committee on American Arab Relations at 441 Lexington Avenue, New York City.

NAME/ADDRESS
OF TARGET

A characterization of the Action Committee on American Arab Relations and its activities is attached to this memorandum.

NAME OF
TARGET

It is, therefore, requested that the President of the United States, through the Attorney General, and in the interest of national security, consider this request in conjunction with all other intelligence information available to the Executive concerning this subject and that you authorize the surveillance requested through March 29, 1973.

Respectfully,
 For the Acting Director

SENT FROM D. O.
 TIME 1:57 PM
 DATE 12-29-72
 BY elw

W. Mark Felt
 Acting Associate Director

Enclosure

105-131134

THG:dsm

(8)

SECRET

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Classified by W. Mark Felt
 Exempt From General Declassification
 Schedule of Executive Order 11652
 Exemption Category Number 2
 Automatically Declassified On Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
 Subject to Criminal Sanctions

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

JAN 17 1973

Felt _____
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 Soyars _____
 Walters _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Mr. Kinley _____
 Mr. Armstrong _____
 Ms. Herwig _____

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

NOTE:

See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. E. S. Miller dated 12/27/72, captioned "Action Committee on American Arab Relations: Internal Security - Middle East." prepared by THG:dsm.

NAME OF
TARGET

Classified "Secret" since it reveals a sensitive investigative technique, the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in serious damage to the national security of the United States.

SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET

1 - Mr. D. D. Kinley
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. M. Sizoo
1 - Mr. T. H. George

JUNE

December 29, 1972

PRO-PALESTINE GROUP

RE: ACTION COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN ARAB RELATIONS
INTERNAL SECURITY - MIDDLE EAST

*NAME OF
FOUNDER*

*NAME OF
TARGET
GROUP
FOUNDER*

Captioned organization was formed in 1964 by Dr. Mohammed T. Mehdi, an Iraqi citizen currently a permanent resident alien in the United States. The organization espouses the cause of the Palestinian liberation movement. In 1970 Dr. Mehdi was identified as an Al Fatah contact by a source of another Government agency and since that time has been reported by sources to have been in contact with individuals identified as Al Fatah cadre members in the United States and Puerto Rico.

Another Government agency now reports information from a source of that agency that a Black September group exists in Toronto, Canada. Representatives of this group have been in contact with source of that agency who is publicly known for his violent anti-Semitic views. Purpose of the contact was to obtain weapons and personnel to support a Black September operation in the United States. This operation is to include assassination of Jews and kidnaping of important Zionist figures to obtain the release of political prisoners. The source was furnished the name Dr. M. T. Mehdi, New York City, telephone numbers 212 682-1154 or 461-5223 as the United States contact of this group. New York City telephone number 212 682-1154 is the telephone of captioned organization.

*NAME AND
TELEPHONE
NUMBERS
TENDING
TO
IDENTIFY
A SOURCE
OF ANOTHER
GOVERNMENT
AGENCY*

105-131134

THG:dsm

(7)

SECRET

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

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Exempt From General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category Number 2
Automatically Declassified On Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Purvis _____
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Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____

Mr. Miller _____
Mr. Neenan _____

DocId:32989559

Page 140

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The "Black September" group of Al Fatah was responsible for the assassinations of Israeli athletes at the XXth Olympiad, Munich, Germany, on September 5, 1972, and we have been informed by a source that Al Fatah has contacted the Cleaver Faction of the Black Panther Party in the United States to obtain explosives and ammunition to be used to create an incident in this country. Another highly sensitive source has advised that Al Fatah contemplates a "spectacular action" in the United States.

All sources of this Bureau furnishing the above information have furnished reliable information in the past.

NOTE:

See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. E. S. Miller dated 12/27/72, captioned "Action Committee on American Arab Relations; Internal Security - Middle East," prepared by THG:dsm.

*NAME OF
TARGET*

Classified "Secret" since it reveals a sensitive investigative technique, the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in serious damage to the national security of the United States.

SECRET

- 2 -



SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
February 13, 1956

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
FBI File 100-3

HEADQUARTERS
OF TWO BASIC
REVOLUTIONARY
GROUPS

The Communist Party, USA, national and New York State organizations moved their headquarters early this month from 268 Seventh Avenue, New York City, to the Jefferson School of Social Science Building located at 575 Sixth Avenue, New York City.

ADDRESS
TO
ADDRESS

We formerly had technical surveillances on these two important segments of the Communist Party, USA, at their former headquarters which were exceedingly productive and furnished highly important day-to-day information concerning the Communist movement that could not have been obtained from any other source.

BASIC
REVOLUTIONARY
GROUPS

It is recommended that you authorize technical surveillances on the Communist Party, USA, telephone Oregon 5-9250, and the New York State organization, telephone Watkins 9-0464, at the new headquarters or at any other address to which they may move.

HEADQUARTERS OF
TWO BASIC
REVOLUTIONARY
GROUPS AT
THEIR NEW
ADDRESSES

The postal address of the Jefferson School of Social Science Building is 575 Sixth Avenue; however, the telephone company listing for the above telephones is 101 West 16th Street, New York City, which is the side entrance to the same building and which will probably be the address given for the Communist Party, USA, national and New York State headquarters.

1. INFORMATION REGARDING
ADDRESSES AND TELEPHONE NUMBERS
OF THE TWO GROUPS

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

Approved: 2403
Date: 2-13-56

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET ENCLOSURE



SECRET

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
NEW YORK CITY

*HEADQUARTERS
OF TWO BASIC
REVOLUTIONARY
GROUPS*

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to intercept wire communications to and from the telephone installation located at 23 West 26th Street, New York City, which installation is listed under the name of the Communist Party, USA.

*Address
basic
REVOLUTIONARY
Group*

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified Secret and Top Secret, which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested electronic surveillance is necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or any other hostile action of a foreign power, is necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means, and is necessary to protect the United States against any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the Government.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the continuation of the surveillance presently conducted until May 3, 1973.

Richard G. Kleindienst

RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Attorney General of the United States

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION


Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

2/2/73
Date

SECRET

Classified by The Attorney General
Exempt From General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category Number 2
Automatically Declassified on Indefinite

SECRET



Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT: ELIZABETH BOYNTON MILLARD

Foreign Intelligence Contact

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to intercept wire communications to and from the telephone installed at the residence of Elizabeth Boynton Millard located at 57 Charles Street, New York City.

Foreign Intelligence Contact

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested electronic surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States.

Residence Address

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States, do hereby authorize the surveillance requested through November 19, 1972.

Richard G. Kleindienst

RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Attorney General of the United States

8/19/72
Date

SECRET

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions



SECRET

Office of the Attorney General

Washington, D. C. 20530

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI


SUBJECT: ELIZABETH BOYNTON MILLARD

*Foreign Intelligence
CONTALL*

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to intercept wire communications to and from the telephone installed at the residence of the subject, which is located at 57 Charles Street, New York City. *RESIDENCE*

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested electronic surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States, do hereby authorize the surveillance requested through February 19, 1973.



RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Attorney General of the United States

11/9/72.
Date

SECRET

Classified By Attorney General
Exempt From General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category Number 2
Automatically Declassified on Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

JUNE

1 - Mr. D. D. Kinley
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
11 - Mr. A. J. Decker
1 - Mr. J. M. Sizoo
1 - Mr. R. A. Mullins

August 29, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

On behalf of the President of the United States you are requested to authorize a telephone surveillance at the summer residence of Elizabeth Boynton Millard, Schultz Hill Road, Staatsburg, Dutchess County, New York, telephone number 266-3759, for a period of three months ending November 29, 1972. *NAME OF TARGET*

A characterization of Millard is attached to this memorandum. It is expected that this surveillance will provide reliable and significant intelligence information regarding the subject. *TELEPHONE NUMBER*

It is, therefore, requested that the President of the United States, through the Attorney General and in the interest of national security, consider this request in conjunction with all other intelligence information available to the Executive concerning this subject and that you authorize the surveillance until November 29, 1972. *NAME OF TARGET*

Respectfully,

L. Patrick Gray, III
Acting Director

SENT FROM D. O.

TIME 9:15 am
DATE 8/31/72
BY [Signature]

SENT FROM D. O.

TIME 10:00 am
DATE 8/29/72
BY [Signature]

Enclosure

61-10200

RAM:vgc

(8)

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

Group 1

Felt _____
Bates _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Campbell _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SEP 19 1972

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

NOTE:

See Memorandum A. J. Decker to Mr. E. S. Miller, dated 8/29/72, same caption, prepared by RAM:vgc/plh.

Classified "Secret" since this deals with highly sensitive coverage in the internal security field, the unauthorized disclosure of which could seriously affect the security of the U.S.

SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET

JUNE

1 - Mr. D. D. Kinley
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. A. J. Decker

August 29, 1972

1 - Mr. J. M. Sizoo
1 - Mr. R. A. Mullins

ELIZABETH BOYNTON MILLARD

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE CONTACT

According to another United States intelligence agency, two Cuban-backed Latin American revolutionaries are scheduled to carry out the assassination of a top official of the United States Government. These revolutionaries reportedly would be coming from foreign countries and would contact Millard, a resident of New York City employed as a free-lance journalist. She has been deeply involved in Communist and Latin American revolutionary activities since 1934. Reportedly, Millard is scheduled to give the assassins the exact details of their assignment.

*NAME/RESIDENCE OF TARGET
TARGET EMPLOYMENT*

NAME/RESIDENCE OF TARGET

In view of the foregoing we have established close coverage at Millard's New York City residence and her activities have been constantly monitored. Information has now been received that she has proceeded to her summer home at Staatsburg, New York, which is located in a very remote area and would be an ideal meeting place for persons involved in an assassination plot. At the present time, physical surveillance of Millard is very difficult since any unusual activity in the isolated area would attract immediate attention.

RESIDENCE OF TARGET

RESIDENCE OF TARGET

In view of the serious allegations involved herein we believe that close coverage of Millard's summer residence is necessary if we are to determine the full details of this plot.

*NAME OF TARGET
RESIDENCE*

61-10200

RAM:jlrr
(7)

DC 71-1

Felt _____
Baker _____
Bates _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

Group 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ENCLOSURE

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

MAIL ROOM 22849539 TELETYPE UNIT

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO 03 51 15

LSI-3 1000
SEC. 1000

Q. J. Miller RAM
61-10200-142

SECRET

Re: Elizabeth Boynton Millard

*NAME OF
TARGET*

NOTE:

See memorandum A. J. Decker to Mr. E. S. Miller, dated 8/29/72, same caption, prepared by RAM:vgc/plh.

Classified "Secret" since this deals with highly sensitive coverage in the internal security field, the unauthorized disclosure of which could seriously affect the security of the U. S.

- 2 -

SECRET

SSC Request of December 16

Items 1 - 4 of Attachment

RETAIN



SECRET

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT: LEIBEL BERGMAN

Foreign Intelligence Agent

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to continue the telephone surveillance on subject's residence, Apartment 5H, 52 Arden Street, New York, New York. *Residence Address*

Based upon intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States and to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the continuation of the surveillance presently being conducted until June 16, 1974.

W B Saxbe

WILLIAM B. SAXBE
Attorney General of the United States

3/13/74

Date

SECRET

Classified by The Attorney General
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT: LEIBEL BERGMAN

*Foreign
Intelligence
Agent*

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to continue the microphone surveillance on captioned individual's residence, Apartment 5H, 52 Arden Street, New York, New York.

*Residence
Address*

Based upon intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States and to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the continuation of the surveillance presently being conducted until June 1, 1974.

W B Saxbe


WILLIAM B. SAXBE
Attorney General of the United States

3/4/74
Date

SECRET

Classified by The Attorney General
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions



Office of the Attorney General

Washington, D. C. 20530

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI


LEIBEL BERGMAN
INTERNAL SECURITY - CHINA

*Foreign Intelligence
Agent*

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States for authority to intercept wire communications to and from the telephone installation located at Apartment 2 E, 53 Osborne Terrace, Newark, New Jersey, which installation is listed under the name of Victoria Garvin. *Residence address*
Another individual

Based upon intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that continuation of the above electronic surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States and to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the institution of the surveillance requested until April 19, 1973.



RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Attorney General of the United States

Re: 1/22/73
Date

SECRET

Classified by The Attorney General
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions



SECRET

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT: LEIBEL BERGMAN
INTERNAL SECURITY - CHINA

*Foreign
Intelligence
Agent*

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States for authority to intercept wire communications to and from the telephone installation located at Apartment 2E, 53 Osborne Terrace, Newark, New Jersey, and to install a microphone surveillance on the subject's automobile. The telephone installation is listed under the name of Victoria Garvin. *RESIDENCE ADDRESS*
Another individual

Based upon intelligence data available to the President, classified Secret and Top Secret, which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that installation of the above electronic surveillances is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the installation of the surveillances requested until October 13, 1972.

Richard G. Kleindienst

RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Attorney General of the United States

7/20/72
Date

But authorized orally on 7/14/72

SECRET

Group 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET



Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT: LEIBEJ. BERGMAN
INTERNAL SECURITY - CHINA

*Foreign
Intelligence
Agent*

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States for authority to intercept wire communications to and from the telephone installation located at Apartment 2E, 53 Osborne Terrace, Newark, New Jersey, and to install a microphone surveillance on the subject's automobile. The telephone installation is listed under the name of Victoria Garvin. *Residence address*

Another individual

Based upon intelligence data available to the President, classified Secret and Top Secret, which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that installation of the above electronic surveillances is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the installation of the surveillances requested until October 13, 1972.

Richard G. Kleindienst

RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Attorney General of the United States

7/14/72
Date

SECRET

Group 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

J U N E

1 - Mr. D. D. Kinley
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. A. J. Decker
1 - Mr. J. M. Sizoo
1 - Mr. D. Ryan
July 13, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCES

I hereby request that you, on behalf of the President of the United States, authorize a telephone surveillance on the residence of Leibel Bergman, Apartment 2E, 53 Osborne Terrace, Newark, New Jersey, and also a microphone surveillance on the automobile of Leibel Bergman, a 1967 four-door Ford sedan. Bergman's telephone is listed under the name of his spouse, Victoria Garvin.

NAME OF TARGET
Leibel Bergman
AUTOMOBILE
NAME OF TARGET
ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL

A memorandum outlining the circumstances which prompt this request is attached to this memorandum.

It is therefore requested that the President of the United States through the Attorney General, and in the interest of national security, consider this request in conjunction with all other information available to the Executive concerning Leibel Bergman and that you authorize the above telephone and microphone surveillances requested for a three-month period, ending October 13, 1972.

Respectfully,

REC-32 100-147752-636
L. Patrick Gray, III
Acting Director

SEARCHED _____
SERIALIZED _____
INDEXED _____
FILED _____
JUL 13 1972
FBI - NEW YORK

12340
JUL 16 1972
JUL 26 1972

- Felt _____
- Bates _____
- Bishop _____
- Callahan _____
- Campbell _____
- Cleveland _____
- Conrad _____
- Dalbey _____
- Jenkins _____
- Marshall _____
- Miller, E.S. _____
- Ponder _____
- Soyars _____
- Walters _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Mr. Kinley _____
- Mr. Armstrong _____
- Ms. Herwig _____
- Mrs. Neenan _____

Enclosure

100-147952

DR: dgo
(8) ENCLOSURE

AUG 4 1972

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SECRET

Memorandum for the Attorney General

NOTE:

See memorandum, A.J. Decker to Mr. E.S. Miller, dated 7/11/72, captioned "Leibel Bergman, Internal Security - China," prepared by DR:dgo.

NAME OF
TARGET

Classified "Secret" since memorandum discloses operation of a sensitive investigative technique, the unauthorized disclosure of which could seriously affect U. S. national defense interests.

SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET

J U N E

1 - Mr. D. D. Kinley
1 - Mr. E.S. Miller
1 - Mr. A.J. Decker
1 - Mr. J.M. Sizoo
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

July 13, 1972

LEIBEL BERGMAN

NAME OF TARGET

NAME OF TARGET
AND ADDRESS

Leibel Bergman, Apartment 2E, 53 Osborne Terrace, Newark, New Jersey, is a long-time communist who resided covertly in Communist China from 1965 to 1967. When he returned to the United States in 1967, he advised informants of this Bureau that his mission was to "do a job for the Chinese," and he expressed an interest in gathering information for the Chinese communists as well as recruiting youth for clandestine training in Communist China. Since 1967, he has been in contact with Chinese communist (Chicom) diplomatic establishments in England, France, and Canada, and in the Fall of 1971 he led a delegation to Peking. In May, 1972, he was in contact with the Chicom Embassy, Ottawa, Canada, at which time he advised that a woman would contact that establishment on May 30, 1972, to bring "information" and "other things." On the following day, the Embassy withdrew \$30,000 in United States currency from its account and thereafter, on May 30, 1972, a female was observed entering the Embassy with an attache-size case.

100-147952

DR:dgo.
(7)

NOTE:

See memorandum, A.J. Decker to Mr. E.S. Miller, dated 7/11/72, captioned "Leibel Bergman, Internal Security - China," prepared by DR:dgo.

Classified "Secret" since unauthorized disclosure of information contained herein could lead to identification of several valuable sources, thereby seriously affecting U. S. national defense interests.

Felt _____
Bates _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Campbell _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

Group 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SECRET



Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

NAIM NICOLA SHUNNARAH
INTERNAL SECURITY - MIDDLE EAST

ARA 6
TERRORIST
ACTIVIST

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to intercept wire communications to and from the telephone installation located at 2734 West Logan Street, Second Floor, Chicago, Illinois.

ROSS, J. N. C. 2
ADDRESS

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States, do hereby authorize the surveillance requested through June 23, 1973.

A handwritten signature of Richard G. Kleindienst, written in dark ink, is positioned above the printed name.

RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Attorney General of the United States

4/2/73
Date

SECRET

Classified by The Attorney General
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET



Office of the Attorney General

Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

NAIM NICOLA SHUNNARAH
INTERNAL SECURITY - MIDDLE EAST

*Arab terrorist
activist*

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to intercept wire communications to and from the telephone installation located at 161 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois.

business address

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States, do hereby authorize the surveillance requested through June 23, 1973.

Richard G. Kleindienst

RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Attorney General of the United States

4/2/73
Date

SECRET

Classified by The Attorney General
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

1 - Mr. D. D. Kinley
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. F. S. Putman, Jr.
1 - Mr. J. M. Sizoo
1 - Mr. T. H. George

March 23, 1973

JUNE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

name of target
I hereby request that you, on behalf of the President of the United States, authorize a telephone surveillance on Naim Nicola Shunnarah at his residence, 2734 West Logan Street, Second Floor, Chicago, Illinois. *address Target*

3 Name of target
A characterization in duplicate of Naim Nicola Shunnarah and his activities is attached to this memorandum.

It is, therefore, requested that the President of the United States, through the Attorney General, and in the interests of national security, consider this request in conjunction with all other intelligence information available to the Executive concerning this subject and that you authorize the surveillance requested through June 23, 1973.

Respectfully,
Ans

L. Patrick Gray, III
Acting Director

REC-5

105-237256-4
16 APR 3 1973

Enclosures (2)

105-237256 NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

THG:ems
(8)

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Baker _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Gebhardt _____
Mr. Jenkins _____
Mr. Marshall _____
Mr. Miller, E.S. _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Mr. Thompson _____
Mr. Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Mr. Bowers _____
Mr. Herington _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mr. Mintz _____

SENT FROM D. O.

TIME 3:00 PM
DATE 3/27/73
BY DMK

SECRET

Classified by Acting Director, FBI
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

6 APR 9 1973

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

NOTE:

NAME of target
par. 3 See memorandum F. S. Putman, Jr. to Mr. E. S. Miller dated 3/22/73, captioned "Naim Nicola Shunnarah; Internal Security - Middle East," prepared by THG:ems.

Classified "Secret" since it reveals a sensitive investigative technique, the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in serious damage to the national security of the United States.

SECRET

1 - Mr. D. D. Kinley
 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
 1 - Mr. F. S. Putman, Jr.
 1 - Mr. J. M. Sizoo
 1 - Mr. T. H. George

March 23, 1973

JUNE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
 ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

NAME of target
 I hereby request that you, on behalf of the President of the United States, authorize a telephone surveillance on Naim Nicola Shunnarah at his place of business, Beehive Custom Shoe Repair Salon, 161 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois.

*EMPLOYMENT
 OF TARGET
 AND
 ADDRESS*

A characterization in duplicate of Naim Nicola Shunnarah and his activities is attached to this memorandum.

NAME of TARGET

It is, therefore, requested that the President of the United States, through the Attorney General, and in the interests of national security, consider this request in conjunction with all other intelligence information available to the Executive concerning this subject and that you authorize the surveillance requested through June 23, 1973.

Respectfully, REC-5

105-237256-5

16 APR 3 1973

L. Patrick Gray, III
 Acting Director

Enclosures (2)

105-237256

THG:ems
 (8)

SENT FROM D. O.	
TIME	3:00 pm
DATE	3/27/73
BY	DM

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

SECRET Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Classified by Acting Director, FBI
 Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
 Date of Declassification Indefinite

6 APR 9 1973

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Mr. Felt _____
 Mr. Baker _____
 Mr. Callahan _____
 Mr. Cleveland _____
 Mr. Conrad _____
 Mr. Gebhardt _____
 Mr. Jenkins _____
 Mr. Marshall _____
 Mr. Miller, E.S. _____
 Mr. Soyars _____
 Mr. Thompson _____
 Mr. Walters _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Mr. Kinley _____
 Mr. Armstrong _____
 Mr. Bowers _____
 Mr. Herington _____
 Mr. Herwig _____
 Mr. Mintz _____
 Mrs. Neenan _____

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

NOTE:

NAME of target
3 See memorandum F. S. Putman, Jr. to Mr. E. S. Miller dated 3/22/73, captioned "Naim Nicola Shunnarah; Internal Security - Middle East," prepared by THG:ems.

Classified "Secret" since it reveals a sensitive investigative technique, the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in serious damage to the national security of the United States.

SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET

- 1 - Mr. D. D. Kinley
- 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
- 1 - Mr. F. S. Putman, Jr.
- 1 - Mr. J. M. Sizoo
- 1 - Mr. T. H. George

March 23, 1973

JUNE

RE: NAIM NICOLA SHUNNARAH
INTERNAL SECURITY - MIDDLE EAST

ARAB TERRORIST
ACTIVIST

TARGET
DATE
BIRTH

NAME of target

TARGET'S PLACE OF BIRTH

Shunnarah is a naturalized American citizen having been born May 5, 1929, at Ramallah, Jordan. Two sources have reported that subject is a member of, and acting on behalf of, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), an Arab terrorist group. These two sources report that subject is in constant communication with PFLP and Al Fatah members by telephone. According to one of these sources Shunnarah appears to be the focal point for PFLP activities in the Chicago area, collects funds on its behalf and distributes the PFLP newspaper. Shunnarah claims to be in contact with Beirut via telephone and also claims he makes arrangements for the training of PFLP members who go to the Middle East. Shunnarah owns and operates the Beehive Custom Shoe Repair Salon at 161 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. Shunnarah resides at 2734 West Logan Street, Second Floor, Chicago, Illinois.

NAME
OF
TARGET

NAME
OF
TARGET

NAME
OF
TARGET

EMPLOYMENT
AND
RESIDENCE
OF TARGET

The PFLP has been responsible for acts of terrorism in the past, which have included the hijacking of American airplanes and the incident at Lod Airport in May, 1971, wherein 29 individuals, the major portion of whom were American citizens from Puerto Rico, were killed by three Japanese terrorists acting on behalf of the PFLP.

The Black September group of Al Fatah was responsible for the assassinations of Israelis at the XXth Olympiad, Munich, Germany, September 5, 1972, and two American diplomats March 3, 1973, at Khartoum, Sudan. A highly sensitive source has advised that Al Fatah contemplates a "spectacular action" in the United States. On March 6 and 7, 1973, three highly explosive devices were located at New York City.

- Mr. Felt
- Mr. Baker
- Mr. Callahan
- Mr. Cleveland
- Mr. Conrad
- Mr. Gebhardt
- Mr. Jenkins
- Mr. Marshall
- Mr. Miller, E.S.
- Mr. Soyars
- Mr. Thompson
- Mr. Walters
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Kinley
- Mr. Armstrong
- Mr. Bowers
- Mr. Herington
- Ms. Herwig
- Mr. Mintz

105-237256

THG:ems

(8)

SECRET

EM DE M/GCM FSP

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

Classified by Acting Director, FBI

Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2

Date of Declassification Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

NAIM NICOLA SHUNNARAH

NAME of TARGET

near Israeli-connected business establishments. Literature found with these devices indicates the Black September group of Al Fatah was responsible. Khalid Dahham Al Jawary, an Iraqi national who has been identified as having Black September connections in the past, has been charged with this offense.

Sources utilized herein have furnished reliable information in the past.

NOTE:

^{per 3} See memorandum F. S. Putman, Jr. to Mr. E. S. Miller dated 3/22/73, captioned "Naim Nicola Shunnarah; Internal Security - Middle East," prepared by THG:ems.

NAME of TARGET

Classified "Secret" since it reveals a sensitive investigative technique, the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in serious damage to the national security of the United States.

SECRET

- 2 -



SECRET

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT: MOHAMMAD AYYAD AHMAD AYYAD
INTERNAL SECURITY-MIDDLE EAST

ARAB
TERRORIST
ACTIVIST

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to intercept wire communications to and from the telephone installation at the residence of subject at 2621 Throckmorton Street, Apartment 137, Dallas, Texas.

Residence
Address

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified Secret and Top Secret, which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the surveillance requested until December 18, 1972.

RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Attorney General of the United States

9/21/72
Date


NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Group 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification



Office of the Attorney General

Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

MOHAMMAD AYYAD AHMAD AYYAD
INTERNAL SECURITY - MIDDLE EAST

*ARAB TERRORIST
ACTIVIST*

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to continue to intercept wire communications to and from the telephone installation located at subject's residence, 2621 Throckmorton Street, Apartment 137, Dallas, Texas.

*Residence
Address*

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States, do hereby authorize the continuation of the surveillance requested through March 18, 1973.

RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Attorney General of the United States

12/15/72

Date

SECRET

Classified by The Attorney General
Exempt From General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category Number 2
Automatically Declassified On Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

1 - Mr. D. D. Kinley
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. M. Sizoo
1 - Mr. T. H. George

JUNE

December 13, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

On behalf of the President of the United States, you have previously authorized a telephone surveillance on Mohammad Ayyad Ahmad Ayyad at his residence, located at 2621 Throckmorton Street, Apartment 137, Dallas, Texas, from September 18, 1972, to December 18, 1972.

A characterization of Mohammad Ayyad Ahmad Ayyad and his activities is attached to this memorandum. This surveillance has in the past provided and continues to provide reliable and significant intelligence information regarding the subject.

It is, therefore, requested that the President of the United States, through the Attorney General, and in the interest of national security, consider this request in conjunction with all other intelligence information available to the Executive concerning this subject and that you authorize the surveillance requested through March 18, 1973.

Respectfully,
For the Acting Director

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
W. Mark Felt Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Acting Associate Director

SENT FROM D.O.
TIME 4:00 PM
DATE 12-13-72
BY ddb

Enclosure

105-219373-9 SECRET

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

THG:dsm
(8)

Classified by W. Mark Felt
Exempt From General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category Number 2
Automatically Declassified On Indefinite

Felt _____
Baker _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Gebhardt _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Rivis _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

NOTE:

✓ See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. E. S. Miller dated 12/11/72, captioned "Mohammad Ayyad Ahmad Ayyad: Internal Security - Middle East," prepared by THG:dsm.

Classified "Secret" since it reveals a sensitive investigative technique, the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in serious damage to the national security of the United States.

SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET

1 - Mr. D. D. Kinley
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. M. Sizoo
1 - Mr. T. H. George

JUNE

December 13, 1972

RE: MOHAMMAD AYYAD AHMAD AYYAD
INTERNAL SECURITY - MIDDLE EAST

NAME OF TARGET

AGE

Mohammad Ayyad Ahmad Ayyad is a 35-year-old Palestinian who is a listed member of Al Fatah in the United States. He is the brother-in-law and close associate of Dr. Abu Ayman Wadi, head of Al Fatah in the United States. His brother, Odeh Ahmad Ayyad, is also a member of Al Fatah and reportedly had a great deal of influence with Yasar Arafat, leader of Al Fatah.

ASSOCIATE
OF TARGET

RELATIONS
ship of
TARGET to
ANOTHER
INDIVIDUAL

BROTHER OF
TARGET

Al Fatah is the terrorist organization whose "Black September" group is responsible for the assassinations at the XXth Olympiad in Munich, Germany. Dr. Wadi, the subject's brother-in-law, also resides and works in Dallas, Texas. He is presently in the Middle East obtaining funds to finance Fatah's terrorist operations in the United States. These operations are to include the killing of Jews in this country and the sabotage of their establishments. A source has advised that Al Fatah has contacted the Cleaver Faction of the Black Panther Party in this country. The Black Panthers are to obtain explosives and ammunition for Fatah in exchange for financial backing. The explosives and ammunition will be used by Fatah to create an incident at an eastern airport in the United States similar to the massacre of 29 persons at Lod Airport, Tel Aviv, Israel, May 30, 1972. Another highly sensitive source advised

LOCATIONS
TENDING TO
IDENTIFY
TARGET'S
RELATIONSHIP
AND TARGET

105-208879

THG:dsm

(7)

SECRET

Classified by W. Mark Felt

Exempt From General Declassification

Schedule of Executive Order 11652

Exemption Category Number 2

Automatically Declassified On Indefinite

DEM

EM

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Felt _____
Baker _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Gebhardt _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Purvis _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

that Fatah contemplates a "spectacular action" in the United States. A source in Los Angeles has advised that Fatah has cells of guerrillas in Washington, D. C., and Detroit, Michigan, to carry out terrorist acts.

Sources who furnished the above information have furnished reliable information in the past.

Subject continues to maintain contact with other members of Al Fatah in the Dallas, Texas, area. Subject has been contacted by individuals who indicate they have recently traveled abroad and while abroad met with leaders of Al Fatah.

NOTE:

✓ See memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. E. S. Miller dated 12/11/72, captioned "Mohammad Ayyad Ahmad Ayyad; Internal Security - Middle East," prepared by THG:dsm.

Classified "Secret" since it reveals a sensitive investigative technique, the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in serious damage to the national security of the United States.

SECRET

- 2 -



SECRET
Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT: GERALD SIDNEY ROSS

*Foreign
Intelligence
Agent*

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to continue the telephone surveillance on captioned individual's residence, 11632 Viking Place, Northridge, California.

*Residence
Address*

Based upon intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested surveillance is necessary to obtain counterintelligence (including foreign) information deemed essential to the security of the United States and to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the continuation of the surveillance presently being conducted until April 15, 1975.

W B Saxbe

WILLIAM B. SAXBE
Attorney General of the United States

1/14/75
Date

SECRET

Classified by The Attorney General
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions



SECRET

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT: GERALD SIDNEY ROSS

Foreign Intelligence Agent

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to continue the telephone surveillance at captioned individual's residence, 11632 Viking Place, Northridge, California.

Residence Address

Based upon intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States and to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the continuation of the surveillance presently being conducted until April 15, 1974.

W. B. Saxbe
WILLIAM B. SAXBE
Attorney General of the United States


1-9-74
Date

SECRET

Classified by The Attorney General
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions



SECRET

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT: GERALD SIDNEY ROSS

*Foreign
Intelligence
Agent*

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to intercept wire communications to and from the telephone installation located at 11632 Viking Place, Northridge, California, which installation is listed under the name of Gerald Sidney Ross.

*Residence
Address*

The Foreign Intelligence Agent

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified Secret and Top Secret, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested electronic surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States and is necessary to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the continuation of the surveillance presently conducted until July 15, 1973.

Richard G. Kleindienst

RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Attorney General of the United States

4/5/73
Date

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

Classified By Attorney General
Exempt From GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite



SECRET

Office of the Attorney General

Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI


SUBJECT: GERALD SIDNEY ROSS

The Agent
This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to install a telephone surveillance on the residence of Gerald Sidney Ross located at 11632 Viking Place, Northridge, California.

Residence Address

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified Secret and Top Secret, which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested electronic surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States and is necessary to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the requested surveillance until April 15, 1973.



RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Attorney General of the United States

4/16/73
Date

SECRET

Classified by Attorney General
Exempt From GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

JUNE

1 - Mr. D.D. Kinley
1 - Mr. E.S. Miller
1 - Mr. W.A. Eranigan
1 - Mr. J. M. Sizoo
1 - Mr. H.F. Crowley

January 15, 1973

REC-67

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

I hereby request that you, on behalf of the President of the United States, authorize a telephone surveillance on the residence of Gerald Sidney Ross at 11632 Viking Place, Northridge, California.

A characterization of Gerald Sidney Ross and his activities is attached to this memorandum.

It is therefore requested that the President of the United States through the Attorney General, and in the interests of national security, consider this request in conjunction with all other intelligence information available to the Executive concerning this subject and that you authorize the surveillance requested until April 15, 1973.

Respectfully,

L. Patrick Gray, III
Acting Director

Enclosure

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

65-72369

HFC:pag pag
(8)

SECRET

SEE NOTE
PAGE TWO

Classified by Acting Director, FBI
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

Felt _____
Baker _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Gebhardt _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Purvis _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Ludwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

JAN 30 1973
MAIL ROOM
TELETYPE UNIT
Page 177

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SECRET

Memorandum For The Attorney General

NOTE:

Classified "Secret" since it involves a sensitive technical coverage, the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

See memorandum W. A. Branigan to Mr. E. S. Miller, dated 1/12/73, captioned "Gradual Level, Espionage - Russia," prepared by HFC:vlb.

CODE NAME OF TARGET

SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET

JUNE

1 - Mr. D.D. Kinley
1 - Mr. E.S. Miller
1 - Mr. W.A. Branigan
1 - Mr. J.M. Sizoo
1 - Mr. H.F. Crowley

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

January 15, 1973

GERALD SIDNEY ROSS

Foreign Intelligence Agent

TARGET'S RANK IN SERVICE

BRANCH OF SERVICE

DATE

DATE

DATE

Captioned subject is a former Major in United States Army intelligence who, following a promise of immunity from court-martial, admitted collaboration with Soviet intelligence for monetary gain in Europe and the United States from 1950 until early 1965. He was released from military service under other than honorable conditions. The facts concerning subject's activities on the part of Soviet intelligence were presented to the United States Department of Justice and prosecution was declined on May 11, 1970, because the Department believed that immunity against prosecution by the military might extend to prosecution in civil court.

NAME OF TARGET

NAME OF TARGET

Ross agreed to cooperate with this Bureau to atone for his past actions against the United States. Under our direction, he has re-established contact with Soviet intelligence and is currently receiving instructions from them. He has been contacted by Soviet intelligence at his residence in the past. In view of the caliber of information furnished by Ross to Soviet intelligence when he violated the trust placed in him by United States Army intelligence and the nature of the present assignments given to him by Soviet intelligence, a telephone surveillance on his residence is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States and to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

65-72869

HFC:vlb

(7)

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

SECRET

7

Classified By Acting Director, FBI

Exempt From GDS, Category Number 2

Date of Declassification Indefinite

ENCLOSURE

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

EM

65-72869-221

Felt _____
Baker _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Gebhardt _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Purvis _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET

Gerald Sidney Ross

NAME OF
TARGET

CODE NAME OF
TARGET

NOTE:

See memorandum W. A. Branigan to Mr. E. S. Miller,
dated 1/12/73, captioned "Gradual Level, Espionage - Russia,"
prepared by HFC:vlb.

Classified "Secret" since it involves a sensitive
technical coverage, the unauthorized disclosure of which
could reasonably be expected to result in serious damage
to the national security.

SECRET

SECRET

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT: KENNETH R. TOLLIVER

Foreign Intelligence Agent

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to continue the telephone surveillance on captioned individual's place of employment, Delta Design Group, 207 South Harvey Street, Greenville, Mississippi.

NAME AND ADDRESS OF BUSINESS

Based upon intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States and to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the continuation of the surveillance presently being conducted until June 22, 1974.

W B Saxbe

WILLIAM B. SAXBE
Attorney General of the United States

3/19/74
Date

SECRET

Classified by The Attorney General
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET



Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT: KENNETH R. TOLLIVER

Foreign Intelligence Agent

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to continue the telephone surveillance on subject's residence, 328 Cannon Street, Greenville, Mississippi.

RESIDENCE Address

Based upon intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States and to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the continuation of the surveillance presently being conducted until June 22, 1974.

W B Saxbe

WILLIAM B. SAXBE
Attorney General of the United States

3/19/74
Date

SECRET

Classified by The Attorney General
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions



SECRET

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT: KENNETH R. TOLLIVER

*FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE
AGENT*

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to continue the microphone surveillance on captioned individual's place of employment, Delta Design Group, 207 South Harvey Street, Greenville, Mississippi.

*NAME AND ADDRESS OF
BUSINESS*

Based upon intelligence data available to the President, classified "Secret" and "Top Secret," I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States and to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the continuation of the surveillance presently being conducted until June 22, 1974.

W B Saxbe

WILLIAM B. SAXBE
Attorney General of the United States

3/19/74
Date

SECRET

Classified by The Attorney General
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT: KENNETH R. TOLLIVER

*Foreign
Intelligence
Agent*

*the
agent* This is in response to your request to the
President of the United States of America for authority
to continue a telephone surveillance on the residence
of Kenneth R. Tolliver located at 328 Cannon Street,
Greenville, Mississippi.

*RESIDENCE
ADDRESS*

Based upon the intelligence data available to
the President, classified Secret and Top Secret, which
cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President
of the United States, determined that the requested
electronic surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign
intelligence information deemed essential to the security
of the United States and is necessary to protect national
security information against foreign intelligence activities.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested
in me by the President of the United States of America, do
hereby authorize the continuation of the telephone
surveillance presently conducted until March 22, 1973.

Richard G. Kleindienst

RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Attorney General of the United States

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions.

12/21/72
Date

SECRET

Classified By The Attorney General
Exempt From General Declassification;
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category Number 2
Automatically Declassified on Indefinite

SECRET

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT: KENNETH R. TOLLIVER

*Foreign
Intelligence
Agent*

*the
agent* This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to continue a telephone surveillance on the employment of Kenneth R. Tolliver which is the Delta Design Group located at 849 Washington Avenue, Greenville, Mississippi.

*NAME of
business*

business address

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified Secret and Top Secret, which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested electronic surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States and is necessary to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the continuation of the telephone surveillance presently conducted until March 22, 1973.

Richard G. Kleindienst

RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Attorney General of the United States

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

12/21/72
Date

SECRET

Classified By The Attorney General
Exempt From General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category Number 2
Automatically Declassified on Indefinite



SECRET

Office of the Attorney General

Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT: KENNETH R. TOLLIVER

Foreign Intelligence Agent

The Agent

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to install a telephone surveillance on the residence of Kenneth R. Tolliver located at 1242 Kirk Circle, Greenville, Mississippi.

Residence Address

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified Secret and Top Secret, which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested electronic surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States and is necessary to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the surveillance until December 22, 1972.

Richard G. Kleindienst

RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Attorney General of the United States

10/3/72
Date

SECRET

Group 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions



SECRET

Office of the Attorney General

Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT: KENNETH R. TOLLIVER

Foreign Intelligence Agent

the Agent business → This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to install a telephone surveillance on the employment of Kenneth R. Tolliver which is the Delta Design Group. The Delta Design Group is located at 849 Washington Avenue, Greenville, Mississippi.

NAME OF BUSINESS ADDRESS

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified Secret and Top Secret, which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested electronic surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States and is necessary to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the surveillance until December 22, 1972.

Richard G. Kleindienst

RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Attorney General of the United States

10/3/72
Date

SECRET

Group 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

JUNE

1 - Mr. D. D. Kinley
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. J. M. Sizoo
1 - Mr. G. M. Quinn

September 22, 1972

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

I hereby request that you, on behalf of the President of the United States, authorize a telephone surveillance on the residence of Herbert H. Goldfarb at 1242 Kirk Circle, Greenville, Mississippi.

A characterization of Kenneth P. Tolliver and his activities is attached to this memorandum.

It is, therefore, requested that the President of the United States through the Attorney General, and in the interests of national security, consider this request in conjunction with all other intelligence information available to the Executive concerning this subject and that you authorize the surveillance requested until December 22, 1972.

Respectfully,

ST-115

L. Patrick Gray, III
Acting Director

15 OCT 3 1972

Enclosure

65-68209

GLQ: aeh (8)

QEN

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 9:20 am
DATE 9/29/72
BY DDX

SECRET

Group 1

**Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification**

ROUTE IN DEVELOPMENT

Felt _____
 Baker _____
 Bates _____
 Bishop _____
 Callahan _____
 Cleveland _____
 Conrad _____
 Dalbey _____
 Jenkins _____
 Marshall _____
 Miller, E. S. _____
 Ponder _____
 Soyars _____
 Walters _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Mr. Staley _____
 Mr. Armstrong _____
 Ms. Herwig _____
 Mrs. Neenan _____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET

Memorandum for the Attorney General

NOTE:

This communication is classified "SECRET" since it refers to a highly confidential investigative technique, the unauthorized disclosure of which could cause serious damage to the national defense interests of the United States.

^{see 127} See memorandum W. A. Branigan to Mr. E. S. Miller, dated 9/20/72, captioned "WEEVIL, Espionage - Russia," prepared by GMQ:aeh.

CODE NAME
OF TARGET

SECRET

- 2 -

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SECRET

JUNE

1 - Mr. D. D. Kinley
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. J. M. Sizoo
1 - Mr. G. M. Quinn

September 22, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

I hereby request that you, on behalf of the President of the United States, authorize a telephone surveillance on the employment of Kenneth R. Tolliver which is the Delta Design Group located at 849 Washington Avenue, Greenville, Mississippi.

A characterization of Kenneth R. Tolliver and his activities is attached to this memorandum.

It is, therefore, requested that the President of the United States through the Attorney General, and in the interests of national security, consider this request in conjunction with all other intelligence information available to the Executive concerning this subject and that you authorize the surveillance requested until December 22, 1972.

Respectfully,

L. Patrick Gray, III
Acting Director

Enclosure

SI-115

REC-67

65-68209 NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

GMQ:aeh (8)

Unauthorized Disclosure

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO 1972

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Felt _____
Baker _____
Bates _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Ponder _____
Sparks _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Mr. Herwig _____
Mr. Noonan _____

SENT FROM D. O.	
TIME	9:20 am
DATE	9/29/72
BY	OBX

SECRET

Group 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SECRET

Memorandum for the Attorney General

NOTE:

This communication is classified "SECRET" since it refers to a highly confidential investigative technique, the unauthorized disclosure of which could cause serious damage to the national defense interests of the United States.

²⁰⁷ See memorandum W. A. Branigan to Mr. E. S. Miller, dated 9/20/72, captioned "WEEVIL, Espionage - Russia," prepared by GMQ:ah.

CODE NAME
OF TARGET

SECRET
- 2 -

SECRET

JUNE

1 - Mr. D. D. Kinley
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. J. M. Sizoo
1 - Mr. G. M. Quinn

September 22, 1972

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENT

KENNETH R. TOLLIVER
ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA

Captioned subject is a United States citizen who was born on February 4, 1934, in Chicago, Illinois, and who resides at 1242 Kirk Circle, Greenville, Mississippi. Tolliver is a partner in Delta Design Group, a public relations firm located at 849 Washington Avenue, Greenville, Mississippi. In addition, Tolliver is employed as an occasional newscaster with WAEG TV station in Greenville, Mississippi. Tolliver has indicated that he is no longer actively engaged in work as a local TV newscaster but merely "fills in" on emergency situations.

The subject has been of investigative interest to the Federal Bureau of Investigation since 1963 because of his contacts with Soviet and Soviet-bloc personnel. Subject advised this Bureau on August 23, 1972, that he met with a Soviet in Mexico City, Mexico, on August 27, 1972. Subject advised that the Soviet discussed subject's hiring of a Soviet illegal in Greenville, Mississippi. The subject was observed meeting with a Soviet national on August 27, 1972, in Mexico City who has been identified as Vladimir Bogachev. Bogachev is assigned to the Commercial Office of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City and has been identified as a known Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) officer. The subject has identified Bogachev as the Soviet he met in Mexico City. According to the subject, Bogachev has particular interest in subject's ability to travel freely, his potential for hiring a Soviet "illegal" agent and in obtaining employment for other Soviet "illegal" agents. The subject stated that Bogachev

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

65-68209

GMQ: aeh (7)

SECRET

Group 1

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

aeh

INFORMATION

DELETED TENDS TO IDENTIFY
SENSITIVE FOREIGN
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
OPERATION

ENCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET

Kennoth R. Tolliver

has indicated to him that he, the subject, might be used as a "courier" to deliver money and instructions to Soviet agents. Subject has identified the Soviet illegal and reports that he is expected to arrive in the United States before October 1, 1972. Subject has informed this Bureau that he has received instructions relating to meetings with Soviet nationals over the telephone.

Past investigation of Tolliver has shown him to be of unsavory character, a person of questionable morals, a convicted thief and a former psychiatric patient. In view of these facts, this surveillance on his residence is absolutely necessary to determine his veracity in connection with the information he has furnished to this Bureau.

A telephone surveillance on Tolliver's residence is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States and to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities.

NOTE:

This communication is classified "SECRET" since it refers to a highly confidential investigative technique, the unauthorized disclosure of which could cause serious damage to the national defense interests of the United States.

See memorandum W. A. Branigan to Mr. E. S. Miller, dated 9/20/72, captioned REEVIL, Espionage - Russia, prepared by GMQ:ach.

SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

March 15, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

I hereby request that you, on behalf of the President of the United States, authorize a microphone surveillance on the employment of Kenneth R. Tolliver which is the Delta Design Group located at 207 South Harvey Street, Greenville, Mississippi.

NAME OF
TARGET
- NAME/ADDRESS
OF EMPLOYMENT

A characterization in duplicate of Kenneth R. Tolliver and his activities is attached to this memorandum.

NAME OF
TARGET

It is therefore requested that the President of the United States through the Attorney General and in the interests of national security, consider this request in conjunction with all other intelligence information available to the Executive concerning this subject and that you authorize the surveillance requested until June 22, 1973.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "L. Patrick Gray, III".

L. Patrick Gray, III
Acting Director

Enclosures (2)

SECRET

Classified By Acting Director, FBI
Exempt From GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

March 15, 1973

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENT

KENNETH R. ICLLIVER
ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA

Captioned subject is a United States citizen who was born on February 4, 1934, in Chicago, Illinois, and who resides at 328 Cannon Street, Greenville, Mississippi. He is a partner in the Delta Design Group, a public relations firm located at 207 South Harvey Street, Greenville, Mississippi. In addition, he is employed as a "fill in" on emergency situations as a newscaster with WABG TV station, in Greenville, Mississippi.

The subject has been of investigative interest to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) since 1963 because of his contacts with Soviet and Soviet-bloc personnel. Subject advised this Bureau on August 28, 1972, that he met with a Soviet in Mexico City, Mexico, on August 27, 1972. Subject advised that the Soviet discussed hiring of a Soviet illegal by the subject in Greenville, Mississippi. Subject has identified the Soviet as Vladimir Bogachev. Bogachev, a Committee for State Security (KGB) officer, is assigned to the Commercial Office of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

Since August, 1972, the subject's activities with the KGB have been under the control of this Bureau. On December 4, 1972, the subject met with Mikhail M. Globenko at New York City. Globenko, a KGB officer, is employed as an Attache at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations (SMUN), New York City. Globenko furnished the subject with \$1,000 and questioned him concerning his knowledge of the Central

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WHO

SECRET

Classified By Acting Director, FBI
 Exempt From GDS, Category Number 2
 Date of Declassification Indefinite

INFORMATION DELETED

TENDS TO IDENTIFY SENSITIVE
 FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
 OPERATION.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
 Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

KENNETH R. TOLLIVER

Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the FBI. He instructed the subject to prepare reports concerning FBI personnel and operations in the Greenville, Mississippi, area and concerning methods which could be utilized and documentation necessary for establishing Soviet illegals in the United States. Subject was furnished dead drops and a personal meeting site in the New York City area. On February 27, 1973, the subject again met with Globenko at New York City. He was smuggled by automobile onto the Soviet Estate located at Upper Brookville, Long Island, New York, where he was extensively interrogated by Globenko concerning his past relationships with the KGB. Subject was instructed to plan travel to Europe in order that he may be taken to Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to undergo espionage tradecraft training. At the February 27, 1973, meeting the subject was furnished \$1,000 by Globenko.

Past investigation of the subject has shown him to be of unsavory character. He has been less than frank in furnishing complete details concerning his past activities for the KGB. A microphone surveillance on the subject's employment is necessary to determine his veracity in connection with his contacts with the KGB particularly in view of his forthcoming travel abroad for espionage tradecraft training. Additionally, a microphone surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States and to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities.

SECRET

- 2 -



SECRET

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

ARAB INFORMATION CENTER
INTERNAL SECURITY - MIDDLE EAST

*Propaganda Outlet of League
of Arab States*

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to continue to intercept wire communications to and from the telephone installation located in the office of subject organization, Suite 3711, 405 Lexington Avenue, New York City.

Business Address

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified Secret and Top Secret, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States, do hereby authorize the surveillance requested through June 14, 1973.

Richard G. Kleindienst

RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Attorney General of the United States

3/12/73
Date

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

Classified by The Attorney General
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SECRET

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

September 14, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

I hereby request that you, on behalf of the President of the United States, authorize a telephone surveillance on the Arab Information Center office, Suite 3711, 405 Lexington Avenue, New York, New York.

*Subject
Address*

A summary of the circumstances which prompt the request is attached to this memorandum.

pub It is, therefore, requested that the President of the United States, through the Attorney General, and in the interest of national security, consider this request in conjunction with all other intelligence information available to the Executive concerning the Arab Information Center and that you authorize the surveillance requested through December 14, 1972.

Respectfully,

L. Patrick Gray, III

L. Patrick Gray, III
Acting Director

Enclosure

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

Group 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

September 14, 1972

Propaganda outlet League of Arab States

~~ARAB INFORMATION CENTER~~
INTERNAL SECURITY - MIDDLE EAST

Subject

location Arab Information Center (AIC) *subject* headquarters in the United States are located in Suite 3711, 405 Lexington *Address* Avenue, New York, New York. Branch offices are located in various cities in the United States including Dallas, Texas, *location* and Washington, D. C. The *subject* (AIC) is funded from the Middle East by and is the representative in the United States of the League of Arab States, which is made up of Arab nations in the Middle East.

subject A representative of the AIC New York office has identified a function of the organization as propagandizing for the Palestinian cause in the United States and has further indicated that the United States is considered a *year* direct party to the dispute and allied with Israel. In (1970) the then head of the *subject* (AIC New York office), during an interview reported in Cairo, Egypt, said that the new policy of the *subject* (AIC) in the United States would be to work indirectly through existing organizations including the "New Left," "black movement," and "student revolt" in order to change United States public opinion to favor the Arab cause.

City Investigation has identified the head of the *subject* (AIC) Dallas office as *Name* Dr. Abu Ayman Wadi. This individual has been identified by a sensitive source as the head of Al Fatah in the United States. It has further been developed that a current employee of the *location* Washington, D. C., office of *subject* (AIC) is *employee* Hatem Isbaq Hussaini, who has been identified by a source as an Al Fatah cadre in the United States. Contact has been established between the Palestine Liberation Organization office in New York City and the *subject* (AIC) office in *location* Washington, D. C. The Palestine Liberation Organization

SECRET

Group 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and

~~classification~~

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

Subject
Arab Information Center

headquartered in the Middle East is the umbrella organization for Arab resistance organizations including Al Fatah. The head of Al Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization is Yasser Arafat, who is in the Middle East. Activities of the AIC offices in the United States are directed from the headquarters office in New York City.

The "Black September" group of Al Fatah was responsible for the assassinations of Israelis at the XXth Olympiad, Munich, Germany, on September 5, 1972, and we have been informed by a source that Al Fatah has contacted the Cleaver faction of the Black Panther Party in the United States to obtain explosives and ammunition to be used to create an incident in this country. Another highly sensitive source has advised that Al Fatah contemplates a "spectacular action" in the United States.

A source has furnished information that cells of Al Fatah are located in Washington, D. C., and Detroit, Michigan, for the purpose of performing terrorist acts.

Sources utilized herein, furnishing information concerning Al Fatah, have furnished reliable information in the past.

SECRET

SECRET

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT: ARAB INFORMATION CENTER *subject*
INTERNAL SECURITY - MIDDLE EAST

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to intercept wire communications to and from the telephone installation at the Arab Information Center, Suite 3711, 405 Lexington Avenue, New York, New York. *business address*

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified Secret and Top Secret, which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the surveillance requested through December 14, 1972.

Richard G. Kleindienst

RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Attorney General of the United States

9/18/72

Date

SECRET

Group 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET



Office of the Attorney General

Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

Propaganda outlet League of Arab States
ARAB INFORMATION CENTER

INTERNAL SECURITY - MIDDLE EAST

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to continue to intercept wire communications to and from the telephone installation located in the office of subject organization, 1603 New Hampshire Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D. C.

Known address of propaganda outlet

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified Secret and Top Secret, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States, do hereby authorize the surveillance requested through June 14, 1973.

RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Attorney General of the United States

3/12/73.
Date

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

Classified by The Attorney General
Exempt from GDS, Category Number 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SECRET



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

September 14, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

I hereby request that you, on behalf of the President of the United States, authorize a telephone surveillance on the Arab Information Center office, 1608 New Hampshire Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D. C. *Subject*

A summary of the circumstances which prompt the request is attached to this memorandum.

It is, therefore, requested that the President of the United States, through the Attorney General, and in the interest of national security, consider this request in conjunction with all other intelligence information available to the Executive concerning the Arab Information Center and that you authorize the surveillance requested through December 14, 1972.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "L. Patrick Gray, III".

L. Patrick Gray, III
Acting Director

Enclosure

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

Group 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

September 14, 1972

Propaganda Outlet League of Arab States
ARAB INFORMATION CENTER
 INTERNAL SECURITY - MIDDLE EAST

Subject
 (Arab Information Center (AIC)) headquarters in the United States are located *in Suite 3711, 405 Lexington Avenue,* New York, New York. Branch offices are located in various cities in the United States including *(Dallas, Texas, and Washington, D. C.)* The *Subject* (AIC) is funded from the Middle East by and is the representative in the United States of the League of Arab States, which is made up of Arab nations in the Middle East.

Subject
 A representative of the (AIC New York) office has identified a function of the organization as propagandizing for the Palestinian cause in the United States and has further indicated that the United States is considered a *year* direct party to the dispute and allied with Israel. In *(1970)*, the then head of the *Subject* (AIC New York) office, during an interview reported in Cairo, Egypt, said that the new policy of the AIC in the United States would be to work indirectly through existing organizations including the "New Left," "black movement," and "student revolt" in order to change United States public opinion to favor the Arab cause.

City Investigation has identified the head of the *Subject* (AIC) *Dallas* office as *(Dr. Abu Ayman Wadi)*. This individual has been identified by a sensitive source as the head of Al Fatah in the United States. It has further been developed that a current employee of the Washington, D. C., office of *Subject* (AIC) is *(Hatem Ismael Hussaini)*, who has been identified by a source as an Al Fatah cadre in the United States. Contact has been established between the Palestine Liberation Organization office in New York City and the *Subject* (AIC) office in *(Washington, D. C.)*. The Palestine Liberation Organization

SECRET

Group 1

Excluded from automatic
 downgrading and
 declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
 Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

subject
Arab Information Center

headquartered in the Middle East is the umbrella organization for Arab resistance organizations including Al Fatah. The head of Al Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization is Yasser Arafat, who is in the Middle East. Activities of the AIC offices in the United States are directed from the headquarters office in New York City.

The "Black September" group of Al Fatah was responsible for the assassinations of Israelis at the XXth Olympiad, Munich, Germany, on September 5, 1972, and we have been informed by a source that Al Fatah has contacted the Cleaver faction of the Black Panther Party in the United States to obtain explosives and ammunition to be used to create an incident in this country. Another highly sensitive source has advised that Al Fatah contemplates a "spectacular action" in the United States.

A source has furnished information that cells of Al Fatah are located in Washington, D. C., and Detroit, Michigan, for the purpose of performing terrorist acts.

Sources utilized herein, furnishing information concerning Al Fatah, have furnished reliable information in the past.

SECRET

- 2 -



SECRET

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT: ARAB INFORMATION CENTER
INTERNAL SECURITY - MIDDLE EAST


*Propaganda outlet for
Arab States*

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to intercept wire communications to and from the telephone installation at the Arab Information Center, 1608 New Hampshire Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D. C.

*Subject
address*

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified Secret and Top Secret, which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize the surveillance requested through December 14, 1972.



RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Attorney General of the United States

9/18/72
Date

SECRET

Group 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions



SECRET

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI


ARAB INFORMATION CENTER
INTERNAL SECURITY - MIDDLE EAST

*Propaganda outlet
League of Arab States*

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to intercept wire communication to and from the telephone installation located in the office of subject organization, Suite 1302, Hartford Building, 400 North St. Paul Street, Dallas, Texas. *Insertion at this point*

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified Secret and Top Secret, which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States, do hereby authorize the surveillance requested through April 1, 1973.


RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Attorney General of the United States

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

1/2/73
Date

SECRET

Classified by The Attorney General
Exempt From General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category Number 2
Automatically Declassified On Indefinite

SECRET

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

December 27, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

On behalf of the President of the United States you have previously authorized a telephone surveillance on the ^{Subject} Arab Information Center, located at ^{Address} Suite 1302, Hartford Building, 400 North St. Paul Street, Dallas, Texas, from October 1, 1972, to January 1, 1973, under the name of ^{Name} its then Director, Dr. Abu Ayman Wadi.

A characterization of ^{Subject} Arab Information Center and its activities is attached to this memorandum. This surveillance has in the past provided and continues to provide reliable and significant intelligence information regarding the subject.

It is, therefore, requested that the President of the United States, through the Attorney General, and in the interests of national security, consider this request in conjunction with all other intelligence information available to the Executive concerning this subject and that you authorize the surveillance requested until April 1, 1973.

Respectfully,
For the Acting Director

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "W. Mark Felt", is written over a horizontal line.

W. Mark Felt
Acting Associate Director

Enclosure

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Classified by W. Mark Felt
Exempt From General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category Number 2
Automatically Declassified On Indefinite



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

December 27, 1972

Subject
(ARAB INFORMATION CENTER)
INTERNAL SECURITY - MIDDLE EAST

Subject
(Arab Information Center (AIC)) headquarters in the United States are located in Suite 3711, 405 Lexington *Address* Avenue, New York, New York. Branch offices are located in various cities in the United States including Dallas, Texas, *city* and Washington, D. C. The *city* (AIC) is funded from the Middle East by and is the representative in the United States of the League of Arab States, which is made up of Arab nations in the Middle East.

A representative of the *Subject* (AIC New York office) has identified a function of the organization as propagandizing for the Palestinian cause in the United States and has further indicated that the United States is considered a *year* direct party to the dispute and allied with Israel. In *year* 1970, the then head of the *Subject* (AIC New York office), during an interview reported in Cairo, Egypt, said that the new policy of the *Subject* (AIC) in the United States would be to work indirectly through existing organizations including the "New Left," "black movement," and "student revolt" in order to change United States public opinion to favor the Arab cause.

City Investigation has identified the former head of the *Name* (AIC Dallas office) as (Dr. Abu Ayman Wadi). This individual has been identified by a sensitive source as the head of Al Fatah in the United States prior to his deportation from the United States.

The "Black September" group of Al Fatah was responsible for the assassinations of Israelis at the XXth Olympiad, Munich, Germany, on September 5, 1972, and we have been informed by a source that Al Fatah has contacted the Cleaver faction of the Black Panther Party in the United States to

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

Unauthorized Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Classified by W. Mark Felt
Exempt From General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category Number 2
Automatically Declassified On Indefinite

SECRET

subject
ARAB INFORMATION CENTER

obtain explosives and ammunition to be used to create an incident in this country. Another highly sensitive source has advised that Al Fatah comterplates a "spectacular action" in the United States.

All sources furnishing the above information have furnished reliable information in the past.

SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET



Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

ARAB INFORMATION CENTER
INTERNAL SECURITY - MIDDLE EAST

Propaganda Outlet League of Arab States

This is in response to your request to the President of the United States of America for authority to conduct a microphone surveillance in the office of subject organization, Suite 1302, Hartford Building, 400 North St. Paul Street, Dallas, Texas. *above*

Based upon the intelligence data available to the President, classified Secret and Top Secret, which cannot here be disclosed, I have, on behalf of the President of the United States, determined that the requested surveillance is necessary to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States.

I, therefore, pursuant to the authority invested in me by the President of the United States, do hereby authorize the surveillance requested through April 1, 1973.


RICHARD G. KLEINDIENST
Attorney General of the United States

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

1/2/73
Date

SECRET

Classified by The Attorney General
Exempt From General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category Number 2
Automatically Declassified On Indefinite



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

December 27, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: REQUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

On behalf of the President of the United States you have previously authorized a microphone surveillance on the ^{Subject} Arab Information Center, located at ^{Address} Suite 1302, Hartford Building, 400 North St. Paul Street, Dallas, Texas, from October 1, 1972, to January 1, 1973, under the name of its then Director, (Dr. Abu Ayman Wadi.)

A characterization of ^{Subject} Arab Information Center and its activities is attached to this memorandum. This surveillance has in the past provided and continues to provide reliable and significant intelligence information regarding the subject.

It is, therefore, requested that the President of the United States, through the Attorney General, and in the interests of national security, consider this request in conjunction with all other intelligence information available to the Executive concerning this subject and that you authorize the surveillance requested until April 1, 1973.

Respectfully,
For the Acting Director

W. Mark Felt
Acting Associate Director

Enclosure

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

Classified by W. Mark Felt
Exempt From General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category Number 2
Automatically Declassified On Indefinite

SECRET



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

December 27, 1972

Propaganda outlet League of Arab States

ARAB INFORMATION CENTER
INTERNAL SECURITY - MIDDLE EAST

subject
(Arab Information Center (AIC) headquarters in the United States are located in Suite 3711, 405 Lexington *avenue* Avenue, New York, New York. Branch offices are located in various cities in the United States including Dallas, Texas, *city* and Washington, D. C. The *subject* (AIC) is funded from the Middle East by and is the representative in the United States of the League of Arab States, which is made up of Arab nations in the Middle East.

A representative of the *subject* (AIC New York office) has identified a function of the organization as propagandizing for the Palestinian cause in the United States and has further indicated that the United States is considered a *year* direct party to the dispute and allied with Israel. In *1970*, the then head of the *subject* (AIC New York office) during an interview reported in Cairo, Egypt, said that the new policy of the *subject* (AIC) in the United States would be to work indirectly through existing organizations including the "New Left," "black movement," and "student revolt" in order to change United States public opinion to favor the Arab cause.

subject Investigation has identified the former head of the (AIC Dallas office as Dr. *name* Abu Ayman Wadi. This individual has been identified by a sensitive source as the head of Al Fatah in the United States prior to his deportation from the United States.

The "Black September" group of Al Fatah was responsible for the assassinations of Israelis at the XXth Olympiad, Munich, Germany, on September 5, 1972, and we have been informed by a source that Al Fatah has contacted the Cleaver faction of the Black Panther Party in the United States to

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Classified by W. Mark Felt
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Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category Number 2
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subject
ARAB INFORMATION CENTER

obtain explosives and ammunition to be used to create an incident in this country. Another highly sensitive source has advised that Al Fatah contemplates a "spectacular action" in the United States.

All sources furnishing the above information have furnished reliable information in the past.

SECRET

- 2 -

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

EBF 1237x

Retain

SSC request of November 21

238-10444

~~SECRET~~



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 25-330971

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

January 24, 1957

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: ⁰MUSLIM CULT OF ISLAM
INTERNAL SECURITY - MCI

The Muslim Cult of Islam (MCI) is composed entirely of Negroes. Its leader, Elijah Mohammed, claims to have been sent by Allah, the Supreme Being, to lead the Negroes out of slavery. Members fanatically follow the teachings of Allah as interpreted by Mohammed; they disavow allegiance to the United States; and they are taught they need not obey the laws of the United States. Allegations have been received that its members may resort to acts of violence in carrying out its avowed purpose of destroying non-Muslims and Christianity.

Coverage by technical means of the Boston, Massachusetts, Temple of the MCI, could provide information of value concerning the aims, activities and purposes of this organization in the Boston area.

Therefore, I recommend authorization of a surveillance on the Boston Temple of the MCI, 552 Columbus Avenue, Boston, Massachusetts, or at any other address to which this temple may be moved.

Respectfully,

RECORDED - 26

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED *W. P. Rogers*

DATE: *Jan 24, 1957*

25-330971-1450
6 FEB 1 1957

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~

62-1237X

1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Donohue
1 - Mr. Rampton

January 9, 1961

Airtel

To: SAC, Kansas City (94-150)

From: Director, REG⁵⁸ (25-330971) — 11466

JUNE

YJ
NATION OF ISLAM EX-105
INTERNAL SECURITY - NOI

ReKCAirtel dated 1-5-61.

Provided full security is assured, authority is granted to install a microphone surveillance at 1210 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri, to afford coverage of the NOI Muhammad's Temple of Islam No. 30. You should advise the date and time this installation was made. At the end of 30 days you should furnish the Bureau with a succinct, concise summary of the information developed through this coverage and submit justification for continuance.

NOTE ON YELLOW:


See memo Belmont to Parsons dated 1-6-61, captioned "Nation of Islam, Internal Security - NOI," RJR:had.

Airtel is being used in view of Kansas City request that Bureau expedite reply in view of possibility NOI Temple No. 30 pay delinquent rent before installation can be attempted.

MAY
This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Tolson _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Belmont _____
Callahan _____
DeLoach _____
Malone _____
McGuire _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
W.C. Sullivan _____

RJR:had
(8)



ENCLOSURE

62-116325-1237

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. D. J. Parsons

DATE: January 6, 1961

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

JUNESUBJECT: NATION OF ISLAM
INTERNAL SECURITY - NOI

Tolson _____
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 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

The Kansas City Office, by airtel 1-5-61 with enclosed FD-142, has requested authority to install a microphone surveillance at 1210 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri, which is the address of Muhammad's Temple of Islam No. 30. This address, which contains the local Nation of Islam (NOI) Office, is also used for public and closed meetings of the NOI.

The NOI is an all-Negro, violently antiwhite, fanatical group. Members of this organization believe that some day they will occupy "several states in the wilderness" of North America following "war" against the white man. At the present time, 35 field offices are conducting investigations and submitting reports on this organization.

The Kansas City Office advises Bureau Agents will have secure and legal access to the installation areas for a limited time through the process of a cooperative source "locking out" members of the organization under the pretext of expediting the payment of delinquent rent which is presently two months in arrears. It is believed, therefore, that no trespass is involved and full security is assured.

RECOMMENDATION:

As this microphone surveillance will be a valuable adjunct to informant coverage of this Temple, there is attached for your approval an airtel to Kansas City giving authority to that office to make this installation.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Enclosure

25-330971

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Donohue
- 1 - Mr. Rampton

6 JAN 18 1961

EX-125

5 JAN 12 1961

CG 6119-5* and CG 6408-5*
 1-24-61
 made 1-24-61
 CG 6119-5* and CG 6408-5*
 made 1-24-61
 made 1-24-61
 made 1-24-61

62-116395-1257A

SAC, Detroit (66-3702)

May 25, 1962

Director, FBI (25-330971) - 5:62

J U N E

REC-34
NATION OF ISLAM-113
INTERNAL SECURITY - NOI

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Donohue
- 1 - Mr. Rampton

ReDElet and FD-142, both dated 5-21-62.

Provided full security is assured, authority is granted to install misur coverage at Olympia Stadium, 5920 Grand River, Detroit, Michigan, for the Nation of Islam (NOI) rally to be held 6-10-62. Detroit should advise the time and date of the installation and discontinuance of this misur as well as the symbol number assigned.

Promptly following the rally, Detroit should provide the Bureau, in form suitable for dissemination, information obtained through sources covering this rally. Eight copies of such communications should be furnished.

NOTE ON YELLOW:

See memo Baumgardner to Sullivan dated 5-24-62, same caption, RJR:blw.

RJR:blw
(8)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

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ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1237X

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

RA Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

DATE: May 24, 1962

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *FJB*J U N ESUBJECT: NATION OF ISLAM
INTERNAL SECURITY - NOI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Donohue
1 - Mr. Rampton

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Detroit FD-142 dated 5-21-62 recommends installation of a microphone surveillance (misur) to cover a rally of the Nation of Islam (NOI) at Olympia Stadium, Detroit, Michigan, on 6-10-62. Detroit advises the installation would involve minimum risk of detection and assures maximum security without trespass.

The NOI has scheduled a mass rally at the Olympia Stadium in Detroit on 6-10-62. Elijah Muhammad, the national leader of the NOI, and other officials of the NOI will speak at this rally. A crowd of 7,000 to 10,000 is expected to attend, including NOI members from widely scattered areas of the country. Live informant coverage will be utilized but past experience has shown the informants are generally given specific assignments by NOI officials which hamper their coverage of the speeches. Excellent results were obtained by similar misur coverage of an NOI rally held in Washington, D. C., in 1961.

The NOI is a fanatical, antiwhite, all-Negro organization with nationwide ramifications. We are conducting an active investigation and furnishing reports to the Department on a continuing basis.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letter to Detroit, authorizing this installation, be approved.

Enc.

25-330971

RJR:blw (6)

REC-50

25-330971-15-11

25-330971-58

JUN 5 1962

62-116395-12374

JAN 23 1963

JUN 8 1962

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

1 - Mr. Donohue
1 - Mr. Rampton

June 25, 1962

SAC, Kansas City (94-150A)

Director, FBI (25-330971)

JUNE

0
NATION OF ISLAM
INTERNAL SECURITY - NOI

Reurlet 6/18/62 and the enclosed FD-143
justifying continuation of [KC 734-S*.]

Authority is granted to continue the
operation of this installation for an additional
six-month period. You should give continuous
appraisal of the information developed and in
the event this installation does not appear
justified the Bureau should be immediately noti-
fied along with the recommendations of your office.

Item 16 (Personnel Costs) of the FD-143
did not specify the total salary costs under sub-
item a. By return mail advise what these costs are
in order that the Bureau file in this matter will
be complete.

NOTE ON YELLOW:

See Recommendation by Assistant Director
(Item 18) of FD-143 dated 6/18/62 (from SAC, Kansas City).

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemi-
nation outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by
your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized person-
nel without the express approval of the FBI.

EX-105 REC-21
FBI - JUSTICE
REC.D - 20051444

17 JUN 28 1962

RJR:mar
(5)

JUN 55 4 20 PM '62

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MAILED 8

JUN 25 1962
COMM-FBI

62-116395-23

JAN 24 1963

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (25-330971)

DATE: 6/18/62

FROM : SAC, KANSAS CITY (94-150A)

J U N E

SUBJECT: ^O
NATION OF ISLAM
~~IS - NOI~~

Re Kansas City letter 2/13/62 and enclosed FD-143, justifying continuance of KC 734-S*; Bureau airtel to Kansas City 6/4/62.

Enclosed to the Bureau is one FD-143 for justification of continuance of microphone surveillance concerning captioned organization.

There has been some technical difficulty concerning this installation subsequent to referenced Kansas City communication relating to the leased lines involved. However, this has been corrected by the telephone company source through installation of a new six pair cable and terminal box. No further difficulty has arisen since this has been completed, and no further difficulty is anticipated in this regard.

In view of the militant nature of this organization as evidenced by their recent activities in Los Angeles, this installation is being continued for an additional six-month period to closely follow the activities of the Kansas City organization, UACB.

Continuous appraisal of information developed from this source will be made during this period.

2 Bureau (Enc. 1) (RM)
2 Kansas City
JHS:djn
(4)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings of your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

JAN 24 1963

ENCLOSURE

JUN 21 1962

SPEC. MAIL

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

JUNE

TO : DIRECTOR (Bufile 25-330971) DATE: 6/18/62

FROM : SAC, KANSAS CITY (94-150A)

SUBJECT: JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUATION OF TECHNICAL OR MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCE

RE: Title NATION OF ISLAM

Character of Case IS - NOI
Field Office Kansas City
Symbol Number KC 734-S*
Type of Surveillance: (Technical or
Microphone)

1. Name of person or organization on whom surveillance placed:
NATION OF ISLAM, aka Muhammad's Temple of Islam # 30, Muhammad's Mosque of Islam # 30, 1210 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri
2. Address where installation made. Also give exact room number or area covered:

1210 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri; office and assembly hall.
3. Location of monitoring plant:
Field Division
4. Dates of initial authorization and installation:

Authorized 1/9/61; installation completed and activated 1/29/61.
5. Previous and other installations on the same subject (with dates and places):

None

REC-31 25-330971-23-6
25-330971-6004

6. If installation is a technical surveillance, answer following questions:

a. Is a trunk line utilized?

JUN 21 1962

b. Is the surveillance on a switchboard?

c. Is the surveillance on a public coin-operated telephone?

1-Bureau

1 Kansas City

JHS:djn

JAN 24 1963
Registered Mail

ENCLOSURE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

d. Is surveillance on a private line or a party line?

e. If a party line, how many parties?

7. If a microphone surveillance involved, state number of microphones actually used and location of each:

One in office; two in assembly hall.

8. Is the installation part of a tel-mike? If so, give symbol of other side of the combination:

No

9. Specific examples of valuable information obtained since previous report with indication of specific value of each item and the date information received. State what use was made of each item involved: (Add insert pages)

(See. attached)

10. Could above information have been obtained from other sources and by other means?

No

11. Number of live informants (in field division) who cover same subject:

One

12. Has security factor changed since installation?

No

13. Any request for the surveillance by outside agency (give name, title and agency):

No

14. Cost of Plant Premises:

a. Rental costs for plant premises: None

b. Give total number of other surveillances monitored at same plant.

- c. If any others, set out the proportionate cost of instant surveillance:

15. Cost of Leased Line for instant installation?

Three leased lines at \$4.00 per month - total \$12.00

16. Personnel Costs:

- a. Give total number of special employees and/or Special Agents working at plant and total salary costs.

1 GS 13; 2 GS 7

- b. Total number of man hours per week spent at plant?

1 GS 13 48 hours;

1 GS 7 40 hours;

1 GS 7 20 hours - Total 108 hours

- c. If other installations monitored at same plant, list proportionate number of man hours per week spent on instant surveillance:

Approximately 20 per cent of "b"

- d. If other installations monitored at same plant, list proportionate salary expense per annum for instant surveillance:

Approximately 20 per cent of "a"

17. Remarks (By SAC):

In view of the militant nature of this organization as evidenced by recent activities at Los Angeles and in view of recent reports that this organization may take up arms, it is highly recommended that this installation be continued to closely follow the activities of the Kansas City group, insofar as their activities may affect the security of the United States.

18. Recommendation by Assistant Director:

(If this surveillance involves cryptanalysis, include statement that decrypted material is or is not sufficiently important to continue decrypting.)

[KC 734-S*] is a microphone installation.

[KC 734-S*, authorized 1/9/61, was installed and activated 1/29/61, at 1210 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri, Temple office and assembly hall of Muhammad's Temple of Islam No. 30. During the period KC 734-S* has been installed, service has been interrupted from time to time due to technical difficulties related to leased lines and also due to shortage of personnel resulting from a special investigation concerning CALBOM (Bufile 149-2144).]

[Since 2/5/62 KC 734-S* has covered public and closed meetings of this organization, including business and Fruit of Islam meetings; however, there has been some interruption during this period due to technical difficulties. Kansas City at present has only one live informant (KC 86-S) covering this Temple of approximately 30 to 35 members. The technical difficulties involving leased lines have been corrected through installation of a new six pair cable and terminal box.] It is believed desirable to continue this installation for an additional six months as a means of corroborating and checking the information furnished by [KC 86-S] and to further evaluate the necessity of this coverage. It is recommended, therefore, that the installation be continued for an additional six months. If approved, a letter to Kansas City is attached advising of this approval and requesting additional information in connection with Item 16 of this FD-143 (Personnel Costs).

JHK
JHC

W. C. Meyer

R

per
D

BS

9. This installation has afforded coverage of public and closed meetings, including business and FOI meetings, since February 5, 1962, which are held Monday, Wednesday, and Friday nights and Sunday afternoons. There has been some interruption due to technical difficulties relating to leased lines during this period, as well as shortage of personnel resulting from special investigation concerning CALBOM (Bufile 149-2144).

Coverage of the public meetings has continued to provide specific information concerning the aims, purposes and ideologies of the NOI as taught by the local leaders in relation to the National organization.

Coverage of closed FOI meetings and business meetings continues to furnish information concerning identities of various members and leaders, as well as security measures proposed and taught in the temple.

All information obtained is disseminated on a continuing basis to the organizational file, as well as to individual case files. Any information of particular significance when obtained, is furnished to the Bureau, Chicago and other interested offices.

By closely following the activities of this organization, its leaders and members, accomplished in great part by the use of this installation, one of the leaders, namely ANTHONY WALTON, also known as ANTHONY X, Secretary, was recently convicted for violation of the Selective Service Act of 1948 and sentenced to a term of three years in the custody of the Attorney General.

(Attachment)

SAC, Buffalo (105-468-Sub 1)

August 13, 1962

REC-35

Director, FBI (25-330971)

25-330971-6-4

JUNE

NATION OF ISLAM
INTERNAL SECURITY - NOI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Donohue
1 - Mr. Rampton

Reference is made to Buffalo FD-142 dated 8-6-62.

Provided full security is assured, authority is granted to install a microphone surveillance at 292 Glenwood Avenue, Buffalo, New York, to afford coverage of Muhammad's Mosque Number 23 of the Temple of Islam. Advise date and time of installation and symbol number assigned. At the end of 30 days, you should furnish the Bureau a succinct, concise summary of the information developed through this coverage and submit justification for continuance.


NOTE ON YELLOW:

See memorandum Mr. Baumgardner to Mr. Sullivan, same caption, dated 8-10-62, RJR:cdb:mea.

RJR:cdb
(8)

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JAN 21 1963

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1237

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: August 10, 1962

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

JUNESUBJECT: NATION OF ISLAM
INTERNAL SECURITY - NOI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Donohue
1 - Mr. Rampton

The Buffalo Office has requested authority to install a microphone surveillance at 292 Glenwood Avenue, Buffalo, New York, which is the address of Muhammad's Mosque Number 23. This address is the meeting place for the Nation of Islam (NOI) in Buffalo and is also the headquarters for NOI activity in western New York and the territory covered by the Buffalo Office.

The NOI is an all-Negro, violently antiwhite, fanatical group. It has been the subject of much publicity recently due to its clashes with police and prison authorities. Buffalo advised officers of Muhammad's Mosque Number 23 conduct administrative and executive meetings in a locked office adjacent to the main meeting room of the Mosque and that live sources have not been able to penetrate these meetings which limits the possibilities of obtaining valuable information concerning the efforts of the NOI to enlarge its activities in the western New York area. Installation of a microphone surveillance at this location should obtain the desired information.

Despite the fact trespass is involved, it is believed this installation will provide valuable information. Buffalo assures full security.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letter to Buffalo authorizing installation of this microphone surveillance be approved.

Enclosure

25-330971

RJR:cdb/mea
(6)

Tolson _____
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This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. It is not to be disclosed to official proceedings by your Committee and the contents may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

JAN 21 1963

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EX-113

REC-35 25-330971-6-5

25-330971-6-5

25 AUG 17 1962

SPEC. MAIL RM.

62-116395-1232K

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

JUNE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (Bufile 25-330971) DATE: 1/2/63

FROM : SAC, BUFFALO (105-468-Sub 1)

SUBJECT: JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUATION OF TECHNICAL OR MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCE

RE: Title NATION OF ISLAM

Character of Case IS - NOI

Field Office Buffalo

Symbol Number BU 277-S* 2 CONF. INFT.

Type of Surveillance: (Technical or
Microphone) Microphone

1. Name of person or organization on whom surveillance placed:

Muhammad's Mosque No. 23, 292 Glenwood Avenue, Buffalo, New York

2. Address where installation made. Also give exact room number or area covered:

292 Glenwood Avenue, first floor, private office

3. Location of monitoring plant:

Buffalo Office

4. Dates of initial authorization and installation:

Authorized 8/13/62

Installed 8/30/62

5. Previous and other installations on the same subject (with dates and places):

None

6. If installation is a technical surveillance, answer following questions:

a. Is a trunk line utilized? No

b. Is the surveillance on a switchboard? No

c. Is the surveillance on a public coin-operated telephone? No

① - Bureau (RM)

1 - Buffalo

RWD:jny

Registered Mail

(2)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

BU 105-468-Sub 1

d. Is surveillance on a private line or a party line?

e. If a party line, how many parties?

7. If a microphone surveillance involved, state number of microphones actually used and location of each:

One - in private office

8. Is the installation part of a tel-mike? If so, give symbol of other side of the combination:

No

9. Specific examples of valuable information obtained since previous report with indication of specific value of each item and the date information received. State what use was made of each item involved: (Add insert pages)

See attached

10. Could above information have been obtained from other sources and by other means?

No

11. Number of live informants (in field division) who cover same subject:

Three

12. Has security factor changed since installation?

No

13. Any request for the surveillance by outside agency (give name, title and agency):

No

14. Cost of Plant Premises:

a. Rental costs for plant premises: None

b. Give total number of other surveillances monitored at same plant.

Six

9. (Continued)

- 10/16/62 Source revealed that Buffalo NOI officials expressed disappointment at the lack of attendance at Civil trial being held in U. S. Court, Buffalo, New York, involving "Muslim" prisoners held in Attica State Prison, Attica, New York, who petitioned U. S. Court to hear their complaints that New York State correctional authorities were denying these prisoners their religious rights because they were "Muslims." This information was used to help this Office to assess the response of NOI members to this trial.
- 10/17/62 Source reported attendance of the Minister of Muhammad's Temple in Washington, D. C. at a meeting of Muhammad's Mosque #23, Buffalo, held this date as well as the fact that this Minister testified at the "Muslim" trial in Buffalo this date. The information regarding this attendance has been furnished to the Washington Field Office.
- 10/22/62 Source provided information regarding an unidentified individual's appearance at the headquarters of Muhammad's Mosque #23 at which time this individual advised that he registered for selective service at Jamestown, New York. This individual was advised by an individual believed to be ROBERT J. WILLIAMS, Minister of Muhammad's Mosque #23, to obtain a conscientious objector form and bring it to Muhammad's Mosque #23 headquarters where he would be given assistance in properly executing it. Based on this information, investigation was launched in an effort to identify this individual. Also on this date, one of the Muhammad's Mosque #23 officials revealed that he had been able to speak with one of the Attica State prisoners who was one of the inmates at Attica seeking Federal court hearing on accusations that his religious practices as a "Muslim" were being denied him by officials of the New York State Department of Correction. This prisoner expressed appreciation at the number of "Muslims" who were

BU 105-468-Sub 1

9. (Continued)

10/22/62 (Continued)

Attending the trial based on his civil petition. This information was used to assist the Office to make an assessment regarding attendance on the part of Muhammad's Mosque #23 members at the trial.

11/5/62 Source disclosed that the Brother Secretary of Muhammad's Mosque #23, believed to be JAMES A. HARRIS, met with an unnamed individual regarding plans to transport copies of the paper "Muhammad Speaks" to Rochester and Syracuse, New York, for sale in those cities. This information has resulted in efforts to verify sale of the newspaper in Rochester and Syracuse.

12/29/62 Source reported on meeting of two individuals at Muhammad's Mosque #23 headquarters at which it was disclosed that 2000 copies of the newspaper (believed to be "Muhammad Speaks") were sold in Rochester, New York in one day while only 1500 were sold in Buffalo. This information was used to alert live NOI Buffalo sources to obtain fuller information on the sale of the newspaper "Muhammad Speaks" by Muhammad's Mosque #23.

- c. If any others, set out the proportionate cost of instant surveillance:

Not applicable

15. Cost of Leased Line for instant installation?

\$11.66

16. Personnel Costs:

- a. Give total number of special employees and/or Special Agents working at plant and total salary costs.

Three Special Employees and one clerk - full time, \$28,630.

- b. Total number of man hours per week spent at plant?

160

- c. If other installations monitored at same plant, list proportionate number of man hours per week spent on instant surveillance:

Ten hours or approximately 6 per cent

- d. If other installations monitored at same plant, list proportionate salary expense per annum for instant surveillance:

Approximately \$1,800.00

17. Remarks (By SAC):

Source has access to meeting place at which only officers of Muhammad's Mosque #23 are admitted unless one of these officers requests an individual member of this Mosque to visit him to receive instructions or be disciplined. Discussions by these officers regarding Mosque plans can be reported by this source.

Through this source, Buffalo on occasion is able to be alerted to the visit of NOI officials to the Buffalo area.

For the most part, live sources of the Buffalo Office are not in a position to furnish accurate information concerning the

BU 105-468-Sub 1

17. (Continued)

financial progress of Muhammad's Mosque #23 or detailed information regarding future plans of the NOI locally and nationally.

I recommend the continuance of this installation, and I will continue to afford it close, personal supervision to insure that its continuance is justified.

18. Recommendation by Assistant Director:

[BU 277-S*] is a microphone surveillance which is installed at Muhammad's Mosque No. 23, 292 Glenwood Avenue, Buffalo, New York. This installation was authorized 8/13/62 and installed 8/30/62.

During the past 90 days, this installation has provided valuable information which was not available through other sources. It has furnished the identities of individuals in contact with Mosque No. 23 as well as information concerning the selling of the Nation of Islam newspaper, "Muhammad Speaks," in Buffalo, Rochester, and Syracuse, New York. It continues to be in a position to furnish information concerning the Muslim Girls' Training. This source has also furnished information which was not available to live sources in the Buffalo area.

In view of the valuable information this installation is providing which is not available through other sources, it is recommended it be continued for an additional 90 days.

msd

JH *JH*

Ways

Bo

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

JUNE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

(Bufile 25-330971) DATE: 2/27/64

FROM : SAC, BUFFALO (105-468-Sub 1)

SUBJECT: JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUATION OF TECHNICAL OR MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCE

ReButel, 2/14/64.

RE: Title NATION OF ISLAM

Character of Case IS - NOI
Field Office Buffalo
Symbol Number BU 277-S* ~~CONF. INFT.~~
Type of Surveillance: (Technical or
Microphone) Microphone

1. Name of person or organization on whom surveillance placed:

Muhammad's Mosque #23

2. Address where installation made. Also give exact room number or area covered:

292 Glenwood Avenue, Buffalo, New York, first floor, private office

3. Location of monitoring plant:

Buffalo Office

4. Dates of initial authorization and installation:

Authorized 8/13/62
Installed 8/30/62

5. Previous and other installations on the same subject (with dates and places):

None

6. If installation is a technical surveillance, answer following questions:

a. Is a trunk line utilized? Not applicable

b. Is the surveillance on a switchboard?

c. Is the surveillance on a public coin-operated telephone?

① - Bureau (RM)

1 - Buffalo

Registered Mail

RWD:jny

(2)

MAR 23 1964

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ENCLOSURE

62-116345-1237X

BU 105-468-Sub 1

d. Is surveillance on a private line or a party line?

e. If a party line, how many parties?

7. If a microphone surveillance involved, state number of microphones actually used and location of each: One - in private office

8. Is the installation part of a tel-mike? If so, give symbol of other side of the combination:

No

9. Specific examples of valuable information obtained since previous report with indication of specific value of each item and the date information received. State what use was made of each item involved: (Add insert pages)

See attached

10. Could above information have been obtained from other sources and by other means?

No

11. Number of live informants (in field division) who cover same subject:

Three

12. Has security factor changed since installation?

No

13. Any request for the surveillance by outside agency (give name, title and agency):

No

14. Cost of Plant Premises:

a. Rental costs for plant premises: None

b. Give total number of other surveillances monitored at same plant.

Nine

9 (Continued)

9/20/63 An unnamed male present in office of Muhammad's Mosque #23 (MM #23) revealed that he had to provide \$1,000.00 bond in connection with some type of legal case involving this individual. Source was unable to identify this person.

Subsequent investigation through live informants providing information with respect to MM #23 developed that the person released on bond was an individual by the name of WALTER X YOUNG.

JOHN B.X STRICKLAND, Captain of MM #23, revealed that all Fruit of Islam (FOI) members were expected to be present at MM #23 headquarters at 10:00 a.m., Sunday, 9/22/63, for the purpose of selling copies of "Muhammad Speaks," newspaper published by the Nation of Islam (NOI).

Informants were alerted in an effort to identify those individuals who responded to this call from JOHN B. X STRICKLAND.

9/23/63 HENRY X PURIFOY, a Lieutenant of MM #23, was present at MM #23 headquarters along with an unidentified male. At this time PURIFOY revealed that MALCOLM X (LITTLE) was planning to visit Buffalo, New York, from New York City.

This information was furnished to the New York Office.

9/30/63 HENRY X PURIFOY was present at MM #23 headquarters at which time he advised CLARENCE A. X JENKINS, a Secretary of the FOI, MM #23, that contact had been made by PURIFOY with an individual identified by source only as JOSEPH X (believed to be the Captain of MM #7, New York City). PURIFOY stated this individual was planning to attend a trial of Muslims in Rochester, New York.

This information was furnished to the New York Office, and Rochester Resident Agents alerted accordingly.

9. (Continued)

10/2/63 An unidentified male provided source with identities of individuals who on this date gathered at MM #23 headquarters to sell copies of the newspaper "Muhammad Speaks." At this time source revealed that 2,000 copies of this newspaper were being transmitted to Rochester, New York, for sale in that city.

Dissemination of this information was made to the individual files on persons who reported to MM #23 on this date to sell the newspaper "Muhammad Speaks." Chicago Office also advised.

10/5/63 Source revealed that ROBERT J. X WILLIAMS, Minister of MM #23, was present at this Mosque's headquarters. WILLIAMS told an unnamed male that a notice was being sent to MM #23 which would necessitate the moving of this Mosque within 90 days from the date the removal notice was received.

With this information, investigation was instituted to ascertain the location of any new headquarters for MM #23. Investigation was successful.

10/6/63 According to source, an unidentified male revealed on this date that there were approximately 200 "Brothers" engaged in selling copies of the newspaper "Muhammad Speaks."

This information was used in an effort to receive from live sources a more accurate estimation of the true membership of MM #23.

10/8/63 Source revealed that JOHN B. X STRICKLAND advised a meeting of "laborers" of MM #23 that he, STRICKLAND, had made a survey of property at 251 Broadway, Buffalo, New York, in an effort to determine whether this address could be utilized as a new headquarters for MM #23.

BU 105-468-Sub 1

9. (Continued)

Investigation was made at this address to determine the possibility of developing a confidential source for assistance in the event that MM #23 moved to this address.

10/14/63 Minister ROBERT J. X WILLIAMS of MM #23 revealed to an unidentified male that he and HENRY X PURIFOY were planning to proceed to Jamestown, New York, in connection with "Muslim business."

This information was furnished to the Resident Agency at Jamestown, New York, in order to assist in coverage of possible Muslim activity in the Jamestown, New York area.

10/16/63 Source reported that JOHN B. X STRICKLAND dictated a letter to an unidentified female believed to be ANNETTA X BELLAMY, Secretary of MM #23, which letter was addressed to the headquarters of the NOI at Chicago, Illinois. In this letter STRICKLAND revealed that he planned to promote a "freedom dinner" to be held on the evening of 10/16/63, at MM #23, which dinner would be used to obtain funds to assist in meeting obligations in regard to operational expenses of MM #23. STRICKLAND advised also in this letter that as a part of his plans for raising money, he was going to schedule a theatrical play to be held at MM #23.

This information was submitted to Chicago.

10/18/63 JOHN B. X STRICKLAND met with an unidentified male who revealed that he had traveled extensively in Egypt, Europe, and India, and was extremely interested in any plans which involved bettering the condition of the "so-called Negro."

Investigation has been instituted to identify this unnamed individual.

11/20/63 JOHN B. X STRICKLAND reported to an unidentified male at MM #23 headquarters that some progress had been realized at Niagara Falls, New York, concerning a program for developing support of the teachings of ELIJAH MUHAMMAD, National leader of the NOI, in that city.

9. (Continued)

This information was used in order to alert sources familiar with NOI activity in Niagara Falls, New York, to increase efforts to locate any evidences of NOI activity in that city.

11/26/63 ROBERT J. X WILLIAMS while present at MM #23 headquarters stated that the name of one of the owners of the building to which MM #23 hoped to move was named DON MARSH.

Information regarding DON MARSH was valuable in assisting the Buffalo Office in ascertaining the location of the new headquarters contemplated by MM #23.

11/29/63 Source reported that on this date an unidentified male met with JOHN B. X. STRICKLAND who identified himself only as MELVIN 2X, a barber, residing at 394 Glenwood Avenue, Buffalo, New York, whose name, according to source, was "D_NSTON."

Based on this information, an investigation was successfully undertaken to identify this individual.

12/1/63 Source revealed that at a meeting of officials of MM #23, information was obtained to the effect that a new headquarters for MM #23 was to be established in a building located near the corner of Northampton and Jefferson Avenue in Buffalo, New York, and rent for this new space would be approximately \$160.00 a month.

This information was important in that it identified the location of the new headquarters of MM #23 and was utilized in development of a new confidential source at this establishment.

1/1/64 Unidentified males meeting at headquarters of MM #23 revealed that on this date several sections of the City of Buffalo were outlined for sales territories to be utilized by MM #23 in its efforts to sell the newspaper "Muhammad Speaks" in the City of Buffalo.

9. (Continued)

Information was utilized in part as a means to verify information furnished by live sources regarding programs used by MM #23 to sell the newspaper "Muhammad Speaks."

1/4/64 ROBERT J. X WILLIAMS addressed a group of "laborers" meeting at MM #23 headquarters. At this time he reviewed the activities of MM #23 during the year 1963. As part of this review he mentioned a trial of members of MM #23 in Rochester, New York, as being worth thousands of dollars in publicity.

The information regarding this "laborers" meeting was utilized in order to assess the progress of MM #23 during the past year. Information regarding publicity value was furnished Chicago.

1/10/64 JOHN B. X STRICKLAND while present at MM #23 headquarters revealed that plans were being discussed to charter a plane to transport members of MM #23 to the annual convention of the NOI in Chicago, Illinois, in February, 1964.

This information was used to alert informants to attempt to ascertain the identities of those individuals who were committing themselves to such transportation. Chicago Office advised.

1/15/64 JOHN B. X STRICKLAND met with an unidentified male at MM #23 headquarters and revealed that "they" (meaning the FBI) had been out that day "trying to talk to us." In this connection, STRICKLAND reported that he was giving advice to NOI members to the effect that no one should let "them" in nor should anyone talk to them. (This conversation refers to efforts on the part of this Office to determine whether there was any truth to an anonymous telephone call received at the Buffalo FBI Office to the effect that a meeting of Muslims was held on the evening of 1/14/64, at Rochester, New York, at which plans were discussed regarding efforts to assassinate President JOHNSON.)

BU 105-468-Sub 1

9. (Continued)

This information reported by source was
utilized in connection with the investigation
of this anonymous telephone caller.

- c. If any others, set out the proportionate cost of instant surveillance: Not applicable

15. Cost of Leased Line for instant installation?

\$12.50

16. Personnel Costs:

- a. Give total number of special employees and/or Special Agents working at plant and total salary costs.

Three Special Employees and two clerks, all full time,
\$40,465.00

- b. Total number of man hours per week spent at plant?

200

- c. If other installations monitored at same plant, list proportionate number of man hours per week spent on instant surveillance:

15 hours or approximately 7 per cent

- d. If other installations monitored at same plant, list proportionate salary expense per annum for instant surveillance:

\$2,832.55

17. Remarks (By SAC):

Source has access to private office to which only officers of Muhammad's Mosque #23 are admitted unless an individual is specifically summoned to this office for the purpose of being disciplined or receiving instructions from an officer of Muhammad's Mosque #23. Source has been utilized to provide information regarding future plans of Muhammad's Mosque #23 officials. Source on occasion furnishes information regarding presence of Nation of Islam officials from other sections of the country outside the Buffalo Division. Through utilization of source, information on occasion is realized with respect to financial plans of Muhammad's Mosque #23, which plans of this Mosque may not be available to live sources who furnish regularly information regarding the Nation of Islam in the Buffalo Division.

BU 105-468-Sub 1

I recommend the continuance of this installation and I will continue to afford close personal supervision to insure that its continuance is justified.

18. Recommendation by Assistant Director:

(If this surveillance involves cryptanalysis, include statement that decrypted material is or is not sufficiently important to continue decrypting.)

This is a microphone surveillance which was installed on Muhammad's Mosque Number 23, 292 Glenwood Avenue, Buffalo, New York, until 2/20/64 at which time it was moved to cover the new temple location at 367 Northampton Avenue, Buffalo, New York. This letter covers justification for the period 10/1/63 to 2/20/64. This installation was authorized 8/13/62 and installed 8/30/62.

During this period this microphone surveillance has continued to furnish valuable information regarding Nation of Islam (NOI) activities in the Buffalo area, including information concerning finances, contacts with national leaders of the NOI, meetings, travel of national leaders, identities of new members, transfer of headquarters from one location to another thereby enabling immediate transfer of coverage, membership figures, instructions issued by NOI concerning Bureau investigation regarding alleged plot to assassinate President Johnson and travel of Buffalo members to attend the Annual Muslim Convention in Chicago 2/26/64.

In view of the above it is felt that this installation should be continued. Buffalo has been instructed to submit a justification for this installation at its new location by 3/20/64 at which time it should be re-evaluated.

SAC, Kansas City (94-150A)

March 27, 1963

REC- 70

Director, FBI (25-330971-23) - 23

EX-117

NATION OF ISLAM
INTERNAL SECURITY - NOI

JUNE

1- Mr. Belmont
1- Mr. Sullivan
1- Mr. Baumgardner
1- Mr. Row
1- Mr. Donohue
1- Mr. Smith

ReKClet dated 3-19-63 (FD-142).

Provided full security is assured, authority is granted to install a microphone surveillance at 3415 Prospect, Kansas City, Missouri, to afford coverage to Nation of Islam, Muhammad's Temple of Islam Number 30.

You should advise the time and date this installation is made and symbol number assigned. At the end of 30 days, you should furnish the Bureau with a succinct concise summary of the information developed through this coverage and submit justification for a 6 months' continuance.

You are reminded that in making this installation, your office is not relieved of its responsibility to develop sufficient and effective live informant coverage of this group.


NOTE ON YELLOW:

See memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan dated March 26, 1963, captioned "Nation of Islam, Internal Security - NOI," WLS:pag.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

WLS:pag

(9)



8 1963

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

NW 55109

DocId:32989559 Page 249

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W.C. Sullivan *WCS*

DATE: March 26, 1963

FROM : Mr. F.J. Baumgardner *FJB*

JUNE

SUBJECT: NATION OF ISLAM — KANSAS CITY
INTERNAL SECURITY — NOI

- 1- Mr. Belmont
- 1- Mr. Sullivan
- 1- Mr. Baumgardner
- 1- Mr. Row
- 1- Mr. Donohue
- 1- Mr. Smith

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Casper _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Gale _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

A recommendation is being made that a microphone surveillance be installed at Nation of Islam (NOI), Muhammad's Temple of Islam Number 30, 3415 Prospect, Kansas City, Missouri. This location is used for public and closed meetings and business affairs of the NOI operating in the Kansas City area.

The NOI is an all-Negro fanatically antiwhite organization with headquarters in Chicago and is under active investigation. The Kansas City group is one of approximately 80 groups of this organization located in as many different cities throughout the country.

The activities of Temple Number 30 were covered by a microphone surveillance (KC 734-S*) prior to 8-28-62. The surveillance was discontinued when the Temple moved to its present location. [KC 734-S*] was able to furnish valuable information as to the activities of this group and a microphone surveillance at the present location should also provide valuable information concerning the aims, principles, teachings and other activities of the Temple.

SAC, Kansas City, personally recommends this installation. Maximum security assured both during installation and operation of this proposed surveillance. Also, it is believed that trespass is involved; however, valuable intelligence will be obtained.

RECOMMENDATION:

As this microphone surveillance will be a valuable adjunct to informant coverage in this Temple, there is attached for your approval a letter to Kansas City giving authority to that office to make this installation.

25-330971-23

Enclosure

WLS:pag
(7)

17 APR 9 1963

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

6 APR 11 1963

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

7/20/64

10
16
Airtel

1 - Mr. Donohue
1 - Mr. Rosack

To: SAC, Seattle (105-1230)

From: Director, FBI (25-330971) - 50 - 24

JUNE

Subject: NATION OF ISLAM
INTERNAL SECURITY - NOI

ReSEairtel 7/10/64.

Authority granted to utilize the services of SE 25-S* to provide coverage of a meeting scheduled to be held 7/26/64 at Washington Hall, Seattle. Complete details of this organizational meeting of the Nation of Islam should be furnished to the Bureau in memorandum form suitable for dissemination. Authority based on full security being assured.

Advise date and time SE 25-S* is reactivated and date and time of discontinuance. Inasmuch as the services of this source are being authorized to provide coverage of Nation of Islam activities, it is felt that an additional symbol number should be utilized when reporting Nation of Islam information. You should, therefore, provide the Bureau a symbol number designation which will be utilized.

NOTE:

Seattle advises that attempts are being made to establish the Nation of Islam in Seattle. The organizational meeting is being held for this purpose. Elijah Muhammad, Nation of Islam leader, has stated that he believed the State of Washington should be organized by the Nation of Islam.

TPR:mlf
(5)

CONTINUED PAGE TWO

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

MAILED 8
JUL 20 1964
COMM-FBI

Tolson _____
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AUG 3 1964

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

NW 55109 DocId:32989559 Page 251

62-116395-1237

Airtel to Seattle
RE: NATION OF ISLAM
25-330971

[SE 25-S*] is an intermittent microphone authorized 11/5/59 to provide coverage of the Communist Party, USA, Northwest District, meetings of which are held at Washington Hall, Seattle. The use of this installation was last authorized 5/14/64 and discontinued 5/22/64. Seattle advises that [SE 544-S] would cover this meeting. It is felt, however, that the services of [SE 25-S*] should be utilized to provide complete coverage.

FBI

Date: 7/10/64

Transmit the following in _____

(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL

AIR MAIL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Casper _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. DeLoach _____
Mr. Evans _____
Mr. Gale _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Sullivan _____
Mr. Tavel _____
Mr. Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (25-330971)
FROM: SAC, SEATTLE (105-1230) (-P-)
SUBJECT: NATION OF ISLAM
IS - NOI

Re: [Handwritten signature]
Bo [Handwritten signature]

On 7/10/64, [SE 544-S] advised that a meeting was held at the home of HERSEL X. HART, 1610 - 33rd Avenue, Seattle, Washington, from 8:00 p.m. to 12 midnight, on 7/9/64, at which 18 individuals were present including 7 Muslims from California who are attempting to organize the NOI in the Seattle area. They had been in Seattle for two days distributing 500 copies of "Muhammad Speaks", most of which were purchased by white people. [SE 544-S] said that it was learned at this meeting that another Muslim from Los Angeles had left for California before the meeting, and said that the seven from San Francisco left following the meeting. [SE 544-S] is unable at this time to identify the individuals from California. He stated that they reportedly stayed at the Frye Hotel while in Seattle.

[SE 544-S] said that a last organizational meeting is being planned to be held at Washington Hall, Seattle, on 7/26/64, and it was stated that the ELIJAH MUHAMMAD believed that the state of Washington should be organized. Source said that economics of the Negro was stressed at the meeting at HART's residence, which meeting was also attended by GREGORY X. HUGULEY.

- 3 - Bureau (AM) (REG)
- 2 - Chicago (100-35635) (AM) (REG)
- 2 - Los Angeles (105-2604) (AM) (REG)
- 2 - San Francisco (25-29163) (AM) (REG)
- 4 - Seattle EX 110 REC-48
- (2 - 105-1230)
- (1 - 100-26314) (HERSEL CECIL HART)
- (1 - 100-26725) (GREGORY HUGULEY)

HWW/mlh

(13)

[Handwritten signature]
[Handwritten signature]

4 JUL 28 1964

Information in this communication is to be controlled and its disclosure by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Approved: _____

Sent _____

M

Per _____

Airtel to SE Special Agent in Charge

ENCLOSURE

62-116345-12-217

SE 105-1230

[CSSE 680-S] advised that there had been no requests for the facilities of Washington Hall on 7/26/64. It is believed that in the event there is an organizational meeting, it will be covered by [SE 544-S] however, to more fully cover this matter, Bureau permission is requested for the use of the services of [SE 25-S*] (see Bufile 100-3-20).

The Bureau will be advised of any additional effort and progress to organize the NOI in Seattle.

1 - J. D. Donohue
1 - T. P. Rosack

SAC, Kansas City (94-150-A)

12/29/64

JUNE

Director, FBI (25-330971-23)

NATION OF ISLAM
INTERNAL SECURITY - NOI


Reurlet (FD-143) dated 12/21/64.

[KC 751-S*] is being continued for a period of 60 days after which time it should be re-evaluated and recommendation submitted to the Bureau regarding continuance. It is believed that the information being obtained is insufficient to justify this source beyond a 60-day period and if greater value is not received during this additional period, [KC 751-S*] should be discontinued.

In this regard, you should continue efforts to develop additional live informant coverage of the Nation of Islam in Kansas City.

TPR:jad
(5)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.



REC 20 25-330971-23-
EX-100
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ENCLOSURE

62-116375-1237

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

JUNE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (Bufile 25-330971) DATE: 12/21/64

FROM : SAC, KANSAS CITY (94-150A)

SUBJECT: JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUATION OF TECHNICAL OR MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCE

Remylet (FD-143),
6/23/64.

RE: Title NATION OF ISLAM, aka

Character of Case IS-NOI
Field Office Kansas City
Symbol Number KC 751-S*
Type of Surveillance: (Technical or
Microphone) Microphone

✓ CONT. ATT.

1. Name of person or organization on whom surveillance placed:
NATION OF ISLAM, aka Muhammad's Temple of Islam No. 30,
Muhammad's Mosque of Islam No. 30,
3415 Prospect Avenue, Kansas City, Missouri (Bufile 25-330971)
2. Address where installation made. Also give exact room number or area covered:
3415 Prospect Avenue
Kansas City, Missouri (Mosque office)
3. Location of monitoring plant:
Field Division
4. Dates of initial authorization and installation:
Authorized 3/27/63. Installation completed and activated
4/18/63, assigned Symbol Number KC 751-S*.
5. Previous and other installations on the same subject (with dates and places):
[KC 734-S*] - Authorized 1/9/61, completed and activated 1/29/61
at 1210 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri; discontinued
8/28/62, when subject moved to 3415 Prospect, Kansas City, Mo.
[KC 738-S*] - Authorized 1/9/61, completed and activated 11/15/61;
discontinued 8/28/62, as above.
6. If installation is a technical surveillance, answer following questions:

a. Is a trunk line utilized? REC-44

b. Is the surveillance on a switchboard?

c. Is the surveillance on a public coin-operated telephone?

1 - Bureau

1 - Kansas City

WGB:bk

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized persons without the express approval of the FBI.

SEE ADDENDUM PAGE FOUR.

d. Is surveillance on a private line or a party line?

e. If a party line, how many parties?

7. If a microphone surveillance involved, state number of microphones actually used and location of each:

One - in office.

8. Is the installation part of a tel-mike? If so, give symbol of other side of the combination:

No.

9. Specific examples of valuable information obtained since previous report with indication of specific value of each item and the date information received. State what use was made of each item involved: (Add insert pages)

(See attached Page 2A)

10. Could above information have been obtained from other sources and by other means?

No.

11. Number of live informants (in field division) who cover same subject:

One.

12. Has security factor changed since installation?

No.

13. Any request for the surveillance by outside agency (give name, title and agency):

No.

14. Cost of Plant Premises:

a. Rental costs for plant premises: None.

b. Give total number of other surveillances monitored at same plant.

Two.

9. This installation has proved to be an invaluable source on a day-to-day basis in guiding investigation of the NOI in Greater Kansas City, Missouri. It has provided details concerning the financial status of the organization and individual members. It has assisted in evaluating daily contacts of NOI members and officials in the development of live informant potential. Co-ordination of information from this installation has led to the identification of many NOI members and associates not previously known. The following are selected specific examples:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Topic</u>
6/17/64	JESSE 4X, Minister, MM #30, stated he intended to keep the Kansas City Mosque going, but he said that the members were old and "you can't get nothing out of them old fools". JESSE 4X said that they have their own ideas and they are not interested in "The Messenger's Program". (This indicated lack of interest of leadership of MM #30 and older NOI members.)
7/13/64	JESSE 4X stated that Brother ROBERT was doing "picture work" and he wanted ROBERT to continue contributing his free labor and picture (photography) and newspaper work which would be the equivalent of selling 300 newspapers, "Muhammad Speaks". JESSE said that Headquarters (Chicago) had called him today wanting to know when they would send in their articles for the newspaper, and Brother ROBERT is behind in his work. JESSE indicated that they could not afford to hire a photographer. (This indicated interest of MM #30 in participating in contributions of news to "Muhammad Speaks" Newspaper.)
8/11/64	Brother Secretary (ANTHONY WALTON, JR.) of MM #30 showed the filing system to another NOI member that they use at the Mosque.

8/11/64
(Cont'd.)

Brother Secretary said that they have a separate jacket for each Muslim and also a student enrollment jacket. He said that each member of the FOI is checked out before he becomes a member. (This indicates detailed record keeping of MM #30.)

9/14/64

During the FOI meeting, the training consisted of judo and karate and similar "defensive" measures. (This indicates MM #30's interest in physical fitness and defensive tactics.)

9/25/64

Brother Secretary discussed paper sales and financial condition of the Mosque. He indicated that they should have \$132.85 but they do not because he had taken out (for personal use) \$80.35 from the treasury to be put back in at a later date. They owed \$25.00 for light bill, \$10.00 for car payments, and \$21.00 for miscellaneous items. (This indicates poor financial condition of MM #30.)

10/14/64

Brother JESSE said that one day the "Devil" would try to knock them (NOI) off the street but if they could get the papers they would sneek them to the customers. JESSE said they did not know how they would do it, but the person he was talking to replied that the "Messenger" would tell them how. JESSE and the other persons all involved agreed that if some day they would have to fight the "Devil", their people should all live in one area, close to each other. (This indicates the belief of members of MM #30 in program of Mr. MUHAMMAD.)

10/15/64

Brother JESSE reading a letter from Headquarters to Brother Secretary, which indicates that Headquarters expects a total of \$2,250. a year from MM #30 in contributions. (This indicates close financial supervision by NOI Headquarters in Chicago.)

10/26/64

Brother JESSE and Brother Secretary discussed finances of MM #30, indicating that their approximate monthly money needs were:

\$250.00 rent, \$30.00 gas, \$15.00 lights, \$23.00 telephone, \$450.00 for papers for a total of \$768.00 a month.

JESSE suggested that each Brother sacrifice \$5.00 for rent. He mentioned that they had twelve Brothers but could not count on two of these members. After this discussion, an FOI meeting was held at which there were seven members in attendance. (This indicates current monthly budget of MM #30, lack of financial participation by members, and actual number of male members.)

11/1/64

ELIJAH MUHAMMAD, JR., was in Kansas City, Missouri, at MM #30 to settle a dispute among NOI members and Minister JESSE 4X WHITE of MM #30. Several members claimed that JESSE 4X had sold a shoe shine stand owned by a member and had taken for his own use over \$400.00 in "paper" money, which money was result of paper sales by members of the "Muhammad Speaks" newspaper.

As a result of the charges, JESSE 4X was "suspended" as minister of MM #30 until further notice by ELIJAH MUHAMMAD, JR., according to relayed instructions given to MM #30 Secretary ANTHONY WALTON, JR., by Minister CLYDE 2X of the St. Louis Mosque. CLYDE 2X instructed Secretary ANTHONY to conduct the meetings of MM #30 on Wednesday and Friday nights and he, CLYDE 2X, would try to get over to Kansas City from St. Louis "soon" to help MM #30 get straightened out. CLYDE 2X may conduct Sunday meetings occasionally for MM #30, but this point was not certain.

11/1/64
(Cont'd.)

CLYDE 2X also told Secretary ANTHONY to try to get a smaller place for MM #30 and, in effect, left Secretary ANTHONY "in charge". CLYDE 2X instructed Secretary ANTHONY to call him in St. Louis if he had any problems, but was told by Secretary ANTHONY that the telephone had been cut off due to non-payment. (This indicates degree of interest by National NOI officials in internal affairs of MM #30.)

11/30/64

JESSE 4X told another individual that he had to keep quiet for ninety days, and then after that he thought he could go back as Minister in MM #30. (This indicates JESSE 4X's intention to follow instructions of Chicago NOI Headquarters to maintain position of Minister in MM #30.)

12/3/64

Brother JESSE 4X (who apparently still seems to be in charge of MM #30), said that Headquarters were sending them an investigator this Sunday to check attendance and JESSE said he wanted to have a big crowd at the meeting. (This indicates continued close supervision of MM #30 and probably will have a bearing on whether JESSE 4X is retained as Minister of MM #30.)

- c. If any others, set out the proportionate cost of instant surveillance:

15. Cost of Leased Line for instant installation?

\$14.42 per month.

16. Personnel Costs:

- a. Give total number of special employees and/or Special Agents working at plant and total salary costs.

Two investigative Clerks (both GS7) at \$13,100.

- b. Total number of man hours per week spent at plant?

80 hours

- c. If other installations monitored at same plant, list proportionate number of man hours per week spent on instant surveillance:
40 hours; another installation in operation and additional installations being surveyed which will decrease the proportionate number of man hours and expense on instant surveillance.

- d. If other installations monitored at same plant, list proportionate salary expense per annum for instant surveillance:

\$6,550.00.

17. Remarks (By SAC):

This installation is proving to be extremely valuable in affording the Kansas City Division detailed coverage of NOI activities, identity of members and financial problems of the Mosque and individual members. It will greatly supplement and corroborate live informant coverage. Maintaining this installation does not increase the expense of operation of the plant since another installation is also monitored here and additional ones are expected in the future. It will be impractical to attempt to remove this installation at the source since the NOI occupies the building on a daily twenty-four hour basis which was not true when installation was made and, if removed, it may not be possible to promptly reinstitute it if the need arises.

I fully recommend that this installation be continued.

18. Recommendation by Assistant Director:

(If this surveillance involves cryptanalysis, include statement that decrypted material is or is not sufficiently important to continue decrypting.)

This is a microphone surveillance on the activities of the Nation of Islam (NOI) Temple Number 30, located at 3415 Prospect Avenue, Kansas City, Missouri. It was authorized 3/27/63 and activated 4/18/63. This Temple is a branch of and directly affiliated with the national NOI group. The NOI is an all Negro, antiwhite group which seeks complete separation of the races. During the past six months this installation has provided information concerning the day-to-day workings of Temple Number 30. Information regarding financial difficulties, individual members and plans has been provided.

It is believed that the information being furnished by this installation, although valuable on a local level, is insufficient to warrant continuation. Kansas City points out, however, that the installation does not increase the expense of operation and that it would be impractical to remove the installation at the source since the building is occupied by the NOI on a 24-hour basis.

In view of the above, a letter is being directed to the Kansas City Office advising that this installation is being continued for a period of 60 days instead of the usual six months after which time the continuance of this installation should be re-evaluated.

DM
FJB
WGS
Q

2/26/65

CODE

RADIOGRAM

URGENT

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Donohue
1 - Mr. Rosack

TO SAC BUFFALO (105-468 SUB 1)

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (25-330971 SUB 1) - 107

JUNE NATION OF ISLAM, INTERNAL SECURITY - NOI

REURAIRTEL FEBRUARY TWENTY-FOUR, ONE NINE SIX FIVE.

AUTHORITY GRANTED TO REINSTITUTE BU TWO SEVEN SEVEN DASH S
ASTERISK AS REQUESTED. ADVISE TIME AND DATE OF INSTALLATION
AND SUBMIT COMPLETE JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUANCE WITHIN THIRTY
DAYS AFTER INSTALLATION.

NOTE:

See memo Baumgardner to Sullivan, same caption, same
date, TPR:jed.

Radiogram being utilized in view of desirability to have
this surveillance in operation as soon as possible. In event
next radio contact missed, message should be sent via urgent
teletype.

TPR:jed
(8)

462333
TYPED
LOGGED BY

VIA TELETYPE
FEB 26 1965
8:45 PM JRC
ENCIPHERED

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
DeLoach _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

MAR 3 1965 MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

Memorandum

ROUTE 10 ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 2/26/65

FROM : F. J. Baumgardner

J U N E

SUBJECT: NATION OF ISLAM
INTERNAL SECURITY - NOI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Donohue
1 - Mr. Rosack

Miss Gandy

By airtel dated 2/24/65 the Buffalo Office requested authority to reinstitute BU 277-S*, a microphone surveillance, for a period of 30 to 60 days. BU 277-S* would provide coverage of the Buffalo, Nation of Islam Temple, 192 Broadway, Buffalo, New York. This request was made in view of recent developments including the murder of Malcolm X Little and numerous reports of reprisal.

BU 277-S* was originally authorized 8/10/62 and installed 8/30/62 to provide coverage of Nation of Islam activities in Buffalo. This microphone surveillance was discontinued 4/20/64 since the Nation of Islam Temple at Buffalo moved to a new location, 192 Broadway, Buffalo, New York. Authority was requested by Buffalo to reinstitute the surveillance in December, 1964, but this authority was denied.

It is felt that it would be desirable and to the best interest of the Bureau to authorize the reinstitution of BU 277-S* at this time. Buffalo Office advises that the installation can be made with full security.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached radiogram to the Buffalo Office be sent authorizing reinstitution of BU 277-S*.

Enclosure

25-330971-6

TPR:jed
(6)

REC-29

MAR 4 1965

3

MAR 8

1965

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

FBI

Date: 2/24/65

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL REGISTERED
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (25-330971 Sub 6)

FROM: SAC, BUFFALO (105-468 Sub 1) (P)

NATION OF ISLAM
IS - NOI

"JUNE"

Remyairtel, dated 12/24/64.

Authority requested to reinstitute BU 277-S*
for a period of 30 to 60 days at MM #23, 192 Broadway,
Buffalo, New York in view of recent Muslim controversies
and activities involving death of MALCOLM X, and possibility
of increased activity of MM #23 locally and other areas.

This installation can be made with full
security.

3 - Bureau (AMRM)
1 - Buffalo
RWD:pad
(4)

REC-25

25-330971-6-117

12 FEB 25 1965

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

INT. SEC.

DO NOT HUE

SEC. 1


Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

62-116395-1237X

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

(RI) 105-165706

April 1, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
NEW YORK DIVISION

The Black Panther Party in New York, New York, has completed negotiations for occupancy of additional quarters at 12 West 127th Street, New York, New York. Indications are that the Black Panther Party will continue to operate its present branches at 2026 Seventh Avenue, New York, New York, and 1370 Boston Road, Bronx, New York.

The Black Panther Party is the most violence-prone black extremist organization in the United States today. The New York Black Panther Party group has for some time been undergoing a complete restructuring process under the guidance of West Coast Black Panther Party leaders. It has always been the Black Panther Party's key East Coast organizational group. It actively foments racial extremism and has engaged in numerous terroristic acts directed against law enforcement personnel.

Information developed indicates that the address mentioned above, 12 West 127th Street, will be the main operating headquarters of the Black Panther Party in the New York City area. Indications are that the Black Panther Party will take over occupancy on about April 10, 1970. The Black Panther Party will reportedly request the installation of approximately six telephones at that address.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

~~SECRET~~

~~Group 1~~

~~Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

62-116345-1237X


~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Authority is requested for both telephone and microphone surveillance on the premises occupied by the Black Panther Party at 12 West 127th Street. The telephone instruments to be installed at that address will be new instruments. This Bureau can modify those instruments prior to their installation so that they will be suitable for both telephone and microphone surveillance. Such modifications would not require any trespass into Black Panther Party space since the instruments would be modified prior to their installation.

In view of the brief time available prior to occupancy, expeditious consideration of this matter would be appreciated so that adequate time will be available to make the modifications prior to installation.

Respectfully,



John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED 

DATE 4/2/70

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

September 3, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
(CHICAGO REGION)
MICROPHONE SURVEILLANCE REQUEST

Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) recently opened its Chicago regional office at 701 West Armitage, Chicago, Illinois. This office will be used as the headquarters for planning and directing the massive demonstration being sponsored by SDS at Chicago, Illinois, October 8-11, 1969, for the purpose of protesting the trials of eight individuals indicted for their activities during the Democratic National Convention.

The demonstration at Chicago, October 8-11, 1969, will be one of the major demonstrations of the fall. SDS speakers, along with representatives of other protest groups, are urging individuals from throughout the United States to participate. SDS leaders, such as William Ayers and Mark Rudd, have called for confrontation with the authorities, if necessary. Such actions as the seizure of a Chicago police precinct, the disruption of courts, and the closing down of the city are being advocated.

If you approve, a microphone surveillance will be placed by this Bureau on the Chicago regional headquarters.


Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED *[Signature]* (S.K.M.)DATE 9/3/69~~SECRET~~~~GROUP 1~~~~Excluded from automatic~~~~downgrading and~~~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

62-116395-1237X

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

October 28, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
INTERNAL SECURITY - STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY
(CHICAGO REGION)

Reference is made to the Bureau's memorandum dated September 3, 1969, captioned "Students for a Democratic Society (Chicago Region), Microphone Surveillance Request." By your approval of that memorandum on September 3, 1969, you authorized installation of a microphone surveillance on the Regional Office of the captioned organization at 701 West Armitage, Chicago, Illinois.

The original purpose of this surveillance was to obtain information concerning the Students for a Democratic Society demonstrations which were to be held in Chicago October 8-11, 1969, as it had previously been determined that the Regional Office was to be utilized for planning and directing the demonstrations. Beginning on September 15, 1969, a series of arrests of individuals associated with the Students for a Democratic Society Regional Office inhibited the use of this office by Students for a Democratic Society members and leaders. Accordingly, a minimal amount of information was received from the source prior to and during the demonstrations.

There are a substantial number of individuals currently under Antiriot Laws investigation as a result of their activity at Chicago October 8-11, 1969. It is likely that certain of these individuals may be overheard on this surveillance.

~~SECRET~~~~GROUP I~~

~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ENCLOSURE

62-116315-12371


~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Many of the Students for a Democratic Society members and leaders arrested during the October 8-11, 1969, demonstrations in Chicago are associated with the Weatherman faction of Students for a Democratic Society. This faction at this time controls the Chicago Regional Office of the Students for a Democratic Society, and is a dedicated Marxist-Leninist revolutionary group intent upon the violent overthrow of the United States Government by force and violence. It is also noted that various organizations considered to be part of the New Left in this country are planning demonstrations this fall and winter, and it is expected that the Students for a Democratic Society may possibly be a decisive factor in these demonstrations. It is believed that this surveillance has great potential for furnishing highly valuable information concerning the leadership, policies and activities of the Students for a Democratic Society.

Your authorization is requested to continue the microphone surveillance at the Chicago Regional Office of the Students for a Democratic Society for an additional three months.

Respectfully,


John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED 

DATE 10/28/69

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

F B I

Date: 6/8/62

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-66233)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (105-4630)

SUBJECT : NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY, aka.
RACIAL MATTERS
(OO: BIRMINGHAM)

"JUNE"

On 6/8/62, WILLIAM G. PINSLEY, Anti-defamation League, Chicago, Illinois, advised that according to the current issue of the "Thunderbolt", the publication of captioned organization, the Illinois National States Rights Party (NSRP) will hold a meeting on Saturday 6/16/62 at the La Salle Hotel, Chicago, Illinois.

The meeting, according to this announcement, will commence in Parlor F of the Mezzanine, La Salle Hotel at 8:30 PM. An admission of \$1.00 plus a membership card will be charged although personal guests are welcome. MAX NELSON III is identified as host for this meeting and chairman for the Illinois NSRP.

On 6/8/62, W. FRED PUFFER, La Salle Hotel, advised that record of his office substantiate information contained in above mentioned publication. PUFFER stated his records show a reservation was requested for 7:30 PM 6/16/62 and accommodation for approximately 70 persons was requested.

The Bureau is requested to authorize survey of La Salle Hotel for misur installation.

GALE

3 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Birmingham (INFO.) (105-477) (RM)
1 - Chicago
RJD/jmm

(5) This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Rah ca
6-15-62
FBI

Approved: _____

Sent _____

M

Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

June 13, 1962

CODE

RADIOGRAM

URGENT If next radio contact missed, send via urgent teletype.

TO SAC CHICAGO (1054630)

JUNE

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (105-66233) - 751
REC-32

NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY, AKA, RM. OO: BH.

RE CG TEL DATED JUNE FOURTH, NINETEEN SIXTY TWO.

PROVIDED MAXIMUM SECURITY MAINTAINED, AUTHORITY GRANTED TO CONDUCT SURVEY OF PARLOR F OF THE MEZZANINE, LA SALLE HOTEL, CHICAGO, FOR FEASIBILITY OF MISUR. IF FEASIBLE, PROCEED WITH INSTALLATION. ADVISE TIME AND DATE OF INSTALLATION, SYMBOL NUMBER, AND LOCATION OF PLANT. FURNISH DETAILS CONCERNING ELEMENT OF TRESPASS. ALSO ADVISE TIME AND DATE OF DISCONTINUANCE AND DETAILS CONCERNING REMOVAL OF EQUIPMENT. REGISTERED MAIL COPY TO BIRMINGHAM.
1 - Birmingham (105-477) (Information)(BY REGISTERED MAIL) *ditto*

8-5
RE: 105-477
105-477
This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

1 - Mr. Joseph D. Donohue (Room 815 RB)

SEE NOTE ON PAGE TWO.

VIA RADIOGRAM

JUN 13 1962

11-30A LVS

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Malone _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

NR. 121420

ENC. _____

CK. _____

APPROVED BY _____

TYPED BY _____

42-110395-1237X

RAD TO SAC, CG
NOTE:

The National States Rights Party (NSRP), an anti-Negro, anti-Jewish organization which publishes the scurrilous newspaper, the "Thunderbolt" is holding a meeting on Saturday, 6/16/62 in the La Salle Hotel, Chicago. Chicago has requested authority to conduct a survey of feasibility of misur. Authority for survey and installation of misur is being given in view of the potential for violence which this group has. It has been alleged that the bombing of the Atlanta synagogue in 1958 was planned at a meeting of this organization.

JUN 13 10 12 AM '62
COMMUNICATIONS UNIT

JUN 13 8 31 AM '62
FBI-CHICAGO
REC'D TELETYPE

~~SECRET~~



United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO

FILE NO. _____

December 31, 1956

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: ELIJAH MOHAMMED
INTERNAL SECURITY - MCI

[Handwritten signature]
7-1

The Muslim Cult of Islam (MCI) is composed entirely of Negroes. Its leader, Elijah Mohammed, claims to have been sent by Allah, the Supreme Being, to lead the Negroes out of slavery. Members fanatically follow the teachings of Allah as interpreted by Mohammed; they disavow allegiance to the United States; and they are taught they need not obey the laws of the United States. Allegations have been received that its members may resort to acts of violence in carrying out its avowed purpose of destroying non-Muslims and Christianity.

It is believed that a technical surveillance on the residence of Elijah Mohammed, 4847 South Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, telephone Drexel 3-0966, will furnish not only data concerning the fanatical and violent nature of the organization, but also data regarding the current plans of the MCI to expand its activities throughout the United States.

It is, therefore, requested that authorization be granted to install a technical surveillance on the residence of Elijah Mohammed or any address to which he may move in the future.

Respectfully,

[Handwritten signature of John Edgar Hoover]
John Edgar Hoover
Director

[Handwritten signature]

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized persons without the express approval of the FBI.

APPROVED: *[Handwritten signature]*

DATE: 1-2-57

RECORDED - 51

EX-172

105-24822-14
11 JAN 4 1957

[Handwritten notes: "initials", "changed", "1-2-57", "5 DP"]

~~SECRET~~
ENCLOSURE

62-116375-1237X

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

2/23/65

AIRTEL

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Forsyth
1 - Mr. Donohue
1 - Mr. Rosack

To: SAC, Chicago (100-35635)

From: Director, FBI (25-330971)

JUNE

NATION OF ISLAM - General
IS - NOI

ReCGairtel 2/15/65.

Authority granted to reinstitute [CG 6408-S*] to cover activities of Elijah Muhammad and the Nation of Islam during the period of time Muhammad is in Chicago. This source should be utilized only until such time as the proposed meeting between Muhammad and Martin Luther King, Jr., is held. In the event Muhammad decides to remain in Chicago thereafter for other reasons, this surveillance should be discontinued. In addition to the above, this additional coverage may provide valuable information regarding the Annual Muslim Convention.

Advise Bureau date and time [CG 6408-S*] is reinstituted and also, advise date and time discontinued.

1 - Chicago (100-6989, Sub 2)
1 - Phoenix (66-428)

1 - 105-24822 (Elijah Muhammad)

TPR:kao (11)

NOTE: kao

See cover memorandum captioned as above, dated 2/19/65, from F. J. Baumgardner to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, prepared by TPR:kao.

Tolson _____
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FEB 23 1965

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MAR 5 1965
DocId:32989559 Page 276

62-116395-1237

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 105-24822-501

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 2/19/65

FROM : F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: NATION OF ISLAM - General
INTERNAL SECURITY - NOI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Forsyth
1 - Mr. Donohue
1 - Mr. Rosack

Tolson ✓
Belmont ✓
Mohr ✓
DeLoach ✓
Casper ✓
Callahan ✓
Conrad ✓
Felt ✓
Gale ✓
Rosen ✓
Sullivan ✓
Tavel ✓
Trotter ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Holmes ✓
Gandy ✓

JUNE

Chicago has requested authority to reinstitute [CG 6408-S*] a technical surveillance for the purpose of providing additional coverage of the activities of Nation of Islam (NOI) leader Elijah Muhammad during his stay in Chicago, and in particular, the contemplated meeting between Muhammad and Martin Luther King, Jr. Muhammad arrived in Chicago 2/13/65 and is expected to depart on or about 3/1/65. This additional coverage will be for this period only. This surveillance will provide coverage at Apartment 1, Floor 1, 8205 South Vernon, Chicago, Illinois, which apartment is utilized by Elijah Muhammad for business purposes.

Information has been received that efforts are being made to arrange a meeting between King and Muhammad which meeting will possibly take place at Chicago, Illinois, on 2/28/65. This meeting may also include Roy Wilkins, Executive Director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and James Farmer, National Director of the Congress of Racial Equality. Contacts to arrange this meeting are being made by Bennett Jones Johnson, Jr., a Security Index subject of the Chicago Office and member of the Communist Party, United States of America.

It is noted that Muhammad left Phoenix 2/13/65 for Chicago. At that time technical and microphone surveillances at Phoenix were discontinued. We have authority to institute technical coverage of Elijah Muhammad from the Department which provides that this coverage may be extended to any location to which he may move. With the reinstitution of [CG 6408-S*] this authority would be utilized and this action would not result in an increase of our technical surveillances since [PX 708-S*] the technical surveillance which provided coverage of Muhammad in Phoenix, has been discontinued. 46 such surveillances are in use with three waiting installation. The limit is 75.

REC-44

25-330171-7204

It is felt that this additional coverage in Chicago is extremely desirable since it is expected to provide coverage of the meeting between King and Muhammad and also provide additional coverage of the Annual Muslim Convention which will take place in Chicago 2/26-28/65. This convention will include representatives from all NOI temples.

RECOMMENDATION:

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the EB.

That the attached airtel to Chicago be approved advising that [CG 6408-S*] may be reinstituted for such a period of time as is necessary to resolve the contemplated meeting between Muhammad and King.

25-330971

1 - 105-24822 (Elijah Muhammad)

Enclosure

2-23-65
Page 277

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 2/23/65

FROM : F. J. Baumgardner

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Rosack

SUBJECT: NATION OF ISLAM - General
INTERNAL SECURITY - NOI

Tolson _____
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By memorandum dated 2/19/65 it was recommended that Chicago be granted authority to install additional technical coverage of Nation of Islam leader Elijah Muhammad, especially during a contemplated meeting between Muhammad and Martin Luther King, Jr. Information was set forth concerning this possible meeting which would possibly also include Roy Wilkins, Executive Director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and James Farmer, National Director of the Congress of Racial Equality. Concerning this contemplated meeting, the Director inquired "Have we sent this to A. G. and Watson?"

Information concerning the possible meeting between Elijah Muhammad, leader of the Nation of Islam (NOI), Martin Luther King, Jr., and possibly Roy Wilkins and James Farmer, was furnished to the Honorable Marvin Watson, Special Assistant to the President, and to the Attorney General by letters dated 2/17/65. These letters contained information regarding the proposed meeting and in addition, set out the subversive connections of Bennett Jones Johnson, Jr., who was handling arrangements for the meeting. Johnson is a member of the Communist Party, USA, and leader of a civil rights group in Chicago known as "Protest at the Polls."

ACTION:

For information.

25-330971


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REC 14 25-330971-7203

MAR 2 1965

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MAR 4 1965



~~SECRET~~
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. (IS) 25-330971

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

May 5, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: NATION OF ISLAM - *con*
INTERNAL SECURITY - NOI

*Received
7/28/65*

A technical surveillance was instituted on the Nation of Islam Headquarters, 4847 South Woodlawn, Chicago, Illinois, on January 4, 1957. This surveillance covers the activities of the Nation of Islam and, in particular, Nation of Islam leader Elijah Muhammad. The Nation of Islam is an all-Negro, semireligious organization which preaches extreme hatred of the white man.

This surveillance has continued to produce considerable valuable intelligence information regarding Nation of Islam activities. Some examples include the following:

Source furnished information regarding possible meeting between Muhammad and other civil rights leaders; a denial that the Nation of Islam was implicated in the murder of Malcolm X Little; the identities of the leading ministers of the Nation of Islam; possible travel of Muhammad to Boyda (phonetic), West Pakistan and Mexico; and the identity of an individual from Egypt who was to attend the annual Muslim convention held at Chicago, Illinois, February 26 through 28, 1965.

Unless you instruct to the contrary, this technical surveillance will be continued for an additional six months.

Respectfully,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

EX-110

*Don't
2/1/66
D*

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REC-24

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18 MAY 18 1965

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downgrading and
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